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Prologue
In June 2012, just before starting my pilot fieldwork in Lviv in western Ukraine,
I visited my family in Khmelnitsky, a provincial centre in west-central Ukraine,
which is five hours away by train from Lviv. During the stay I conducted a
trial interview with my maternal grandmother. Although I lived with her for
more than half of my life, I still did not entirely know the story of her marital
and reproductive life. This interview was not intended to be part of my sample.
However, it did cover the same key topics discussed in the interviews that were
later conducted in Lviv and Kharkiv. I started this interview very simply by
asking my grandmother to tell me the story of her marital life, and I used a similar
interview strategy throughout my fieldwork. Similar to other informants, my
grandmother answered this question broadly by starting from the very beginning
of her life. And this is where her life history and my research journey began.
My grandmother was born in 1937 in a village close to Khmelnitsky. She was
the seventh and youngest child in her family. She was born when my great grand-
mother was 36 years old and six years after the birth of my great grandmother’s
sixth child, my great aunt. In 1944, my great grandfather went to Donbas, a min-
ing region in eastern Ukraine, where he, like many men of his generation, helped
to rebuild the region after the Second World War. He was away for 15 years, and
during this time my grandmother’s family received support from their relatives
in the village. At the age of 16, my grandmother finished high school, and while
she applied to several colleges, she was not accepted at any of them. Eventually,
she also went to Donbas, where she found work in the mining sector and lived
with one of her sisters. In 1957, at the age of 20, my grandmother married my
grandfather, who was then 26 and working in the USSR military.
My grandfather was born in the same village as my grandmother and they had
known each other since high school. They met again in a local club before her
high school graduation, and for a few years after that, they kept in touch through
letters and saw each other when they visited their families during the holidays.
During one of these visits, my grandfather proposed to my grandmother, and she
agreed as he was the most attractive candidate she had ever had: a military man
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several years older than she was. Immediately after their wedding, they moved to
Lutsk, a city in the north-western part of Ukraine, where my grandfather worked.
After a few months, they moved to another city in the same area – Ovrych – and
there in 1959, they had their first child, my uncle. For the first three years of my
uncle’s life, my grandmother did not work. The family then moved to Kapustin
Yar – a military base near Volgograd in the southern part of Russia. There
my grandmother started to work part-time as a nanny in a kindergarten, which
allowed her both to work and to take care of her first child. Their second child,
my mother, was born some years later in 1965. At the time, my grandmother was
28 and grandfather was 34. My grandmother acknowledged that both her and
my grandfather wanted to have a second child and my grandmother particularly
wanted to have a baby girl.
Given the number of years before their first and second child, my grandparents
undoubtedly practiced some sort of birth control. However, I do not know exactly
which methods of birth control they used as my grandmother was reluctant to
discuss these issues with me and I did not insist. She also said that she did not
discuss these issues with my grandfather either because he believed that children
were her main concern and not his. From her testimony, however, I could sense
that they used some traditional means of birth control, such as coitus interruptus
and maybe abstinence, as they managed to achieve a six-year gap between their
first and second child, and similar to their first pregnancy, the second one was not
expected either. I do not know if my grandmother had any abortions, but I do
know that four years after my mother was born, my grandmother again became
unexpectedly pregnant, but she miscarried. My grandparents would have happily
accepted a third child if the pregnancy had been successful. However, because
they never planned on having another child, my grandmother never again tried
to get pregnant.
After my mother was born, my grandmother stayed at home for about a year
taking care of both children, and then she resumed working in the kindergarten
and also started working in a library. Both jobs were part-time. During this time,
my uncle helped to care for my mother. However, my grandmother’s flexible
work schedules still allowed her to be the major childcare provider, while my
grandfather supplied most of the family income. My grandmother accepted that
gender responsibilities within the family were distributed this way as it allowed
her to be in charge of the issues related to household and childcare.
Throughout our talk my grandmother always emphasised that her relationship
with my grandfather was very good and that they never quarrelled. She said that
he was a very kind father and husband and that he was also the closest person
to her throughout her entire life. Of course, she had some female friends, but
3none of them were as close to her as he was, and in truth, she did not feel a need
to have a close friendship. Besides that, the family moved often from one place
to another, which also made establishing strong friendships problematic. A few
years after my mother was born, the family moved to Aralsk – a small city in the
south-western part of Kazakhstan, close to the Aral Sea. There my grandmother
started working in a military hotel. The family still frequently changed homes,
but within this area, so my grandmother could continue to work at the same place.
Despite these frequent changes of residence and being more than 3450 km away
from their relatives in Ukraine, the family visited them every summer for at least
a month. Despite these visits, my grandmother acknowledged that it was hard for
her to have these long distance relationships. Consequently, when my grandfather
demobilised in 1977, the family decided to settle down in Khmelnitsky to be close
to their family in the village.
Some years later, my grandmother’s parents, my great grandmother and great
grandfather, died. According to the family inheritance rules, the parental prop-
erty, which was a house and the land around it, had to be equally divided among
the siblings.1 However, because my grandmother cared for her parents before
they died, her siblings agreed to give her their shares of the parental property.
Some years later, in 1983, my mother and father got married. She was 18 and in
her first year of college (technikum) specialising in accounting. My father was 22
and in his second year of technical university. After they married, they lived with
my paternal grandparents. They occupied the second floor of the parental house
and shared the kitchen with them. A bit more than a year later, my mother got
pregnant, but she had a miscarriage. Afterwards, she underwent some fertility
treatments and got pregnant with me. I was born in 1988.
My grandmother remembered the years between my mother’s first and second
pregnancies as the most worrying time in both of their lives because the threat of
another miscarriage was high. Shortly before my birth, my parents moved to my
maternal grandparents. They had a three-room apartment and gave my parents
the biggest room. My grandmother never mentioned if my parents tried to apply
for a social housing from the state. When I asked my mother about it, she said
that they never thought about it because they always had enough living space at
both parental homes. Moreover, when my grandfather died in 1989, it was definite
that my mother would stay with my grandmother. Similar to the way it happened
with my grandmother and her inheritance and elderly care responsibilities, my
1According to the Article 10 of the 1936 Soviet constitution (Constitution, 1936), the law
protects the right of citizens to personal ownership of their incomes from work and of their
savings, of their dwelling houses and subsidiary household economy, their household furniture
and utensils and articles of personal use and convenience, as well as the right of inheritance of
personal property of citizens. In 1977, when the constitution was updated, the private property
rights remained unchanged and appeared under Article 13 (Constitution, 1977)
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uncle agreed to give his share of my grandmother’s apartment to my mother if
she would take care of my grandmother, and this is what she has been doing ever
since. When I was two years old, my mother finished her educational training and
started working as an accountant in a shop. My grandmother used to share many
practical and emotional childcare responsibilities with my mother until I finished
high school. My mother does not have any more children.
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation for this study
“[T ]here are many European societies where fertility declines were so
recent that many can still be interviewed from all cohorts during the
process.”
Szreter 2011, p. 86
Although the life of my grandmother was di↵erent from the lives of many
Ukrainian women at that time primarily because she was the wife of a military
man, lived far away from her relatives and moved often, her reproductive career
highlights the main trends that characterize the fertility transition in Ukraine and
other European republics of the Soviet Union after the Second World War: early
and universal marriage, early starting and stopping with childbearing, significant
spacing of children, prevalence of natural methods of birth control, and a two-child
family ideal. Her life story also shows that many of these trends were echoed in
the next generations, such as that of my mother whose reproductive years fell
in the decades that are commonly associated with the appearance of lowest-low
fertility in the 1990s in this part of Europe (Perelli-Harris, 2005; Sobotka, 2004b).
The lowest-low fertility trend in the Eastern European context was characterised
by first marriage and pregnancy occurring at an even earlier age than that of
their parents’ generation, typically in an individual’s early twenties, while stop-
ping with childbearing also took place at an earlier age, often in a woman’s mid- to
late-twenties. As a result, one-child families became more prominent and even pre-
dominant in this part of Europe (Perelli-Harris, 2005; Rotkirch and Kesseli, 2010;
Sobotka, 2004b; Zakharov, 2008). This gap suggests that my great grandmother
probably used birth control to postpone or maybe even prevent this pregnancy.
The parenthood years of my great grandmother took place in the 1920s and 1930s
5
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Figure 1.1: Total fertility rates for Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, Russia, and
Ukraine, 1901-2013. Sources: Chesnais 1996; Demoscope 2015b; Eurostat 2015a;
Lutz et al. 1990; Ptuha 1960; Steshenko 2010; Ukrcensus 2015; Vishnevskij 2009.
and coincided with the start of the First Demographic Transition in the European
part of the Soviet Union (Zakharov, 2008). Figure 1.1 illustrates that compared
to other European countries, such as Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden, fertility
decline in Ukraine started comparatively late but quickly accelerated. In only 40
years, fertility declined from around 6 children per woman in the 1910s to 2.62
in the 1950s. After the Second World War Ukraine did not experience a baby
boom as the West did, and fertility continued to decline sharply until it reached
a below-replacement level of 2.05 in the 1960s and a lowest-low fertility of 1.39
in the 1990s. In many ways the fertility decline in Ukraine was similar to that in
Russia; however, in Russia fertility started to decline even later and at a faster
pace. This rapid decline of fertility to below-replacement level during the 1960s
in the European part of the Soviet Union is also defined by some scholars as the
beginning of a latent depopulation (Vishnevskij, 2006, 2009).
The rapid fertility decline in Ukraine implied that people who were in their
reproductive age in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, such as my grandmother, were
among the first who entirely experienced the decline of fertility from its onset
during their childhood to the sub-replacement level in their own reproductive
careers. This phenomenon corresponds with the above quote by Szreter (2011)
where he states that in some European countries first-hand accounts of fertility
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decline can still be collected from those who witnessed and experienced it in
their own reproductive decisions. Ukraine, as well as other post-Soviet states, is
one of these countries. Not solely for this reason but also for more substantial
theory-driven motivations that I describe below, this dissertation brings into light
men’s and women’s personal experiences of marriage, pregnancy, childbearing(s),
birth control, and abortion that took place in the course of the post-war fertility
decline, namely during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, in Ukraine. In the study
of each reproductive event, this research will pay close attention to the role of
family and other social relationships and how these shaped individual reproductive
experiences, the issue that was also prominent in my grandmother’s narrative. By
focusing on the role of social relationships for reproductive behaviour this research
seeks to bring an alternative perspective to the debate on fertility behaviour in
the (post-) Soviet space that until now has largely been characterised by the
modernisation theory and politico-economic premises.
1.2 Theoretical background
1.2.1 Towards a socio-cultural analysis of reproductive be-
haviour change: the importance of social relation-
ships
In Ukraine and in the European part of the Soviet Union, the first three decades
after the Second World War were not only a time of continuous fertility decline
but also a time of crucial political changes linked to the Cold War and to the over-
all liberalisation of the Soviet regime. These political changes eventually resulted
in a rapid increase in urbanisation rates and a shortage of housing, in an in-
crease in female employment and educational attainment, and in the legalisation
of abortion even though there was still limited access to other modern meth-
ods of contraception. Those analysing the fertility decline in the Soviet Union
conventionally associate it with these ‘Soviet-type’ modernisation factors (Blum,
1994; Lutz et al., 2002; Vishnevskij, 2006, 2009; Zakharov, 2008), which, on a
theoretical level, often results in a re-application of the Demographic Transition
Theory (DTT) to the (post-) Soviet case. In contrast, studies on the lowest-
low fertility decline go beyond the modernisation paradigm but, nonetheless, still
present transformations of the politico-economic structure as the sole explanation
for fertility changes (Bu¨hler, 2004; Perelli-Harris, 2005, 2008b; Sobotka, 2004b;
Philipov, 2003; Philipov et al., 2006; Sobotka, 2004b; Thornton and Philipov,
2009; Wesolowski, 2015a,b). At first glance, explaining fertility decline in the
(post-) Soviet space through modernisation and post-Soviet transformations per-
8 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
spectives seems plausible. However, the singular focus on structural changes ig-
nores the fact that relationships between people also adjust to politico-economic
changes based on the values that already exist in society. By doing so, the stud-
ies in this realm often remain blind to the kaleidoscope of social (in)equalities,
both outside and within the household, emerging alongside the politico-economic
modernisation, which in tandem contribute to the formation of di↵erent demo-
graphic realities on a micro-level and di↵erent fertility trends on a macro-level
(Ehmer, 2011; Greenhalgh, 1995; Rivkin-Fish, 2003; Szreter, 1996, 2011). As
such, social relationships could be seen as playing an intermediary role in the in-
terplay between the politico-economic reality and the formation of interpersonal
(in)equalities. Because they surround our everyday lives and choices, social rela-
tionships form a coherent social structure that helps us to interpret, make sense
of and adjust to everyday reality, including state legal regulations, political ide-
ology, and economic crises (Hagestad, 2009; Huinink, 2009). Therefore, social
relationships and surrounding values should stay at the core of our explanations
on fertility decline.
In studies on fertility decline, the role of social relationships in reproductive
behaviour change was first acknowledged by the Princeton Fertility Project (Coale
et al., 1979; Coale and Watkins, 1986). Later, the works stemming from this
project adopted a di↵usion approach to study fertility behaviour. This approach
showed that di↵erences in the pace and timing of fertility decline are associated
more with cultural characteristics, such as religion, language and ethnicity as the
most common factors (Bocquet-Appel and Jakobi, 1998; Bongaarts and Watkins,
1996; Cleland and Wilson, 1987; Montgomery and Casterline, 1993; Pollak and
Watkins, 1993; Watkins, 1991). It has been suggested that social interactions are
the primary channels through which changes in reproductive behaviour occur. For
example, in the process of day-to-day interactions a woman can learn from her
mother, older sisters or other women how to breastfeed, and similarly she could
exchange with others her knowledge on abortion or other birth control methods
(Watkins, 1990, 1991). Likewise, such information could be transformed through
gossip, which is also an important social instrument to permit and approve certain
behaviour (Watkins and Danzi, 1995).
The weakness of the di↵usion approach is, however, that it suggests that in-
dividuals learn the norms of their social environments and then internalise and
comply with them. In reality, individuals negotiate, acquire and reproduce their
social identities through their everyday practices and interactions. In anthropo-
logical demography, these two perspectives on the role of culture in demographic
behaviour are often described as ‘culture for the people’ versus ‘culture by the
people’ (Hammel, 1990). While the former perspective implies that individuals
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are passive actors who submit to their socio-cultural environments, the latter ad-
vocates an incorporating view. It perceives individuals and their agency to be
central in their behaviour, which implies that individuals interpret and transform
cultural symbols though social relationships, interactions, practices, and conver-
sations (Bernardi and Hutter, 2007; Hammel, 1990; Kertzer, 1997). These social
relationships form a certain social structure that builds a framework of opportu-
nities for individual actions to take place (Bernardi and Hutter, 2007; Browner,
2000; Carter, 1995; Townsend, 1997).
Building on that, Szreter (1996, 2011, 2015) additionally suggests the need
for contextualising these social structures through the so-called ‘communication
communities’, which he defines as ‘encompassing socio-cultural environments of
language, values, and roles in which individuals and families participate and
through which they form and negotiate their meanings, goals, and social iden-
tities’ (Szreter, 2015, p. 155). He posits that over the life course an individual
may belong to di↵erent communication communities, each of which may matter
for a di↵er sphere of life. However, before we try to define which of these socio-
cultural environments are important for reproductive behaviour change, we first
need to understand the actual role of family relationships in these changes, such
as the relationship between spouses, with parents(in-law), siblings and other kin,
since in some societies family and kin may take over a significant share of respon-
sibilities concerning reproductive life (see for example anthropological studies on
Asia and Africa: Niehof (1985); Van der Sijpt (2011)).
In the context of Eastern Europe and Ukraine, the involvement of family and
social relationships over a life course is particularly high as in this part of Europe
family has been the major source of welfare for centuries (Heady and Kohli, 2010;
Heady and Schweitzer, 2010; Kis, 2012; Robila, 2004b; Viazzo, 2010). Studies
indicate that in the pre-transitional context families used to reside in multigen-
erational households over the entire life course. This stimulated individuals to
marry early and thus to have longer reproductive life spans and to have more
children because infant mortality was high (Czap, 1982; Hajnal, 1982). In the
more contemporary context, strong family ties continue to provide welfare to in-
dividuals, especially around crisis events, such as childbearing and elderly and
child care (see, for example, Gruber and Heady 2010a,b; Jappens and Van Bavel
2012).
Intriguingly, similar to Southern Europe, in Eastern European societies strong
ties between family members are also seen as contributing to lowest-low fertility
today (Castiglioni et al., 2016; Ghodsee and Bernardi, 2012; Heady and Kohli,
2010; Heady and Schweitzer, 2010; Rodin, 2015). This suggests that some changes
between family and fertility already occurred during the historical fertility decline.
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Additionally, in the context of Ukraine, it has been suggested that local-level
family values could be a vital lens to understand persisting regional di↵erences
in fertility trends in the country Perelli-Harris (2008b). That said, little research
has empirically studied the actual role of social and family relationships in fer-
tility behaviour change in Ukraine. Moreover, studies that do address family
and gender relationships treat these merely as background environment for re-
productive decision-making (Carlba¨ck et al., 2012; David and Skilogianis, 1999b;
Goldman, 1993; Gradskova, 2007; Kligman, 1998; Lapidus, 1978; Leinarte, 2010;
Mezei, 1997; Rotkirch, 2000). However, if family and social relationships are
considered actual actors of demographic change alongside individual agency in a
society where family plays such a crucial role in individual lives, this should help
to better understand fertility changes both in the past and today. Therefore, the
primary aim of this dissertation is to study the e↵ects of family relationships and
their continuities on changes in reproductive behaviour through a comparative
regional perspective in Ukraine during the post-war fertility decline.
In the next sections, I present the main theoretical concepts from which this
study derives its theoretical and methodological premises. I start with my re-
conceptualisation of reproductive behaviour through a reproductive career per-
spective. Afterwards, I discuss how social and family relationships may actually
influence individual reproductive decisions. Finally, I suggest a framework to
contextualise the influence of social and family relationships on reproductive be-
haviour within local traditions of family relationships. Against this background,
I underline the research questions and theoretical strategy of this dissertation.
1.2.2 Reproductive behaviour as a process: a reproductive
career perspective
At the onset of fertility decline, an important shift occurred in individual under-
standings of parenthood. Gillis (1992, p. 32) notes that at the end of the 19th
century the cultural meaning of motherhood among the upper- and middle-class
in Britain shifted ‘from an understanding of motherhood as childbearing to an
understanding of motherhood as childrearing’. For women this shift also im-
plied that motherhood became almost a ‘masculine career but without an option
of retirement’ (Gillis, 1992, p. 32). The perception of seeing motherhood and
parenthood as a career or as a process and a life-long experience with di↵erent
stages and sub-transitions is still relevant for contemporary societies experiencing
demographic changes.
Similarly to the changes in individual mind-sets to childbearing and parent-
hood that took place in the course of fertility declines across Europe, a pre-definite
view of vital events in demography has been widely criticised since the 1990s
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primarily by social historians and anthropologists. This critique eventually con-
tributed to the reconceptualisation of demography and to an emergence of a new
discipline of anthropological demography alongside the classical demography (for
more on the establishment of anthropological demography as a discipline, see:
Bernardi and Hutter 2007; Kertzer and Fricke 1997; Kertzer 2005). A key princi-
ple in anthropological demography considers demographic behaviour not solely as
an outcome like death, marriage, migration or fertility but also as a process and
pathway (Hobcraft, 2007; Johnson-Hanks, 2002; Townsend, 1997). This view on
demographic events opens up new vistas for incorporating a kaleidoscope of vari-
ous social and contextual factors in the analysis of demographic behaviours, and
more importantly the meaning attached to each transition, how people undergo
it, how the transitions are interrelated, and who plays which role in it.
In classic demography, fertility is typically seen as the biological ability to
give birth and, as such, it often refers to the number of children that a woman
can bare over her reproductive life span (Weeks, 2008, p. 200). The processual
characteristics of fertility refer to the social side of the childbearing experience,
such as parenthood and its related responsibilities, and to other reproductive
experiences that are related to childbearing, such as courtship, marriage, and
cohabitation, as well as miscarriage, infanticide, birth control and divorce. Seeing
fertility behaviour as a process thus encompasses the meaning and content of
events across men’s and women’s reproductive life span that relate to childbearing
and parenthood. This processual and pathways view on fertility and related life
course events constitutes what I refer to in this study as a reproductive career.
Although the timing, pace and order of events in a reproductive career could
be standardised (Kohli, 1988) as can be observed in some time periods, for ex-
ample, the golden age of marriage in the 1950s and 1960s in the West, a priori
these characteristics should not be seen as universal over time and space (Bledsoe,
2002; Johnson-Hanks, 2002, 2007). This idea is also supported by recent studies
on the dissolution of marriage and the appearance of other forms of partnership
in the West (Perelli-Harris and Lyons-Amos, 2015; Perelli-Harris et al., 2014). As
such, time, pace and order of reproductive events, on the one hand, are shaped by
individual expectations and intentions for these vital events to happen (Johnson-
Hanks, 2002). On the other hand, in their choices and decisions individuals are
constantly constrained by various factors reaching from political-economic cir-
cumstances to cultural norms. As such, social relationships help individuals to
find the balance between these two polar sites of individual life, which makes
relationships crucial for reproductive career development.
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1.2.3 Family and social influences on reproductive behaviour
“A person’s fertility is a description of a place in a web of
relationships with o↵spring, with other kin, and with a range of social
groups and institutions.”
Townsend 1997, p. 108-109
To identify the roles of ‘others’ in reproductive behaviour, scholars have started
to study social influences that di↵erent actors of a social network exert on each
other and what e↵ect these influences have, or do not have, on reproductive
decisions and practices. This line of research was pioneered in the previously
mentioned di↵usion studies on fertility behaviour, but it was first empirically
studied by Bernardi (2003). Bernardi was among the first to examine di↵erent
social influences on reproductive decision-making of men and women in northern
Italy. Later, this approach was advanced by follow-up studies on other European
countries (Bernardi and White, 2010; Diaz et al., 2011; Keim et al., 2009, 2012;
Rossier and Bernardi, 2009).
Bernardi defines social influence as the ‘process by which attitudes, values or
behaviour of an individual are determined by the attitudes, values or behaviour of
others with whom he or she interacts’ (Bernardi, 2003, p. 535). Her first empiri-
cal classification of social influences consisted of such mechanisms as social learn-
ing, social contagion, normative pressure and social pressure (Bernardi, 2003).
She developed this classification based on the accumulated knowledge from social
psychological and sociological studies on this topic, which in many ways opened
up new vistas to describe reproductive-decision making. In their most recent
theoretical overview on social influences, Bernardi and Kla¨rner (2014) reframe
Bernardi’s original classification and define four main mechanisms of social influ-
ence on reproductive behaviour: social learning, social contagion, social pressure,
and social support. This classification constitutes the main point of departure
for the analysis in this study, and I briefly describe the classification‘s four main
mechanisms below.
• Social learning is often defined as an on-going process of perception of oth-
ers’ behaviour via socialisation, communication and (un)conscious observa-
tions. Through these processes individuals may adopt behavioural models
of others as well as learn about positive or negative consequences of these
models.
• Social contagion and emotional contagion are even more unconscious than
social learning. Social contagion often takes place in an intimate and close-
knit setting, such as that of close friends and siblings who are seen as so-
cially similar. In the context of reproductive intentions, if an individual
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is surrounded by childbearing experiences of people whom they are close
to and these people share information and feelings related to childbearing
and childrearing, this is likely to facilitate the individual’s positive or nega-
tive fertility choices into behaviour. Emotional contagion describes more a
spontaneous copying of emotional states and behaviours.
• Social pressure refers to the force that leads an individual to conform to
another person’s expectations. Conformity in this respect implies that cer-
tain sanctions and rewards create channels through which this mechanism
works. Social pressure may also occur in the context of close-knit settings as
well as in broad cultural settings. In the last instance, social pressure would
be closer to normative pressure, or subjective obligation, which is more of
a perception of what others think and want you to do rather than a direct
influence from someone.
• Social support refers to the provision and social exchange of tangible and/or
intangible resources. As such, social support can be material, instrumental,
and emotional.
Although Bernardi and Kla¨rner (2014) do not put a special accent on the role
of individual expectations regarding certain influences, it should be mentioned
that the main particularity of social support and social pressure is that they may
be consciously experienced by the anchor person unlike social learning and social
contagion, which are typically seen as the mechanisms functioning below the level
of individual awareness and therefore cannot be anticipated. The uniqueness of
social support and social pressure implies that these mechanisms are often part of
more complex relationship structures in which individual expectations of perceived
support and pressure also play an important role.
It is obvious that unmet expectations of receiving social support may hamper
one’s reproductive decisions. At the same time, extensive social support may also
negatively a↵ect reproductive decision-making. Kla¨rner and Keim (2016) con-
ducted an empirical study where they di↵erentiate between negative and positive
e↵ects of social support on reproductive practices in Germany. They found that
in western Germany the postponement of first parenthood is strongly linked to
the acquisition of material security in which the expectations and actual provision
of grandparental resources plays an important role.
In another study on Southern Italy, Bernardi and Oppo (2008) discovered that
the maternal grandmother, who is expected to be the main provider of childcare
support and with whom a young couple often lives, often encourages the couple to
achieve educational and employment goals before having children. This promotes
a double-presence model of combining work and family life, which in this society is
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perceived as the only option for a young woman to cope with changing economic
conditions. Similarly, some studies in evolutionary anthropology suggest that
the so-called ‘helpers in the nest’, such as mothers(in-law) and other female kin,
may also hinder women’s childbearing under some circumstances (Voland and
Beise, 2002, 2005) even though they are generally seen as the childcare providers
(Crognier et al., 2001). As such, depending on the circumstances, social support
may also turn into competition relationships. Non-kin can also discourage an
individual’s reproductive intentions and provoke competition via expressing envy
and disapproval of the individual’s (childbearing/childrearing) behaviour (see, for
example, Heady 2007).
Cooperation and conflict relationships may also arise between spouses and
partners with regard to reproductive intentions or birth control practices. As
Browner (2000) showed in her comparative study on several Latin American coun-
tries, in some countries women often underwent an abortion to submit to their
husband’s reproductive wishes in order to avoid conflict. Similarly, it was showed
that before the pill and other modern methods of birth control were introduced
in Britain, women exercised their agency by practicing abstinence, which despite
the risk of spousal conflict, was their way to communicate their wishes to their
partners and challenge the patriarchal structure of gender relationships (Fisher,
2006; Seccombe, 1992; Szreter and Fisher, 2010). As such, cooperation and con-
flict are not mutually exclusive as the lack of cooperation does not necessarily
imply conflict.
These are only a few examples of a large corpus of literature on social influ-
ences on reproductive behaviour, but they vividly illustrate that social influences
are highly interlinked with interpersonal power dynamics and other types of inter-
dependencies between individuals. Identifying how individuals relate to and influ-
ence each other is a crucial step to understand why social relationships influence
individual reproductive decisions in a certain way within a given socio-economic
context.
Thus far, most studies on reproductive behaviour have framed social influences
as universal (Bernardi, 2003; Bernardi and Kla¨rner, 2014), while only recently
have scholars started to notice that certain social influences could be particular
and important in one context and less in another (Bernardi and Oppo, 2008;
Heady, 2007; Kla¨rner and Keim, 2016). This may suggest that the nature of
power relationships and social interdependencies could be crucial not only for
identifying the grounds of these influences but also for identifying contextual
di↵erences in which they appear and why. Until now, however, little research
has focused on this aspect. In the following section, I discuss how I approach
the contextualisation of social influences as deriving from the local traditions of
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family relationships.
1.2.4 Family systems as framework to study continuity and
change between family relationships and individual
reproductive careers
“Family systems are neither good nor bad,but they are not neutral
either”
Reher 1998, p. 215
One way to grasp what drives family relationships into certain power structures
and social interdependencies from which social influences may arise is through
the study of how family and broader kinships are organised in a society. The
organisation of kinship has been the primary focus of anthropologists since the
discipline was established (see the classical anthropological studies: Levi-Strauss
(1971); Malinowski (1913); Murdock (1949); Radcli↵e-Brown (1931)). However,
once the traditional forms of kinship systems connected to inheritance and co-
residence patterns started to dissolve, the interest in ‘regular’ kinship also declined
(Segalen, 2010).
Recently, however, the issue of kinship has become extremely prominent in
historical and sociological studies that have started to re-conceptualise the notion
of traditional kinship systems and to explore the implications they have for value
formation and interpersonal relationships in the modern context (see, for example,
Heady and Kohli 2010; Heady and Schweitzer 2010; Kertzer 1984; Mo¨nkediek
2016; Mo¨nkediek and Bras 2014; Reher 1998). This line of research suggests that
although the organisation of household, and co-residence and inheritance patterns,
aka traditional kinship systems, may change quickly, family relationships and
underlying values behind these traditions are more systematic. When putting
this notion on organisation of family relationships into a context of social change,
these studies suggest that not only an individual but also family relationships
surrounding the individual should be seen as agents that challenge social structure
rather than silently adapt to it, which corresponds to the notion of ‘culture by
the people’ discussed earlier (Hammel, 1990).
This contextualisation of family relationships as connecting both historical
and modern aspects of family life is typically defined under the concept of family
systems. However, there are many definitions of family systems. Mason (2001,
p. 160-161), for example, suggests that family systems should be seen as ‘sets
of beliefs and norms, common practices, and associated sanctions through which
kinship and the rights and obligations of particular kin relationships are defined’.
As such, Mason argues that family systems define what it means and implies for
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an individual to be related to others by blood, descent or marriage. Mason’s
definition also shows how an individual life course can be interdependent on other
people’s life courses and what social, sexual and economic rights and obligations
individuals have depends on their social position in relation to the each other.
Additionally, Mason (2001) thinks that family systems are ‘intertwined, but
not coterminous’ with gender systems. By gender systems she understands ‘a set
of beliefs and norms, common practices and associated sanctions through which
the meaning of being male and female and the rights and obligations of males and
females of di↵erent ages and social statuses are defined’ (Mason, 2001, p. 161).
This implies that gender systems are equally encompassed both in family systems
and in surrounding socio-economic structures. In other words, family systems
may promote a certain gender order, as well as a social order, but it is through
their interaction with socio-economic conditions that certain (in)equalities within
and outside the family, including genders, may arise.
The most common elements that are typically used to describe general prin-
cipals of family organisation are residence and descent traditions, or respective
marriage, household, and inheritance patterns (Das Gupta, 1997, 1999; Mason,
2001; Skinner, 1997). Through these elements family systems can be described
and compared, and based on them, three ideal types of family systems can be
defined: nuclear, stem, and joint. Below, I briefly describe each of them following
Skinner (1997).
The nuclear or conjugal family system is based on neolocal residence of both
bride and groom, and it is usually defined as a unit consisting of a wife and a
husband living with their dependent unmarried children. The neolocal unit often
emerges as a result of equal inheritance division among o↵spring and an absence
of succession per se. Often, the conjugal unit is treated as a building block to
distinguish between other types of families.
Following this idea, several, usually two, conjugal units residing together can
be defined as the stem family system. Under the stem family system, the house-
hold consists of only one married couple from each generation, and these are
typically a married daughter or son living with her or his parents. The inheri-
tance is typically non-divided favouring a single successor, and the transmission
typically takes place at marriage or at the death of the head of household.
When members of at least two conjugal units co-reside it is defined as a joint
family system. This family system implies that spouses of more than one o↵spring
are brought into a family; thus, parents and several of their married children reside
together. Inheritance is partible and equal among all the successors qualified for
it; however, the succession and its timing may vary.
It is important to understand that a family system is not equal to only a single
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type of marriage, household, or inheritance pattern, but it is rather a unique
combination of these three that forms norms and beliefs, as well as rights and
obligations, or in other words, the underlying logic of a nuclear, stem or joint
family system (Das Gupta, 1997, 1999; Skinner, 1993, 1997). That said, the role
of inheritance is one of the major factors underlying this logic, as inheritance often
defines the type of post-marital residence and subsequent household structure.
A comprehensive overview of the role of inheritance in a society is provided
by Heady and Grandits (2003). They argue that inheritance ‘places people and
collectives in relation to physical resources; places people socially; helps to shape
the social structure within which they live’ (Heady and Grandits, 2003, p. 3). As
such, inheritance concerns not only the family but also the rest of the community.
In line with this, ‘inheritance systems are interlocking systems of property and
kinship relationships, which make them highly resistant to change’ (Heady and
Grandits, 2003, p. 13)
What Heady and Grandits (2003) suggest for the logic behind inheritance
systems – as being resistant to change – can also be applied to family systems, in
general. As such, the key aspect of the family systems approach, particularly in
the modern context, is not only to identify a marriage, household and inheritance
type associated with a certain family system, which certainly do change over time,
but also – and probably even more importantly – to find out how the combination
of these patterns forms a logic of relatedness between kin and non-kin members
and subsequent power dynamic between them.
In line with this view, Reher (1998) was among the first to argue in favour of
the continuity and path-dependency between historical family systems and family
ties in contemporary societies. He distinguished between ‘strong family ties’ where
the family group has priority over the individual, and ‘weak family ties’ where
the value of an individual tends to predominate. Reher (1998) also shows that
certain patterns of inheritance and household structures that were associated
with family systems in the past also define relatedness between kin and non-kin
members through solidarity, social cohesion, and social control in contemporary
society. As such, he suggests that strong family ties in the Mediterranean today
can be connected to stem and joint family systems in the past. Similarly, other
studies on Southern Europe also find confirmation for this continuity, even under
the rapidly changing social and economic conditions since the 1960s (see, for
example: Bernardi and Oppo 2008; Dalla Zuanna and Micheli 2004; Schneider
and Schneider 1996). More importantly, these studies illustrate how families re-
configure their livelihoods and reproductive decisions to these economic changes
while still operating by the same logic of close interrelatedness of kin members
over the life course. Yet, in the contemporary context, that same logic of family
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relationships has led to the drastic decrease in family size in Southern Europe,
which is often referred to as a paradox (Dalla Zuanna and Micheli, 2004).
The so-called paradox between strong family ties and lowest-low fertility is also
applicable to the Eastern European context, as family there has played a crucial
role in the lives of individuals both in the past and today (Castiglioni et al.,
2016; Ghodsee and Bernardi, 2012; Hajnal, 1982; Heady and Kohli, 2010; Heady
and Schweitzer, 2010; Robila, 2004a; Rodin, 2015). Scholars have also traced the
roots of these strong family ties in the family system values that were prevalent
in the past in Eastern Europe (Viazzo, 2009, 2010). Over time, these local family
values did not disappear but went through some socio-economic changes that,
in fact, not only reinforced the values during the socialist regimes but were also
reinforced by the socialist regimes even after their collapse (Kligman, 1998; Mezei,
1997; Semenova and Thompson, 2005).
1.2.5 Scope of the study
This dissertation explores continuities in family relationships in Ukraine and their
role in the country’s fertility decline from around the 1950s to the 1970s. In doing
so, it addresses two main research questions:
(1) How did family and social relationships influence individual reproductive
careers in Soviet Ukraine from around the 1950s to the 1970s?
(2) How can local family systems and their associated power dynamics and
social interdependencies help to understand fertility decline in Soviet Ukraine?
I define a reproductive career as all the events that are linked to reproduction
as a social process (Hobcraft, 2007; Johnson-Hanks, 2002; Townsend, 1997). As
shown in Figure 1.2, transitions, such as marriage, pregnancy and childbirth,
could be seen as the main events of a reproductive career that could also repeat
over the life course. These transitions can also be accompanied by sub-transitions,
such as abortion and miscarriage.
To answer my first research question on the role of family relationships in
individual reproductive careers, I will focus on how family and other social influ-
ences shaped individual reproductive decisions in Ukraine from around the 1950s
to the 1970s. With social influences I refer to social learning, social contagion,
social pressure, and social support, following the classification of Bernardi and
Kla¨rner (2014). The last two influences, social pressure and social support, will
also be studied from the perspective of expectations of support or social pressure.
Additionally, I also include social cooperation and competition relationships as
part of the possible social influences.
Through defining these family influences and expectations, I will try to un-
cover the power dynamics and other social interdependencies that underlie family
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Figure 1.2: Conceptual framework: Reproductive careers and family relationships
relationships (see Figure 1.2), and that subsequently may drive individuals to
undertake a certain reproductive activity or not (Das Gupta, 1997, 1999; Ma-
son, 2001). By power dynamics I understand how the authority between family
members is spread and how it is exercised on an everyday basis, particularly with
regard to reproductive decisions and practices. By social interdependencies I un-
derstand the patterns of relatedness between individuals, such as who is close
to them in their reproductive decisions and practices and who they rely on and
expect help from and who they do not.
Overall, the power dynamics and social interdependencies within the family
underlie how family members connect to each other and non-related people. In
a contemporary context, these could be traced through the study of social in-
fluences. In a historical context, these could be revealed through the study of
marriage, household, and inheritance structures (Skinner, 1997; Todd, 1988). A
unique combination of marriage, household and inheritance structures and their
associated power dynamics and social interdependencies would constitute a local
family system. Historically, the ideal typical family systems would be nuclear,
stem, and joint (Skinner, 1997), which, of course, rarely appear in real life.
To answer my second research question, I will first try to uncover what the
variety of observed social influences can say about the existence of certain power
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dynamics and social interdependencies, and I then will try to connect these to
historical power relationships and dynamics underlying local family systems. As
Figure 1.2 shows, I perceive the components of family relationships as interrelated
in the sense that social influences are rooted in and derived from certain power
dynamics and social interdependencies, both of which of which simultaneously
belong to a local family system.
The main premise of this dissertation that family influences may vary depend-
ing on the local family system is also the reason why I adopted a comparative
perspective. It has been suggested that in Ukraine, regional variation in many
aspects of social life is a crucial characteristic of the society (Hrytsak et al., 2007).
Regional di↵erences more than ethnic and class di↵erences also underline di↵erent
patterns of fertility behaviour, which some suggest could be anchored in local val-
ues characterising family relationships (Perelli-Harris, 2008a). Given that, for my
comparative analysis I focus on two borderland cities: Lviv in western Ukraine
and Kharkiv in eastern Ukraine. The localities are di↵erent in many socio-cultural
aspects that make them interesting sites for comparison. In the next section I dis-
cuss the major principles of my methodology and provide a brief overview of the
two localities and the socio-economic situation in Ukraine during the 1950s, 1960s,
and 1970s.
1.3 Methodology and data
1.3.1 General methodological strategy
In investigating the role of family relationships in individual reproductive careers
in the context of fertility decline in Soviet Ukraine, the available regional data
on demographic vital events helped me to see the setting’s macro picture. Most
of these regional demographic data were collected in the archives of Lviv and
Kharkiv. The micro level insights on individual reproductive experiences I re-
ceived from the life history interviews, along with the life history calendars and
family photographs I collected. Some of these photographs appear throughout
this dissertation.
There are various approaches to researching and analysing life histories. Method-
ological literature often di↵erentiates between approaches that are deductively, in-
ductively or narratively driven. For example, Miller (2000) di↵erentiates between
neo-positivist, realist, and narrative approaches to study life stories and family
histories. He defines clear boundaries for each approach suggesting that an ideal
neo-positivist approach is anchored in the deductive testing of an existing theory,
a realist approach focuses on the inductive generation of grounded theory, and
a narrative approach concentrates on situational dynamics within the interview
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itself (Miller, 2000, p. 18). However, and as Miller (2000) himself suggests, in
practice researchers adopt an approach that lies at the intersection of those three;
however, the researcher has to clearly define the main premises underlying the
chosen approach (Maxwell and Chmiel, 2013).
As discussed in the previous section, my theoretical thinking provided me with
the analytical tools to depart from that I used as a starting point during the data
collection. These are possible types of social influences and life events that may
appear in a man’s and a woman’s reproductive careers. These premises I used
as a guide to define the themes I wanted to touch upon in the interviews. As
such, my interviews were open-ended, direct, and personal conversations that, on
average, lasted for two hours. In every interview I attempted to uncover individual
experiences of reproductive events, such as marriage, pregnancy and childbirth as
the major ones. I also addressed the meanings that participants attached to
significant others, namely those who influenced, helped with, or prevented them
from making reproductive decisions. Finally, I tried to understand how their
reproductive choices were shaped by the broader context of influential historical
events and policy regulations, such as the introduction of abortion and maternity
leave, as well as other social-economic conditions (for the interview guide, see
Appendix B).
My second methodological point of departure was that I did not try to re-
peat the same interview procedure with every informant. In practice, this meant
that I did not focus on comparing individual lives to each other but instead on
gaining as many insights as possible into di↵erent reproductive events and social
relationships surrounding them. Adopting this strategy was also important given
that individual memory is not perfect and that people may intentionally omit
discussing certain issues. As such, during the interviews the intention was not to
reveal the truth in every single case but rather to inform the general narrative
that was appearing in the course of data collection through gaining insights of
di↵erent individual examples.
To start detecting the reproductive events, I started every interview with a
narrative question. In this question, I first asked an informant to tell me about his
or her family of origin. Starting with this question was important since it allowed
me to first hear an individual life story as narrated freely by him or herself,
which often lasted up to forty minutes. During this time I tried not to intervene
with the narrative flow but instead made notes for the follow-up questions to
be asked later. The di↵erence between the life story and life history is that the
former corresponds to how the biographical experiences are constructed in the
situation of the interview, while the latter refers to the sequence of biographical
events (Miller, 2000; Rosenthal, 1993, 2006). The life history cannot be analysed
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without understanding the life story. The main aspects of the life story that
I prioritised were those related to how an informant positioned him/herself to
the social structure around him/her. This mainly implied observing how his/her
gender, ethnicity, religion, and political views shaped his/her self-presentation
during the interview.
Quite often, the first narrative also touched upon the informant’s life up to
the present interview. If this did not occur, I asked another narrative question:
to tell the story of his/her marital life, and in the case of childless people, to tell
about their lives up until the interview. Important to note is that before every
interview the informants were told about the broad topic of the study: parenthood
experiences and family relationships of elderly people in Ukraine.
After the narrative part, I started addressing the reproductive events men-
tioned by the informant in the context of the overall decision-making process,
social relationships and constraints that were encountered during the event. At
this stage, I was interested in detecting the logic that underlined family rela-
tionships and exerted family influences, such as social pressure and support, and
in their reproductive decisions in the context of indirect social influences, such
as social learning and social contagion, and socio-economic constraints. In some
cases, I conducted a follow-up interview if some issues had to be addressed in
more depth.
The final key point of my methodological strategy was that I had to position
myself in front of my informants. Recognising a position that an interviewee
occupies during the interview situation is not only an important part of self-
reflexivity during the analysis but also a way to establish certain relationships
during the interview itself. Being a young female researcher helped me to build
trust with both the male and female informants primarily because I was young
and showed interest in the lives of the elderly. However, some informants tried
to use ‘we’ and ‘you’ rhetoric to highlight the regional di↵erences in Ukraine,
which remained a sensitive issue throughout the fieldwork. In such situations, I
tried to position myself as belonging to the younger generation rather than being
from another region; all of the informants knew that I came from west-central
Ukraine. This approach to the interviewing process allowed me to emphasise the
importance of conducting an interview with a generation that has seldom been
studied previously. Telling this to the informants, in turn, seemed to motivate
many of them to be more specific and elaborate more about their past experiences.
In the next sections, I shall address more factual and practical aspects of the
fieldwork.
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1.3.2 Data collection
The life history interviews were conducted with men and women born between
1925 and 1948, residing in the Ukrainian city of Lviv or Kharkiv during the 1950s
through the 1970s, and who were also in their reproductive age during this period,
which was characterised by a rapid decline of fertility rates in Ukraine. In total, 66
interviews were conducted: 33 from Lviv and 33 from Kharkiv. Table 1 illustrates
some general characteristics of the informants, while Appendix E provides more
detailed information on each informant.
Fieldwork was conducted between July 2012 and April 2015. I spent 10 months
conducting fieldwork in both cities: July-August 2012, March-May 2013, August-
November 2013, and February 2014. During October 2014-April 2015, 20 inter-
views were conducted with the help of a research assistant in Kharkiv. The socio-
demographic profile of the research assistant is similar to mine – a female, PhD
student in her mid-twenties – except that she originates from eastern Ukraine,
and I come from western Ukraine. Recruiting a research assistant was not in the
original plan, but it was necessary due to the unstable political situation in east-
ern Ukraine after November 2013. However, coming from the relevant cultural
background allowed her to build trust with the informants more easily during the
fieldwork. The same methodological premises that I described in Section 1.3.1
were applied to train the research assistant. Similar to my experience of conduct-
ing follow-up interviews with informants when needed, the research assistant also
practiced this strategy; however, together we reviewed the topics to be addressed
during the follow-ups.
Snowball and purposeful samples were employed to recruit the informants.
Both samples are purposeful in their nature (Patton, 1990). However, while
snowball sampling, also called chain sampling, is applied to search for a possible
interview subject through the previous informants, the later sampling technique
is applied to search for potential informants through other sources (Patton, 1990;
Silverman, 2006). This allowed me to collect interviews from di↵erent networks of
people. These two sampling techniques were used to ensure that the informants
came from economic and educational backgrounds as diverse as possible.
That said, I did not aim for a representative sample of the entire population
of the two cities but rather to interview a diverse enough group of individuals
to enable a study of di↵erences along a number of axes. The aim for acquiring
the diversity within the sample was also the reason why 66 and not six inter-
views were collected. That said, more than 66 interviews could also have been
collected, but at some stage I realised that many patterns I had investigated
started to re-appear. These were mainly those patterns that concerned cohab-
itation and marriage, childbearing, birth control and abortion. These patterns
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Table 1: Characteristics of the informants interviewed for this study
Lviv Kharkiv
Number of informants 33 33
Men 9 8
Women 24 25
Number of couples 6 4
Rural origin 13 10
Urban origin 20 23
Working class 12 13
Civil servants 17 13
Scientific elite 3 7
Number of children:
0 2 2
1 9 13
2 19 16
3 3 2
Age at marriage:
min 18 18
max 35 34
mean 24.5 23.67
standard deviation 3.55 3.51
Age at first child:
min 19 19
max 36 41
mean 26.12 26.06
standard deviation 3.52 4.47
Age at second child:
min 22 23
max 40 42
mean 31.79 31.64
standard deviation 4.17 4.79
Source: the author’s dataset ‘Family and Fertility in Soviet Ukraine’
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also correspond to the four content chapters in this thesis. However, if I had
decided to get more information on individual experience of divorce, miscarriage
and child mortality, which in this dissertation are analysed in the context of the
aforementioned events, I should have collected more interviews applying critical
case sampling techniques to find people who had experienced these rare events
(Patton, 1990).
I found it di cult to recruit couples for interviewing. At the time of inter-
viewing, many of the women whom my research assistant and I approached and
interviewed were already widowed. This was particularly the case in Kharkiv
province, where the average life expectancy at birth among males was 66.05 in
2014, while that of females was 75.97 (Tymoshenko, 2015, p. 50). In the same
year, the average life expectancy at birth in Lviv province was 68.16 for males
and 77.94 for females (Tymoshenko, 2015, p. 50).
The informants were recruited with the assistance of non-profit organisations
working with the elderly, through Internet advertisements, and with the help of
local people encountered during the fieldwork. This meant that in some cases
the informants directly contacted my research assistant or me, while in other
situations we had to contact the informants whose contact information we had
received. We worked with such non-governmental organisations as Red Cross,
Salvation Army, Veteran Unions and other local organisations. Through these
organisations we were able to recruit people from the working class and civil
servants. To access the higher class (scientific elite), we used our own networks
of people working in scientific institutes and universities.
In addition to the interviews, we collected life history calendars (LHCs) in
which data on household composition, births, marriages, and employment history
of the informant and spouse were recorded (see Appendix C for a LHC example
and for general information on LCH see Axinn and Pearce (2006)). LHCs were
filled in with every informant after the interview. Information provided in Ta-
ble 1 derives from the informants’ LHCs. With some informants we also reviewed
family photographs together and descriptions for these were recorded. I have in-
corporated some of the photographs following page 58. Finally, I used published
information on vital events and census data to calculate basic demographic cat-
egories, such as crude birth rates, crude marriage rates, infant mortality rates,
abortion ratio’s and other categories, for the regions, and incorporated ethno-
graphic literature on historical family systems in western and eastern Ukraine.
1.3.3 Data analysis
The interviews were collected and transcribed verbatim in the original language
(Ukrainian or Russian). I developed a special transcribing strategy to indicate
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pauses, breaks in the speech etc. (see Appendix A). I developed this strategy
when transcribing the first 10 interviews myself and then I used it to train research
assistants to transcribe the remaining interviews. The research assistants were
Ukrainian sociology students whom I got to know during my fieldwork. I used
Atlast.ti qualitative software to code and analyse the interviews. Because the
software does not recognise all the symbols in Cyrillic, I transliterated all the
interviews. For this I used the online transliteration tool (http://translit.cc).
The life history interviewing method can provide incredibly rich data, in my
case complete reproductive histories of men and women. However, because this
method typically gathers retrospective data, life histories (the sequence of bio-
graphical events) should be analysed in line with life stories (how the biographical
experiences are constructed in the interview situation) (Rosenthal, 1993, 2006).
To do so, I reconstructed each informant’s life story by making memos of the
moments of the informant’s self-presentation. I paid particular attention to how
these self-presentations were linked to his/her ethnicity, religion, gender, and fam-
ily situations. I used these memos to interpret the values that informants attached
to di↵erent life course events during the later stages of my analysis.
The coding was performed in three stages. First, I carried out structural
coding aimed at identifying reproductive transitions and their sequences in every
interview (Saldan˜a, 2012). I then performed domain and values coding of the
transitions related to each reproductive event that appeared during the interviews
(Saldan˜a, 2012). My aim at this stage was to grasp the interpersonal connections
an individual developed at every life stage discussed in the interview, attitudes
and perceptions of the life course event itself, and structural conditions underlying
this event. At this stage most of the coding was performed both in English and
in the original languages. I first performed an open coding that was aimed at
identifying the descriptive categories (Friese, 2014). In the later stages, when I
started to observe the relationships between the descriptive categories, I grouped
them into sub-categories related to each reproductive transition, such as ‘spousal
cooperation around childcare’, ’parental control over courting’ ‘choosing a partner
accompanied by parental solidarity’, ‘readiness and second birth’, ‘uncertainty
and second birth’ among others. When I had a clear research question that
I wanted to answer, I grouped the sub-categories under the relevant research
questions (for an example, see Appendix D). The sub-categories also guided me
in formulating the right research question. I then used the query tool to select
the quotations according to the groups of related documents that were created in
the previous steps (i.e. documents families): city (Lviv or Kharkiv) and gender
(male or female). Finally, I used LHCs as a triangulation tool to reconstruct a
biographical profile (life history) of every informant and link it to their narratives
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during the analysis. Because LHCs were collected after the interviews and were
focused on an individual’s life chronology, I usually used them when I needed
to identify occupation, household composition and other contextual information
related to a particular informant.
It is important to mention that Chapter 4 is based on a smaller sample of 30
interviews because that chapter was written during data collection. After all the
interviews were collected, I reviewed them on the subject of the research question
addressed in this chapter. The main phenomena addressed in this chapter – birth
control and abortion, women’s agency, and spousal power dynamics – remained
unchanged. Additionally, in Chapter 3 and Chapter 5, I added contextual infor-
mation on the use of abortion and birth control as related to the transition to
first and second birth.
1.4 Context and setting
Since Ukraine’s independence, scientific interest in comparing the western and
eastern regions in Ukraine has grown significantly. Historically, the western and
eastern regions in Ukraine have been seen as bipolar, not only in terms of lan-
guage, ethnicity, and religion, but also in terms of regional identities, collective
memory, and political preferences.1 However, in exploring these cultural dif-
ferences scholars have paid less attention to reproductive behaviour and family
relationships in a regional perspective. In this section I explain why I chose the
cities of Lviv and Kharkiv as comparative sites during the period 1950-1975. This
section also provides a general overview of demographic behaviour, family policy,
and socio-economic situation in the two regions.
1.4.1 Fertility transition and Soviet family policy
Just as the pace of fertility decline in Ukraine was di↵erent from that in other
Soviet republics (Figure 1.1), significant regional di↵erences in fertility transition
also existed within Ukraine. As Figure 1.3 illustrates, after the 1950s the western
and eastern regions were the outliers in fertility decline. The western part had the
highest birth rates in the country and a slower pace of fertility decline, whereas
the eastern regions had the lowest birth rates and the fastest fertility decline.
This tendency is also pronounced when zooming in on the provincial level.
Take, for instance, Lviv and Kharkiv, the largest provinces and cities in western
1Amongst the largest comparative projects are ‘Lviv-Donetsk’ (for resent results,
see: Hrytsak et al. (2007)) and ‘Region, Nation and Beyond. An Interdisciplinary
and Transcultural Reconceptualisation of Ukraine’ (for an overview of the project, see
http://www.lvivcenter.org/en/researchprojects/stgallenproject/)
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Figure 1.3: Crude birth rates per 1000 people for western, north-central, south-
ern, and eastern Ukraine, 1950-2014. Sources: Dmitrieva 1973; Podjachih 1965;
Ukrcensus 2015.
and eastern Ukraine. Figure 1.4 visualises birth rates for Lviv and Kharkiv as a
single time-dependent path. The path starts in 1885 with highest rates for both
provinces (top-right corner) and goes in a diagonal fashion to the much lower
rates in 2014 (bottom-left corner). When compared to the dashed guideline,
which depicts an equal rates for the two provinces, it becomes clear that fertility
declines in Lviv and Kharkiv were drastically di↵erent.
When the curve goes parallel to the guideline, the pace of the decline is the
same in the both provinces. This, however, holds only partially true for the
beginning of the 20th century when the First Demographic transition just started
and for the mid-1980s and 1990s when lowest-low fertility took place in both
regions, but not for the period in between. The birth rate in Lviv province was
already lower than it was in Kharkiv province at the end of the 19th century, with
CBRs at 40 and 50, respectively, in 1885. From 1900 to 1925, fertility declined
in both provinces, with Kharkiv declining a bit faster; yet, Kharkiv province still
had higher CBRs than Lviv province. However, a rapid increase in birth rates
took place in both provinces in the 1930s and lasted until 1955 when fertility rates
once again declined in Lviv while they remained relatively high and stable around
43 in Kharkiv. This increase is indicated in Figure 1.4 by the curve becoming a
horizontal line. The trends reversed between 1956-1959, when the birth rate in
Lviv slightly increased, yet still remained lower than in Kharkiv. This trend is
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Figure 1.4: Crude birth rates (CBR) per 1000 people for Lviv and Kharkiv
provinces, 1895-2014. Based on the yearly data of CBRs for the both provinces.
Sources: Lviv state archive fonds 312, 283 and 406; Kharkiv state archive fond
1962, fond P-5125 and fond P-5231; Population yearbooks 1991-2001; Main Sta-
tistical O ce in Lviv region databases: http://www.lv.ukrstat.gov.ua [accessed
on April 15, 2015]; State Statistics Service of Ukraine documents publishing:
http://ukrstat.org [accessed on April 5, 2015].
shown in Figure 1.4 by the curve pointing left from the dotted line. In Kharkiv,
however, the rapid decline started in 1955, and it continued through the 1960s
and 1970s when it declined from 35.7 in 1956 to 14 in 1970. The curve crossed
the dotted line in 1962 when the CBR was 21.7 in both provinces. After that the
birth rate in Kharkiv fell for the first time below that of Lviv. In Lviv fertility
declined steadier from 20.7 in 1956, with a peak of 24.2 in 1959, and to 17.1 in
1970. Only in the 1980s and 1990s was the pace of fertility decline more or less
similar in both provinces, and that was when lowest-low fertility took place. In
the mid-2000s, the fertility rate slightly increased in both provinces.
Understanding these drastic di↵erences in birth trends, particularly during
the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, is not only interesting but also necessary because
in these three decades, in fact, for the first time in Ukrainian history, Lviv and
Kharkiv were regulated by the same family and economic policies. The Soviet
family policies after the Second World War, like those in the economic sphere,
were influenced by the Cold War. The death of Stalin in 1953 and the appoint-
ment of Nikita Khrushchev as the prime minister of the Soviet Union signalled
a course towards liberalisation of life in the Soviet Union. In many ways, this
liberalisation implied that the private sphere of life now became a battlefield for
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national super powers, as also featured in the famous ‘Kitchen Debate’.2 In prac-
tice, this liberalisation implied significant shifts and advancements in family and
health care policy.
One of these advancements was the introduction of the patronage system
around maternal and infant care. This system was already introduced after the
Second World War but was e↵ectively implemented during and after Khrushchev.
The system aimed to decrease mortality rates among women and infants, and
this type of care meant to supervise and consult young mothers to prepare them
for delivery and after delivery to consult them on breastfeeding and infant care
(Batkis, 1940). The Soviet Union also introduced the so-called milk kitchens that
provided baby food to mothers who could not breastfeed their babies for any
reason, such as work or medical conditions.
In 1955, the maternity leave for working mothers was introduced and it granted
112 days at full pay, 56 before delivery and 56 days after delivery (Lapidus,
1978). Additionally, mothers could have three months of unpaid leave. Those
who decided to stay longer at home with their infant had the legal right to return
to work in the same position within one year of childbearing; however, this right
did not always work in practice (Lapidus, 1978)3. Altogether these regulations
had a positive e↵ect on the decrease in infant mortality rates (IMR)4 in both
regions (Figure 1.5), and particularly in Lviv where in just one decade IMRs
declined from 79.9 in 1955 to 19.2 in 1965.
By improving maternal health and childcare opportunities, the Soviet state
also aimed to increase and stabilise rapidly declining fertility rates in its Euro-
pean republics, including Ukraine. Moreover, from the 1940s until the 1990s,
the state collected a tax on childlessness from men and married women without
children to encourage child birth. Altogether, these healthcare and family pol-
icy regulations contributed to the reframing of the Soviet family policy towards
a more modern incorporation of pronatalist and paternalistic premises. In this
respect, even though the re-legalisation of abortion in 1955 may sound contradic-
tory when referred to as a part of the pronatalist and paternalist Soviet ideological
thinking, the underlying features behind this legalisation were indeed derived from
these premises. In addition to abortion, no other female birth control methods
were introduced. Only in the mid-1970 were intrauterine devices (IUDs) gradu-
2‘The Kitchen debate’ refers to the series of improvisational exchanges between Richard Nixon
and Nikita Khrushchev during the opening of the American National Exhibition in Moscow on
July 24, 1959. The debate featured discussions on everyday standards of life and particularly
those related to household organisation and consumption. For more on this subject, see in:
Oldenziel and Zachmann 2011; Reid 2002.
3The Soviet Union extended parental life benefits to non-working mothers as well only in
1989 (Lahusen and Solomon, 2008, p. 207)
4The infant mortality rate is the number of deaths of children under the age of 1 per 1,000
live births.
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Figure 1.5: Infant mortality rates per 1000 births, Lviv and Kharkiv province,
1950-1975. Sources: Demograficnuy shorichnyk 2007, 68; Kharkiv State Archive,
fond 5231, opis 9, dokument 1154, 1-45.
ally introduced (David and Skilogianis, 1999b). The rhythm (calendar) method,
abstinence, and Soviet-made condoms that were not always reliable also consti-
tuted the main alternatives to abortion that the healthcare system promoted. The
birth control pill was legalised in the West in the 1960s and primarily aimed to
reduce illegal abortion (Burgnard, 2015) but in the Soviet Union the pill was used
solely for treatment purposes (David and Skilogianis, 1999b). This contradiction
of abortion versus the pill also most likely stemmed from the Cold War healthcare
politics on both sides of the Iron Curtain.
On the individual level, these advancements in the Soviet policy brought many
changes in how reproduction and childcare were handled because before these
changes the family primarily regulated these arenas of private life. In the following
section, I will address some aspects related to traditions of family relationships
as well as structural developments in the two localities under investigation.
1.4.2 Socio-economic developments and family relationships
in Lviv and Kharkiv
The cities of Lviv and Kharkiv are located more than 1000 kilometres apart (Fig-
ure 1.6). While Lviv is situated near the western Ukrainian border with Poland,
32 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Figure 1.6: Map of Ukraine showing research field sites Lviv and Kharkiv. Source:
OCHA/ReliefWeb (2013).
Kharkiv is situated near the eastern side of Ukraine and the Russian border. Lviv
joined the Soviet Union in 1939, the actual Soviet-type industrialisation and new
policy implications took place there mainly in the 1950s and thereafter. Kharkiv,
in contrast, became part of the Soviet Union in 1919 and was also the capital
of the Ukrainian SSR until 1934. Kharkiv city was also seen as the most vivid
implementation of Soviet ideological thinking in many aspects of life.
Historically, Lviv was slower to industrialise and to adopt Soviet social reforms
than Kharkiv, which was comparatively a more industrial and secular city. The
modernisation process in Lviv started in the mid-nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries when it was part of Austro-Hungary and later Poland. However, this
process was slower than in central and eastern Ukraine (Hrytsak, 2007), which at
that time fell under the rule of the Russian Empire. During the interwar period,
Lviv was a multicultural city where ethnic Polish and Jewish groups constituted
the majority of the population. Industrialisation was further reinforced when
western Ukraine became part of the Ukrainian SSR in 1939, and especially after
the Second World War. By 1959, the population of Lviv had reached almost half
a million (411,000), which made it the largest city in western Ukraine (Bodnar,
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2010, p. 41). The city’s population also became more homogeneous in the af-
termath of the Soviet and German occupations during the Second World War,
primarily because most of the Jewish population was sent to concentration camps
during the war and the Polish population was deported to the ethnic Polish terri-
tories during the mid- and late-1940s (Amar, 2015). During the 1950s and 1960s,
the rapid influx of migrants primarily from the neighbouring rural and urban ar-
eas meant that Ukrainians came to constitute the city’s majority (60% in 1959)
(Hrytsak, 2007, p. 41). During this period, Russian migrants were the second
largest minority in the city (27% in 1959) (Hrytsak, 2007, p. 41); however, their
percentage declined over the years.
Lviv after the Second World War can thus be seen as an entirely di↵erent city
than it was in the interwar period because mainly Ukrainian migrants populated
the city. The Soviet government started the process of dissolution of private prop-
erty rights and also started russification and sovietisation campaigns in western
Ukraine. These campaigns, however, were softer in comparison to those in other
Belorussian or Baltic regions at that time (Amar, 2015; Hrytsak, 2007). This
facilitated Ukrainians of provincial origin to retain their more traditional habits,
such as strong religiosity, commonly Greek Catholicism, and strong family ties.
During the post-war years these values made a significant contribution to the
formation of the city’s mentality, which even today is characterised by religiosity,
patriotism and family values (Amar, 2015; Bodnar, 2010; Hrytsak, 2007; Perelli-
Harris, 2008a). By maintaining relationships with family in villages and towns,
as well as with other immigrants to Lviv, newcomers to Lviv were able to retain
their traditional life styles and were thus slower in adopting new socialist norms
(Bodnar, 2010). Moreover, their often family-oriented values were also reinforced
by common opposition to the Soviet regime in this area and the idea that personal
information should be shared only with those whom you trusted, usually relatives
and family members.
Along with the importance of family relationships in their everyday lives, these
migrants’ personal values were built around notions of autonomy and aspirations
of sustaining their own livelihood independent from their parents (Bodnar, 2010).
As ethnographic studies show, this notion of independence was already typical
in western Ukraine in the nineteenth century. After marriage, a couple usually
set up a separate nuclear household and worked on their own land, which they
had received from their parents. Only an older son and his family stayed with
the parents, worked on the same land and provided elderly care in later life.
Inheritance was typically partible and equally distributed among all the sons and
occasionally among daughters as well (Behey, 2003). A similar pattern of family
system is also typical for the northern-central part of Romania and is defined by
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Kaser (2002, 2006) as a mix of stem and nuclear family systems.
In comparison to Lviv, patterns of family relationships and economic devel-
opment followed di↵erent trajectories in Kharkiv. Rapid economic development
in the Kharkiv region started in 1919 when the city of Kharkiv also became the
capital of the Ukrainian SSR. From that moment, the machine industry and var-
ious light industries started to develop in the city. The industrial developments
during the interwar years, which later continued during the 1950s and 1960s, led
to a rapid influx of migrants to Kharkiv from the neighbouring areas and from
Russia. However, the city’s ethnic composition remained the same as before the
Second World War. According to the 1959 census, Kharkiv was composed of
48.4% Ukrainians, 40.4% Russians, and 8.7% Jewish residents (Pikalova, 2004,
pp. 452-457). In the mid-twentieth century, the city became one of the largest in
Ukraine with a population of 950,000 people in 1959 (Rachkov, 2011, p. 213).
As soon as the Soviet regime was established, Kharkiv became one of the
cities held up as an example of communist life. In fact, the tradition of communal
life, where the entire family shares the household goods obtained from working
together on the same land, was common in the Kharkiv area long before the Soviet
regime was established. In this respect, communal life in Kharkiv was similar to
traditional patterns of family relationships found in central and southern Russia
where joint family systems prevailed (Czap, 1982; Hoch, 1982; Melton, 1987; Polla,
2006). An important aspect of the joint family system in the Kharkiv area is
that it implied co-residence of more than two married couples in one household,
typically parents with more than one married son (Hrymych, 2013; Kravec, 1966;
Smolyar, 1998). During the nineteenth century, co-residence patterns started to
change and only a younger son’s family remained with the parents. However,
in this region land was often family-owned, meaning that even when residing
separately from parents, children still worked on the same land with their parents
(Hrymych, 2013; Kravec, 1966; Smolyar, 1998). Inheritance was typically divided
after the death of the father between all the married sons. These co-residence
and inheritance patterns made children economically dependent on the parents
not only before marriage but also later in life.
As described in historical perspective (see also Szoltysek (2015)), the tradi-
tional patterns of co-residence and inheritance rules in Lviv and Kharkiv could be
the underlying factors forming regional family values in contemporary Ukraine,
which are described by Perelli-Harris (2008a, p. 1157) as having a ‘more tra-
ditional, religious and nationalistic family orientation’ in western regions and as
more community oriented in the eastern regions. These connections, though plau-
sible, are still vague, as little is known about family relationships during the Soviet
time in Ukraine. This dissertation addresses this lacuna.
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1.5 Outline of the dissertation
This dissertation is organised into six chapters that mainly focus on the role of
family relationships in an individual’s reproductive careers in the course of the fer-
tility decline in Soviet Ukraine from 1950 to 1975. Considering this, the structure
also follows a reproductive career approach to present the findings. After the in-
troductory chapter, chapters 2 to 5 discuss the major events of informants’ repro-
ductive careers – marriage, entrance into parenthood, birth control and abortion,
transition to second birth – in the light of family and other social relationships.
Chapter 2 focuses on individual experiences of marriage and its surrounding
sub-transitions, such as courtship and wedding, which together could be seen
as a family formation process. This chapter addresses a long lasting question in
demography and family sociology of how and why an early and universal marriage
pattern has been maintained in Ukraine over time, and particularly in the 1950s-
1970s when in many Eastern European countries marriage rates remained high.
This was a reverse trend to most other European countries where during the same
decades the decline of the golden age of marriage had started. The core idea on
which I base my theoretical assumption in this study derives from the findings of
Kligman (1998) and Mezei (1997) that socialist family policies often incorporated
many traditional family values also common for historical family systems, such
as pronatalism and paternalism. Based on this idea, I investigate the theoretical
assumption that family relationships could also have supported and reproduced
these values alongside policy, which altogether might plausibly explain why an
early and universal marriage pattern has prevailed in this part of Europe until
today. This chapter address this question by investigating individual values and
decisions underlying family formation and the influences of family relationships
on this process connected to aspects of continuity of demographic behaviour and
values underlying family relationships.
Chapter 3 addresses the question of entrance into parenthood, which in the
pre-transitional, Soviet-time and contemporary Ukraine has always taken place at
an early age compared to other European countries. Similar to Chapter 2, I also
suggest that the e↵ects of pronatalist family policies encouraging early parenthood
and the emergence of certain reproductive norms favouring early parenthood to-
gether are seen as underlying factors behind this reproductive trend and could
also be connected to family values in Ukraine and their continuity. This chap-
ter, therefore, examines how family relationships influenced decisions about the
transition to first parenthood in Ukraine around 1950-1975 when the pronatalist
family policies and modern reproductive norms emerged.
Chapter 4 discusses individual experiences of abortion and birth control in the
context of gender relationships. In this chapter I particularly examine the role of
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spousal power dynamics in birth control and abortion practices, as the two regions
had significant di↵erences in abortion rates before and after abortion legalisation
in 1955. The debate that I address in this chapter is whether abortion practice can
be seen as a sign of or as lack of female agency in spousal reproductive decisions
and what this knowledge on female agency can tell us about the predominance of
this practice over other birth control practices. As such, this chapter examines the
role of local gender regimes and women’s agency in the emergence of the so-called
abortion culture and, specifically, regional di↵erences in the frequency of abortion
between the two cities in Ukraine from around the 1950s to the 1970s.
The discussion of abortion and other birth control methods in the context of
other family relationships is also addressed in more detail in Chapter 5. Here
I mainly focus on the informants’ experience of transition from first to second
births. In the literature on the lowest-low fertility decline, the transition to second
birth and the associated behaviour of early stopping are always seen as the main
preconditions behind this trend. As such, it has been suggested that regional
family values in Ukraine could help to understand these demographic processes
(Perelli-Harris, 2008a). I argue, however, that the tendency to early stopping had
already emerged during the Soviet time when the two-child norm was established
and that the changing role of the family relationships and values should already
be addressed at this time. This chapter explores the role of family relationships
in individuals’ decisions surrounding the transition to second birth Ukraine from
around the 1950s to the 1970s when the two-child family norm was establishing.
Chapter 6 highlights the main findings and conclusions in the light of the main
two research questions. It also addresses the implications of the theorisation of
family influences through the framework of local family systems and the theo-
retical and methodological implications of this approach. Finally, I discuss the
societal relevance and policy implications of my findings and avenues for future
research.
Chapter 2
Marriage
2.1 Introduction
Nearly every country in Europe has experienced declines in marriage over the
past half century and Eastern European countries are no exception to this trend
(Sobotka and Toulemon, 2008). Despite this decline, Eastern Europe has managed
to maintain a pattern of universal and early marriage, as marriage rates there have
been among the highest in Europe for the last half century (Figure 2.1) and the
average age at first marriage has been among the lowest. In Ukraine, for example,
the average age at first marriage in 2011 was 24.1 for females and 27.1 for males
(Eurostat, 2015b). That said, like the rest of Europe, cohabitation in Eastern
Europe is more common today than in the past, but it is practiced as a ‘prelude
to marriage’ rather than as an alternative to it. This also then suggests that in
this part of Europe marriage still remains an important event in the life course
(Hoem et al., 2009; Perelli-Harris and Lyons-Amos, 2015; Perelli-Harris et al.,
2014). Additionally, premarital cohabitation is more common today in Eastern
Europe than it was in the past.
So how and why has this marriage pattern been maintained in Eastern Europe
over time, and particularly from around the 1950s through the 1970s when most
other European countries experienced a decline in marriage and the start of the
marriage crisis. This study re-visits this question by focusing on individual values
underlying family formation in Ukraine from around the 1950s through 1970s, and
in particular the role of family and other social relationships in these processes.
The focus on family and other social relationships in the context of family
formation in Eastern Europe is important as classical demographic studies on
the area suggest that family structures in Eastern Europe have traditionally fa-
cilitated early and universal marriage through frequent intergenerational post-
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Figure 2.1: Crude marriage rates per 1000 population for Ukraine, Russia, Poland,
the Netherlands and Italy 1950-2012.2Source: Demoscope 2013.
marital co-residence and a tradition of equally partible inheritance (Coale, 1992;
Coale et al., 1979; Czap, 1982; Hajnal, 1965). Other studies argue that starting
after the Second World War this traditional marriage pattern was crucially main-
tained by Soviet family policy. Namely, socialist family policies in Eastern Europe
often incorporated many traditional family values also common to historical fam-
ily systems, such as pronatalism and paternalism (Goldman, 1993; Kligman, 1998;
Mezei, 1997). This suggests that family relationships could have supported and
reproduced traditional values alongside policy, which taken together might plausi-
bly explain why an early and universal marriage pattern has prevailed in this part
of Europe until today. This assumption seems even more plausible in the context
of recent studies showing that some countries with a socialist past no longer have
a universal and early marriage norm. In Eastern Germany, for example, both
the decline in marriage and the de-coupling of marriage and childbearing stem
from a society that is rejecting an early marriage norm as a relic of the socialist
past (Kla¨rner, 2015). As a result, in contrast to the socialist period, economic
and social uncertainty now postpones marriage and replaces it with cohabitation.
However, it must be said that family relationships have never been important for
the family formation stage in Eastern Germany (Kla¨rner and Keim, 2016).
2Data are not weighted by the population size of given countries.
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For many Eastern European countries scholars show that the early and univer-
sal marriage practice is closely connected to social pressure from parents to marry
and to have at least one child early in the marriage to avoid the risk of becoming
an ‘old maid’ (Perelli-Harris, 2008a). Moreover, the need for social recognition is
high in these societies, and marriage, in contrast to cohabitation, often functions
as a justification for others that partners trust each other and that they are ready
to take on adult responsibilities (Isupova, 2015; Mynarska et al., 2014). Finally,
some studies also suggest that path-dependency in family relationships may play
a role in marriage, reinforcing past patterns of early and universal first marriage
and parenthood in Eastern Europe (Ghodsee and Bernardi, 2012; Romaniuk and
Chuiko, 1999). However, little empirical research has been conducted on how fam-
ily relationships shape family formation decisions in practice. The present study
therefore asks how did family relationships and family values influence family for-
mation in Ukraine during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s when the Soviet pronatalist
and paternalist family policies were just enacted? To address this question, I
refer to the framework of social influences on reproductive behaviour introduced
by Bernardi (2003) and also empirically studied in other investigations (Bernardi
and Kla¨rner, 2014; Keim, 2011b,a; Keim et al., 2009, 2012; Rossier and Bernardi,
2009).
I start with an overview of family values underlying family formation in
Ukraine over time. I then reconsider these values and relationships in the con-
text of my empirical data findings. The empirical data consist of 66 life history
interviews with men and women who married, or remained single, from around
the 1950s through the 1970s, and who at the time lived in the city of Lviv in
western Ukraine or in the city of Kharkiv in eastern Ukraine. These regions are
often presented as having di↵ering family values and reproductive strategies in
both historical and contemporary contexts (Hrytsak, 2007; Perelli-Harris, 2008a).
As such, including both of them allows a comparative study of family formation
in Soviet Ukraine.
2.2 Family formations, family relationships and
paternalism in Ukraine over time
In Ukraine, kin members, particularly parents, were historically involved in their
children’s marriages. Parents played a crucial role in many aspects of married
life, such as the choice of a suitable partner, the timing of courtship, and the
organisation of a wedding (Kis, 2012; Smolyar, 1998). Ethnographers have shown
that from the 19th to the early 20th centuries, Ukrainian wedding ceremonies were
typically surrounded by rituals where a wife- and a husband-to-be were passive
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participants who would simply be ‘waiting to be guided’ through this life transition
(Mayerchyk, 2011). In this context, ‘waiting to be guided’ meant that parents, as
well as in-laws, siblings, and other kin would take care of everything regarding the
wedding’s organisation, such as cooking and cleaning. More surprisingly, parents
would also undertake such intimate acts as bathing and dressing up the bride- and
groom-to-be (Mayerchyk, 2011, pp. 90-92). Taken together these rituals signify
not only that young people exercised little agency in marriage decisions but also
that marriage was typically initiated and organised by parents.
The lack of agency in marriage decision-making did not necessarily imply sub-
missive parent-child relationships. In fact, ethnographers have documented that
parents sometimes forced their children into an unwanted marriage to improve the
family’s economic conditions and thus young person well-being. These incidences
aside, scholars suggest that parental involvement in these matters of marriage
was usually seen as an essential and welcomed step in securing their children’s
future livelihoods because parents, and elderly in general, were considered wiser
and more experienced in these matters than young people (Kis, 2012). Before
the 20th century, parents also secured their children’s livelihoods in marriage by
granting their children a share of their inheritance as permitted under the part-
ible inheritance system in some parts of western Ukraine (Behey, 2003), or by
granting them the right to use parental property together with the parents and
other married siblings, as was done in some regions of eastern Ukraine (Hrymych,
2013). As such, primarily for males the transition to marriage signified the en-
trance into adulthood. For females this transition was often realised through a
change of residence to either neolocal or patrilocal residence.
All these traditional inheritance systems and their link to post-marital res-
idence patterns indicate that a child’s dependency on the parents, both moral
and financial, was especially high before marriage, and that this dependency was
frequently prolonged after marriage. Of course, these intergenerational dynamics
would gradually change over the life course, and when the youngest generation
became parents themselves, the cycle would start again. This pattern suggests
that strong intergenerational ties characterised by paternalistic values surrounded
family formation in the pre-historic Ukraine.
In modern times, when the Soviet regime eliminated private property and thus
traditional inheritance patterns, marriage in Ukraine seemed to lose its impor-
tance in conventional terms. Moreover, new legal regulations governing relation-
ships were introduced in the 1920s, such as as the legal recognition of cohabitation
and divorce. These regulations supported the idea that the choice of a partner
had to be a personal one and thus detached from the economic profit of other
family members. The choice of partner was now meant to be primarily based on
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romance and love, and the traditional and pragmatic idea of marriage had to be
replaced by a marriage based on these ideals (Goldman, 1993).
However, this idealistic view of marriage was never realised in Soviet Ukraine.
In practice marriage still continued to perform a pragmatic function: marriage
was an investment in an individual’s future livelihood and security, the two main
criteria for choosing a potential spouse (Lapidus, 1978; Shlapentokh, 1984). Even
during Soviet times, parents played an essential role in their children’s married
life, but less with regard to partner choice and more with respect to post-marital
residence, as many Soviet families resided in multigenerational households (Blum,
2003). In addition, studies show that marriage in the Soviet context often pre-
ceded other life events that were also typically linked to the transition into adult-
hood, such as acquiring material independence from parents and sometimes even
finishing educational training (Blum et al., 2009). This implies that until mar-
riage, and frequently also afterwards, children would remain under parental super-
vision and protection (Ghodsee and Bernardi, 2012; Rotkirch and Kesseli, 2010).
As such, marriage signified an entry stage into adulthood in the Soviet society,
rather than an achievement of adulthood as it was in the West.
Additionally, transition into marriage also changed an individual’s social sta-
tus. Particularly for females, marriage and first childbirth signified the attainment
of womanhood, as only after these events was a woman allowed to proceed with
her career and other self-realisation goals without being subjected to social judg-
ments (Rotkirch, 2000; Rotkirch and Kesseli, 2010). Those women who aimed to
establish their career before marriage and childbearing would typically be consid-
ered selfish in these societies (Rotkirch, 2000).
On the state level, marriage also became an important societal institution,
especially after the 1944 Family Edict when only registered marriages were con-
sidered legal, and cohabitation was no longer recognised (Lapidus, 1978). In the
context of declining fertility rates, marriage started to perform a twofold func-
tion. First, marriage was an essential mechanism to decrease the number of
children born out of wedlock. Particularly during the Second World War, the
number of children born out of wedlock increased, as well as did the number of
orphans (Lapidus, 1978). Second, marriage helped to control not only illegitimate
births but also birth rates, in general, which was essential to maintain population
growth. In the context of homogenisation of genders, which was a part of the
Soviet egalitarian discourse, ‘a couple, despite being based on marriage, was val-
ued only when it (re)produced’ (Mezei, 1997, p. 225). To encourage reproduction,
the state o↵ered many social benefits to married couples with children, such as
accommodations and jobs, while non-reproducing couples received none of these.
In many ways, the Soviet state re-introduced some traditional paternalistic
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and pronatalist values around family formation (Kligman, 1998; Mezei, 1997).
However, the state’s maintenance of these values and the implications of these
values for family formation decisions would not have been e↵ective without the
acceptance and practice of these values within society and particularly within
family. Understanding post-war marriage practices from the perspective of per-
sonal relationships between generations, siblings, spouses, and peers is therefore
necessary.
The approach to study family formation from a social relationships perspective
was also used in a study by Bernardi and Oppo (2011). In their 2012 study,
Bernardi and Oppo argue that alongside individual choices of family formation,
family relationships in the form of the strength of family ties and family culture,
shape these experiences as well. They argue that ‘romantic relationships, in most
cases, bring along a quest for social recognition’, which, in turn, is conditioned on
the evaluations and expectations of others (Bernardi and Oppo, 2011, p. 100).
At the same time, and as Bernardi (2003) argued earlier, social relationships
can also influence individual reproductive decisions. Scholars define four main
mechanisms of social influence on reproductive decisions: (1) social learning, (2)
social and emotional contagion, (3) social and normative pressure, and (4) social
support (see, for example, Bernardi and Kla¨rner (2014)). For a more detailed
description of these influences, see Chapter 1. Until now, studies have examined
social influences only in the context of childbearing decisions. In this present
study I expand this framework to include the study of family formation decisions
and I connect these social influences on childbearing decisions to the character of
family ties and cultural values surrounding them.
2.3 Research methodology
2.3.1 Data collection
Life history interviewing is often used to collect retrospective data on complete
life courses or on parts thereof (Miller, 2000). For this study, I used this method
to collect 66 complete reproductive histories of men and women who resided in the
Ukrainian cities of Lviv or Kharkiv from around the 1950s through the 1970s (for
the informants’ characteristics, see Table 1, Chapter 1). Fieldwork was conducted
between July 2012 and April 2015.
The interviews were open-ended, direct and personal conversations that, on
average, lasted for two hours. In every interview I attempted to uncover the indi-
vidual’s experiences of various reproductive events, including courtship, marriage,
childbearing, and birth control. I also addressed the meanings that participants
attached to significant others in their reproductive decisions, namely those who
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influenced, helped with, or prevented them from making reproductive decisions.
Finally, I tried to understand how their reproductive choices were shaped by the
broader context of influential historical events and policy regulations, such as
the introduction of abortion and maternity leave as well as other social-economic
conditions in Ukraine.
Purposeful and snowball samples were used to recruit the informants. These
two sampling techniques ensured that the informants came from economic and
educational backgrounds as diverse as possible. I did not aim to create a rep-
resentative sample of the entire population of the two cities, but rather I aimed
to interview a diverse enough group of individuals to enable a study of di↵er-
ences along a number of axes. The interview structure, sampling techniques, and
recruitment of informants are discussed in greater depth in Chapter 1.
Secondly, life history calendars (LHC) were filled in with every informant after
every interview. The calendar method helped to structurally gather biographical
data on household composition, births, and marriages over the life course as well
as the informant’s career development and that of the informant’s spouse were
also recorded (Axinn and Pearce, 2006).
2.3.2 Data analysis
To analyse the interviews, I used Atlas.ti qualitative software. I applied two cod-
ing strategies to my analysis. First, I carried out structural coding (Saldan˜a, 2012)
aiming to identify life course transitions and their sequences in every interview.
Second, I performed domain and values coding (Saldan˜a, 2012) of the transitions
related to marriage: courtship, wedding and post-marital residence. After coding,
certain sub-themes emerged, such as ‘practical marriage’, ‘parental control over
courting’ and ‘partners choice and parental solidarity’. I then used the query tool
to select the quotations according to the groups of documents that were created
beforehand (i.e., document families): city (Lviv or Kharkiv) and gender (male or
female). Finally, throughout the analysis, I used the LHCs as a triangulation tool
with which I could reconstruct a biographical profile of every informant and could
link it to their narratives when needed.
2.4 Setting
For decades, the western and eastern parts of Ukraine have been seen as in-
teresting comparative sites primarily because they have historically di↵ered in
many socio-cultural aspects, such as language, religion, and family relationships.
The provincial centres (oblast) Lviv in western Ukraine and Kharkiv in eastern
Ukraine were chosen as the comparative field sites in this study. Over the last
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two centuries, these two cities have undergone di↵erent social changes. Lviv, first
part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and later Poland, became part of the So-
viet Union in 1939. Yet, in practice many Soviet policies were implemented there
only after the Second World War, such as industrialisation and collectivisation,
Khrushchev’s more liberal policies concerning female employment in more flexible
spheres, and the re-legalisation of abortion in 1955 and divorce in 1968.
In terms of population, Lviv had a population of almost half a million (411,000)
in 1959, making it the most populated city in western Ukraine at the time (Bod-
nar, 2010, p. 41). Its population also became more homogeneous in the aftermath
of the Soviet and German occupations during the Second World War. During
the 1950s and 1960s, the rapid influx of Ukrainian migrants primarily from the
neighbouring rural and urban areas meant that Ukrainians came to constitute the
city’s majority (60% in 1959) (Hrytsak, 2007, p. 41). During this period, Russian
migrants were the second largest minority in the city (27% in 1959) (Hrytsak,
2007, p. 41); however, their percentage declined over the years.
Lviv after the Second World War can thus be seen as an entirely di↵erent
city from that in the interwar period, as mainly Ukrainian migrants populated
the post-war city. In western Ukraine in the late 1940s, the Soviet government
started the process of dissolution of private property rights, and also started russi-
fication and sovietisation campaigns. These campaigns, however, were softer than
similar campaigns in other Belorussian or Baltic regions at that time (Amar, 2015;
Hrytsak, 2007). This allowed Ukrainians of provincial origin to retain their more
traditional values, such as strong religiosity, commonly Greek Catholicism, and
strong family ties. During the post-war years these values significantly shaped the
city’s mentality which even today is characterised by religiosity, patriotism and
family values (Amar, 2015; Bodnar, 2010; Hrytsak, 2007; Perelli-Harris, 2008a).
By maintaining relationships with family in villages and towns as well as with
other immigrants in Lviv, newcomers to Lviv were able to retain their traditional
life styles and were thus slower in adopting new socialist norms (Bodnar, 2010).
Moreover, their often family-oriented values were reinforced by the area’s com-
mon opposition to the Soviet regime and by the idea that personal information
should be shared only with those whom you trusted, usually relatives and family
members.
In contrast to Lviv, Kharkiv was proclaimed the first capital of the Ukrainian
SSR in 1919, and after that it was one of the best implementations of the Soviet
ideological thinking. This automatically implies that forced industrialisation and
collectivisation started there much earlier than in the rest of Ukraine. In 1959,
Kharkiv’s population was nearly one million (950,000) and it was also the biggest
city in the area (Rachkov, 2011, p. 213). The city’s ethnic composition did not
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Figure 2.2: Crude marriage rates per 1000 population for Lviv province, Kharkiv
province, and Ukraine 1950-2012. Source: Kharkiv State Archive, fond 5231;
Statystychnuy shorichnyk Lvivskoi oblasti za 2003, 2007, 2011 rik.
change after the Second World War. According to the 1959 census, Kharkiv
was composed of 48.4% Ukrainians, 40.4% Russians, and 8.7% Jewish residents
(Pikalova, 2004, pp. 452-457).
With regard to marital behaviour, Lviv and Kharkiv were very similar during
the Soviet period (Figure 2.2). In both localities marriage rates first sharply
declined during the first decade after the Second World War, a result of the
large decreases in the male population due to war causalities. By the 1970s,
the sex ratio normalised for all ages under forty-three (Lapidus, 1978, p. 251),
and as of the mid-1960s, marriage rates started to increase and reached 10-12
marriages per 1000 population in both regions until the early 1990s (Figure 2.2).
This development indicates a return to a traditional marriage pattern after the
Second World War in Ukraine. In the following section I analyse individual family
formation experiences at the onset of this return.
2.5 Results
The unique status that family formation has in individual lives in Ukrainian
society can be traced through a simple example of language use when referring
to the transition into marriage. In both Ukrainian and Russian, both spoken in
Ukraine, the meaning of the words ‘woman’ and ‘man’ are identical to those of
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wife and husband. In Ukrainian, zhinka is used for both ‘wife’ and ‘woman’. In
Russian zhena and zhenshina are used. Similarly, cholovik in Ukrainian is used for
‘husband’ and ‘man’ and in Russian myzh and myzhchina.3 Putting this language
aspect into the context of the transition to marriage also signifies the overlap with
the entry into social adulthood in this society. The former would denote not only
a change in one’s marital status but also a change of one’s gender identity and
a sense of maturity. Together, these life course changes place incredible pressure
on the individual with regard to family formation, which may require assistance,
support and often even the approval of others, such as family and kin members. In
this section, I examine di↵erent life-course stages linked to family formation that
appeared during the analysis, namely courtship, decision to marry, and wedding,
and the role family relationships played in these stages in Lviv and Kharkiv from
around the 1950s through the 1970s.
2.5.1 Courtship: norms on premarital sexuality in the con-
text of family relationships
From the 1950s through the 1970s men and women in Ukraine viewed courtship
and marriage through a lens similar to that of their counterparts in other Euro-
pean countries. While courtship was generally associated with romantic relation-
ships as well as love and passion, marriage was linked to practical considerations
(Rotkirch, 2000; Szreter and Fisher, 2010). Similarly, the informants from Lviv
and Kharkiv also associated courtship with romantic love, but courtship rarely
meant having long-term pre-marital relationships. The nature of the courtship
practice is also reflected in how the informants referred to it. In nearly every tes-
timony, courtship was referred to as friendship, similar to what Rotkirch (2000)
also finds for Soviet Russia. In this respect, it was common ‘to be friends’ with
several potential candidates without making a promise to marry. However, once
individuals reached a marriage agreement, it was normal to get married soon
thereafter. On average, a courtship period with a future spouse lasted for about
a year and in some rare cases for two or three years. At this stage, continuing
dating other potential candidates was not acceptable and could cause a break up.
After courtship, a brief betrothal period followed. In addition to its brevity,
betrothal had another crucial aspect: it was uncommon for the betrothed to have
intimate contact before marriage. In fact, intimate contact was even stigmatised
as the quotes of these informants highlight:
3The same implies for the words ‘boy’ and ‘boyfriends, and ‘girl’ and ‘girlfriend’, which have
identical spellings: hlopec and divchyna in Ukrainian, and paren and devushka in Russian,
respectively. Rotkirch (2000, p. 60), shows that courtship relationships were typically referred
to as ‘to be friends’ (dryzhit) or courting somebody (uchazhivat za kem-to)
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I have to tell you that although there were several guys before I
got married at the age of 35, I remained ‘honest’ until marriage.
When we visited his parents one week before our marriage, his
mother arranged a bed for us. But I told her that we would not
sleep in the same bed. I did not have anyone before I got married,
and I also agreed with my husband that only after marriage would
that happen (Khrystyna, born in 1931, unskilled worker, Lviv).
Raisa: There were a few [guys], but there was nothing serious
between us.
Interviewer: Do you mean that you didn’t have sex?
Raisa: No, of course we didn’t. It was not acceptable. At that
time it was not even spoken about, these kinds of issues. It was
an enormous shame, for God’s sake. No, no, never.
Interviewer: Didn’t you have friends who went through such ex-
periences [having sex prior to marriage]?
Raisa: No, neither my girlfriends nor me went through it. They
all were normal. They were very strict about it, and the disci-
pline was strict, very strict (Raisa, born in 1934, skilled worker,
Kharkiv).
These quotes vividly illustrate the aspect that was prominent in many tes-
timonies – a vitality of pre-marital female virginity. Similar to Soviet Russia
(Rotkirch, 2000), female virginity before marriage in Ukraine was also a matter of
a woman’s pride. In her quote, Khrystyna highlights that she kept her ‘honesty’,
meaning virginity, until marriage, even though she married for the first time when
she was 35, which even today is quite late by Ukrainian standards. Even though
Khrytyna was exceptional in this respect, her experience indicates that a strong
norm regarding female virginity before marriage not only existed but was also
followed. She also acknowledges emphasising it to her future mother-in-law by
refusing to share a bed with her husband-to-be before they got married. This may
suggest that premarital sex was socially controlled not only through an individ-
ual’s consciousness to follow the norm but also through constantly communicating
it to and confirming it with the social environment, which can also be seen as a
normative pressure (Bernardi, 2003). Such a normative pressure appears even
more explicitly in the testimony of Raisa, who describes the existence of a strict
discipline and hence external social control of female virginity before marriage.
The crucial role of controlling a woman’s pre-marital sexuality was performed
by her parents. In the narratives of female informants, parental control was often
enacted by restricting their young daughters’ freedoms of pre-marital dating in
di↵erent ways, as the quotes below illustrate:
With my parents, we had an agreement that I had to be back
home by ten in the evening. God forbid if it was later, at eleven
or so. That never happened! Otherwise, it would lead to a
huge quarrel with my stepfather (Kateryna, born in 1942, skilled
worker, Lviv).
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My mother always told me ‘Be careful not to invite something
on your lap’4(laughing) (Naida, born in 1936, unskilled worker,
Kharkiv).
When I was at technical college and also worked at the factory,
most of my peers were already married. And then if something
didn’t work out with a man’s wife, he would cheat with factory
girls. But my parents always told me, ‘You don’t need this type
of man. You should not destroy other women’s families. You
don’t need it’. My parents were very strict about it, and as long
as there was no [marriage] stamp in my passport, I had to be
silent (Zoya, born in 1938, civil servant, Lviv).
As the quote by Zoya suggests that once women could show in their passport
that they were married, they received many freedoms, including freedoms in their
relationship with their parents. However, until that moment parents extensively
supervised the courtship of the daughters by controlling their reproductive ac-
tivities to help them preserve their virginity. This is also supported by Naida’s
quote, which refers to a famous Ukrainian proverb that her mother used to tell
her and that warns a young woman to be careful and not to get pregnant before
marriage. Similar to traditional Ukrainian culture (Kis, 2012), a woman who got
pregnant before marriage in Soviet Ukraine would be stigmatised and could even
be marginalised. Although the Soviet family policy granted extensive social sup-
port to single mothers, these women and their families were often dishonoured
in society, and it was harder for them to get married and to have stable rela-
tionships afterwards.5 To reduce their daughters’ risk of pre-marital pregnancy,
parents typically exercised a strong discipline by setting up rules, such as when
a girl is expected to be back home, as in Kateryna’s case, or with whom she can
‘be friends’, as in Zoya’s case.
In the context of a strong patriarchal culture, which the Soviet Union uno -
cially promoted, the norms on premarital relationships for males before marriage
were less strict, as is suggested for the case of Soviet Russia (Rotkirch, 2000).
However, the oral testimonies in this study indicate that Ukrainian culture had
some restrictions on male sexuality.
4The original Ukrainian saying is: ‘dyvys v podoli ne prynesy’
5In traditional Ukrainian culture, parental and community control over the sexuality of un-
married females was extremely strict primarily because females who gave birth out of wedlock,
the so-called pokrytka, would be stigmatised. Moreover, this stigma would also often spread
to their families. Ethnographers describe various rituals related to di↵erent ways of checking
female virginity before marriage, such as the proof of vaginal bleeding after the first intercourse,
which then would be presented to either a community or in-laws as a proof of the bride’s honesty
(Kis, 2012). Another example is that of courting nights, or vechornyci in Ukrainian, where un-
married boys and girls would be allowed to meet and to do some non-sexual activities together
while being surrounded by an older generation, such as was done in western Ukraine (Kis, 2012;
Mayerchyk, 2011). In other regions, such as in central and eastern Ukraine, these activities
could imply some sexual play (Kis, 2012; Worobec, 1990). However, the issue of female virginity
still remained strict even when some sexual experience was allowed, as not every male would
agree to marry a woman if she became accidentally pregnant (Mayerchyk, 2011).
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Today, young people are more open about these issues. Back then
it was very strict. Free sexual relationships were not allowed,
unless within marriage. Normally, it was not even discussed and
very much self-understood. Of course, there were always those
who did not obey the rules. But the general rule was that in case
of something [pregnancy], one should get married. And when I
was dating a woman who I didn’t want to marry because she was
much older than me, and it was just for fun, I tried to be very
careful with her (Andrei, born in 1934, scientific elite, Kharkiv).
Before marriage, no sexual relationships were allowed. But my
mother got to know. She calculated that our first son was con-
ceived before our marriage. She caught us in this (laughing). It
was quite a big scandal (Vasyl, born in 1934, civil servant, Lviv).
The quotes by Andrei and Vasyl suggest that restrictions on male sexual ex-
periences before marriage were less concerned with the issue of virginity and more
concerned with the responsibility to marry a woman if pre-marital sex resulted
in pregnancy. While there were di↵erences in male and female pre-marital sex-
uality norms, male sexual experiences, like their female counterparts, were also
controlled by direct parental and community pressure.
These strict regulations and pressure on the pre-marital sexualities of both
males and females, as well as the short-term courting practices that quickly led
to marriage, could explain why marriage and first childbearing often occurred in
close succession, within one or two years. As indicated above, childbearing was
less likely to be accepted by parents and others if it took place outside marriage.
In relation to this, I observed that a clear age norm existed for when each sex was
supposed to enter into marriage. For females, the age norm was between 20 and
25 years of age. After that, a woman would be considered an old bride, which
Perelli-Harris (2008a) also indicates for contemporary Ukraine. For males, the
age limit was slightly higher; however, by the age of 30 men were expected to be
married. In this respect, parental interest in protecting their children’s reproduc-
tive activities before marriage could be driven by the common acknowledgment
of its fundamental purpose – to enter into parenthood, which I elaborate on in
the following section.
2.5.2 Marriage: norms, decision-making, and family influ-
ences
In addition to the practical aspects of marriage (Rotkirch, 2000; Shlapentokh,
1984), another crucial reason for getting married was its close link to childbearing.
Women, in particular, connected their marriage decisions to their reproductive
roles and to the importance of family in a female’s life course. This furthermore
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justifies why the norm of pre-marital female virginity aimed to secure procreation
within marriage. Surprisingly, men also acknowledged that for them marriage
was also a necessary step to having children, as the quote of a male informant
illustrates.
Once you are married, you are meant to have children. At least
one child should be around. You create a family and children
should be a part of it. Otherwise, why should you get married?
You can continue having a relaxed life. There are many girls
around, beautiful girls, and every day you can go out with a
di↵erent one to enjoy the theatre, cinema and so on (Maksim,
born in 1935, civil servant, Kharkiv).
Similar to other testimonies, Maxim’s view on marriage indicates that this
life stage created a di↵erent set of responsibilities than those surrounding the
pre-marital stage. When still young and not married, a man and a woman had
more freedom with regard to whom they wanted to meet but also with regard
to their leisure time. Entering into marriage restricted these leisure activities
and added extra responsibilities. However, because these changes were among
the major signs of being a proper grown up, many informants perceived them as
their major thresholds to the adult life. At the same time, those who remained
single after passing the marriageable age were seen as not yet being aware of real
life. The narratives explicitly illustrated that people rushed to grow up and to
become proper men and women, both of which could be achieved and confirmed
by passing into a marriage and by acquiring marital status.
As a result, this significance of marriage in an individual’s life created norma-
tive and social pressure to get married as soon as possible. This meant that the
informants not only had a subjective obligation to get married (Bernardi, 2003),
but also received explicit external promotion to do so. Social pressure often came
from the closest circles, such as parents, family and peers as the quotes below
illustrate.
I was 26 when he o↵ered to marry me, and I realised that all
my girlfriends were already married and some even had children,
while I was still as free as a bird. And in a way my mother urged
me to accept his o↵er (Zoya, born in 1938, civil servant, Lviv).
On the moral level, I often felt a pressure that my life was not
yet ‘settled’ (Evgenija, born in 1930, civil servant, Kharkiv).
The quotes by Zoya and Evgenija illustrate that for women in their early and
mid-twenties, the normative pressure to get married would appear, and it would
only grow with age urging the transition to happen. Parents reinforced these
feelings by providing support in advising on a future partner, as in Zoya’s case,
or sometimes also by helping to find a partner, as I show later. Additionally, in
some cases, parents could exert social pressure and literally force their children
into marriage, as the following testimonies illustrate:
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My mother really wanted me to get married. It was something
horrible. It seemed that I hindered her somehow (Oksana, born
in 1932, unskilled worker, Lviv).
His mother basically forced him into marriage. She thought I was
a great candidate. So, one day he came to my place to ask me
(Naida, born in 1936, unskilled worker, Kharkiv).
Parental supervision of their children’s marital trajectories was often driven
by some practicalities, such as the benefits that parents would receive from get-
ting their children married, especially daughters. Marriage often implied patri-
lineal post-marital residence, at least during the first half year. In poorer house-
holds, such as with Okasana, marriage was an opportunity to free up space in
the parental household as the bride would leave to live with the groom’s parents.
Moreover it served a practical function both for the parents and for the newly-
wed. At the same time, the quote by Naida illustrates that in-laws could also
help to accelerate this event, as residing together with a daughter-in-law would
bring additional household help. At first glance these realities may seem archaic
for the Soviet time. However, particularly among people from rural areas who
were the first generation to settle in cities, as with Oksana and Naida, these were
the everyday realities.
In choosing a partner, many of the informants met their future spouses through
work or studies. A variety of educational and work opportunities in Soviet cities
allowed meeting a partner from more or less the same social background, i.e.
similar interests and life priorities, which informants often mentioned as decisive
categories for choosing a future partner. Additionally, Soviet discourse discour-
aged parental involvement in their children’s marital choices. That said, in many
cases a marital choice still remained a practical choice often made for the rest of
the individual’s life, as the informants portrayed it. In this respect, parents and
other kin were often seen as helpful in finding a suitable partner.
In Lviv, it was typical for extended kin or for a village community, in the case of
rural migrants, to mediate in helping individuals find a potential partner. Because
the informants in Lviv distrusted the Soviet regime (Bodnar, 2010; Hrytsak, 2007),
they maintained particularly strong ties with kin and relatives and tended to
spend more time in these social circles and to have most of their friends from
these environments. Additionally, looking for a person from the same community
or through kin would secure the appropriateness and reliability of a future spouse,
as the testimonies clarify:
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He was also from Khmelnytskuy oblast, but from a neighbouring
village. And how did we meet? Well, once our mothers went
together to pick blueberries in the forest, and then they started
to talk, and my mother said that her two daughters lived in Lviv.
And my mother-in-law said that her son had just got back from
military service. So, they gave him my address, and one day he
came to visit me (Anna, born in 1930, skilled worker, Lviv).
We met accidentally. One of my relatives who also lived in Lviv
introduced me to my wife (Petro, born in 1933, unskilled worker,
Lviv).
After the two future spouses made a marriage agreement, it was common to
have an o cial meeting with the family during which this decision was announced.
Even when the future spouses knew each other’s families, this ceremony was a
matter of tradition. For many informants, particularly women, meeting the future
in-laws for the first time and before marriage played an important role in making
a final decision about marriage, as the following testimonies describe:
He said that he wanted to introduce me to his mother. I made din-
ner for this occasion. His mother came; she was a bit plump and
big, similar to my current mother-in-law. And when we started
to eat, the first thing she said was ‘Are you sick?’ and I replied
‘No, I am not sick!’ That was it. You know, I was very thin when
I was young, and I still am, as you can see (laughing). After this
dinner, we arranged a visit to his extended family, but just before
that, I realised that I wouldn’t go. I knew that she [mother-in-
law] didn’t like me from the start and that I wouldn’t be able to
live like that. So we split up (Lidia, born in 1929, civil servant,
Lviv).
I liked him a lot, and more importantly, I trusted him. I knew his
family, I knew his father, and that they are respectable people.
And because they were like that I knew that he couldn’t be a bad
person (Evgenija, born in 1930, civil servant, Kharkiv).
As the testimonies suggest, in reality marriage was a union not only between
a man and a woman, but also ‘with’ and ‘between’ their families. Particularly
for women, the relationships with future in-laws could play a crucial role in their
decisions to enter the marriage with a particular man.
Introducing a future spouse to the parents could also take place after the
marriage registration. The informants who did this claimed that their marriage
was their own choice and that they did not want to involve their parents. However,
behind the presented independence, the informants still feared that their parents
would not approve of their decision.
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Well, his mother was against him getting married at all. She
wanted him to get an education first and then to get married.
He was 25 when we got married and by the time he finished his
studies he would’ve been 30, you see. That’s too late. And one
day he told his mother that we got married. It was big surprise
for her, but it went well. (Viktoija, born in 1931, civil servant,
Kharkiv)
The fear that parents might intend to influence their child’s marital choice
suggests that parental control in its conventional sense still existed in the Soviet
context. Therefore, when parental control was strong, spouses would meet their
families after the marriage registration so that parents could not object to their
child’s marriage. Regardless if spouses met their families before or after the
marriage registration, the union was usually celebrated. In the following section
I discuss the rationale behind the marriage celebration and how it is actually
connected to practices of post-marital residence.
2.5.3 Rationale behind a marriage celebration
The informants typically celebrated their marriage in one of two ways: a formal
wedding or a simple marriage celebration. A formal wedding was a large a↵air
to which family, extended kin, friends and neighbours were invited. This kind of
celebration was more expensive, and many informants claimed that they did not
do it because of the costs. A marriage celebration, on the other hand, was a small
dinner to which only the closest family and friends were invited. The latter was
a more common and a cheaper alternative to the large wedding.
The marriage celebration typically followed the marriage registration in close
proximity, either on the same day or a few days afterwards.6 However, even
though the informants said that these two events often coincided, each of these
events conveyed a di↵erent meaning. The marriage registration was the legal
recognition of a marital union and was more important to the couple. This at-
titude was also supported by the practice of not having anyone present at this
occasion, not even parents, even if they were informed about the registration in
advance.7 On the other hand, the marriage celebration was an essential event
that had a particular social meaning, especially for parents and extended family
6Among some Lviv informants, the tradition of a church wedding, before or shortly after
the marriage registration was also common. However, because the Greek Catholic Church was
banned during the Soviet time, these informants usually had a church wedding either secretly
by inviting a priest to their homes, or in the Orthodox Church, restrictions on which were less
severe.
7In this respect, the church wedding was often performed in a close-knit setting, either with
only spouses present or with only close kin. The initiative of a church wedding always came
from the couple itself and less from the family, which contrasts to a baptism, which was also
always performed secretly, both in Lviv and in Kharkiv, but was often initiated by elderly family
members.
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and, typically, was also financially supported by them.
We didn’t tell anyone that we were going to get married. We
went there [ZAGS ] alone and registered our marriage (laughing).
Just registered and that was it. Then, there was also a small
celebration, a small one with a family, only family (Nadia, born
in 1938, civil servant, Lviv).
It was an ordinary student-like thing. Of course, when we applied
to register our marriage, we informed our parents. But we also
told them not to come, and that we would come and visit them
afterwards. After the registration, we went to them and they
organised a celebration for us, a very small one (Viktor, born in
1938, scientific elite, Kharkiv).
These testimonies illustrate that the marriage celebration most importantly
served to satisfy parental aspirations of having this event. In this respect, the
marriage celebration was a formal way to justify the relationship not only to the
parents but also to the whole community, which the following quotes show:
Well, we registered our marriage a year after the wedding, one
year after. I fist moved in with him and his family and then we
announced to my parents that we were getting married. But then
there were no free spots available on the date we planned, but I’d
already moved to his place, so we had to get married on that date.
Otherwise, it would’ve been awkward and my father would not
have approved (Naida, born in 1936, unskilled worker, Kharkiv).
Well, my mother wanted it [wedding] because she could not han-
dle that her only son would be left out, you understand? So we
save a bit of money for it and had a small wedding. For my
mother it was important, but it was less important for us (Vasyl,
born in 1934, civil servant, Lviv).
As these quotes illustrate, the marriage celebration served to publicly validate
the relationships and to give the relationship certain rights. For example, it
allowed partners to reside together, as Naida also indicated, and to have children in
a conventional and widely accepted way – within marriage. For parents, organising
their child’s marriage celebration was typically a matter of parental pride, as Vasyl
mentioned in regard to his mother.
Overall, the testimonies also illustrate that the matter of who was financially
responsible for the marriage celebration di↵ered between the informants. The
Kharkiv informants often expressed that they expected to receive financial support
for the marriage celebration from their parents. Moreover, the actual practice of
parental support was also common during the first years of marital life. Among the
Lviv informants, a couple would either receive some support from their parents or
they would be entirely self supporting. That said, the informants from Lviv often
tried to acquire material independence before marriage. As a result, some of them
became financially independent before or shortly after marriage. In Kharkiv, in
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contrast, acquiring material independence from parents was not a pronounced
theme in the narratives, and in practice, many informants materially relied on
and resided at their parents’ house even for some years after their first child was
born. The following quotes illustrate the most typical experiences of post-marital
residence in the two cities:
First we lived apart. I lived at my mother’s place. Then, after
some time we married in November and somewhere in spring he
came to visit me and told me that we had gotten an apartment
(Bohdana, born in 1933, civil servant, Lviv).
We lived at my aunt’s for a few months after we got married and
then we started to rent an apartment (Oleh, born in 1929, civil
servant, Lviv).
At first we lived at my parents’ place. When Zhenechka [first son]
was born, we moved to my grandmother’s, my father’s mother,
and lived with her until she died, and we inherited the house
(Natalija, born in 1933, civil servant, Kharkiv).
We lived in another half of my mother-in-law’s house. It was in a
neighbourhood called Holodnaja Hora. She shared the house with
her sister, who lived in another part of the house. Shortly after
our marriage, they [parents-in-law] moved to Donbas, and I lived
together with my husband in their part of the house (Zinaida,
born in 1939, skilled worker, Kharkiv).
Certainly, the expectations to reside with parents for some time after marriage
strongly depended on the housing availability in urban areas, which at that time
was very scarce, and as some scholars suggest, the urban housing shortage forced
many people to reside with their parents (Blum, 2003). However, the testimonies
above, as well as some other studies on this topic (Ghodsee and Bernardi, 2012;
Gruber and Heady, 2010b), illustrate that material factors were also reinforced by
a particular pattern of intergenerational relationships, which di↵ered between the
informants in the two localities. The main di↵erence could be linked to the degree
of paternalism in intergenerational relationships over the life course, particularly
to the patterns of post-marital residence and the reliability of receiving support
from parents and/or a spouse. These issues are explored in greater depth in
Chapter 3 and Chapter 5.
2.6 Conclusions
The main assumption of this chapter is derived from the argument posed some
two decades ago by Mezei (1997) and Kligman (1998). These authors showed that
the normative premises underlying the Soviet family policy, such as pronatalism
and paternalism and that today are often seen as reinforcing factors behind the
early and universal marriage pattern in Eastern Europe (Blum, 2003), are, in
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fact, anchored in the values underlying historical family systems. In this chapter
I primarily focused on this continuity in family values as interrelated with family
formation behaviour. Yet, unlike Mezei (1997) and Kligman (1998), I examined
how these values were expressed within actual family relationships. My main
focus in this chapter was on how family relationships and accompanying values
influenced family formation in Ukraine during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s when
the Soviet pronatalist and paternalist family policies had just been enacted. Be-
cause Ukraine is known for its regional diversity in many socio-cultural aspects,
such as language, religion, and family structures, I explored this issue in a com-
parative perspective of two urban localities, Lviv in western Ukraine and Kharkiv
in eastern Ukraine, where I conducted 66 life history interviews that are the main
source of my results.
Throughout the analysis I distinguished between three stages in the family
formation process: courtship, marriage, and marriage celebration. The courtship,
or betrothal stage, was often brief among the informants in both cities and its
particularity was the value of pre-marital virginity, especially female virginity.
In a previous study (Rotkirch, 2000), the issue of female virginity is frequently
emphasised in the context of stigma attached to illegitimate births. Even though
the Soviet state granted many rights and possibilities to single mothers, the 1944
Family Edict, which declared children born out of wedlock as illegitimate, in
actuality victimised both women and children (Lapidus, 1978). Considering this,
the parental control over female virginity before marriage was the main means
to secure a decent future for the younger generation. Moreover, the informants
associated livelihood security with a successful marriage and with the right choice
of marital partner.
Like female pre-marital sexual experiences, male pre-marital sexual experi-
ences were also subjected to parental control but not directly by protecting male
virginity but rather indirectly by controlling the outcomes of their pre-marital
sexual experiences. Specifically, when needed, parents reinforced the normative
pressure on their sons to marry the woman he unintentionally got pregnant.
Overall, parental social control around male and female pre-marital sexual
practices was not necessarily characterised by both sanctions and rewards, as
Bernardi (2003) and Bernardi and Kla¨rner (2014) assign to social pressure. In-
stead, sanctions associated with social control occurred to keep behaviour in a
certain order for the sake of both an individual’s and a community’s life being.
That is, sexual behaviour was controlled to avoid the shame of pre-marital birth
for the family. This makes social control a distinct mechanism from social and
normative pressure, although the last two reinforce the first. Together, these find-
ings also suggest that the overall historically low rates of illegitimacy in Eastern
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Europe are not only linked to the taboo on pre-marital sexual relationships but
also to the social norm that if a woman became unintentionally pregnant, the
child’s father would marry the mother given the strong parental control on these
matters both in historical and contemporary contexts.
In addition to thinking that a successful marriage provided more security over
the life course, informants also perceived marriage as a way to achieve more rights
and personal freedom. Informants frequently mentioned the state guarantee to
married couples to provide better access to housing and job opportunities as a
major factor for rushing into marriage. Additionally, informants often commented
on the freedom achieved in interpersonal relationships with parents when they got
married. They mentioned that getting married implied less parental control over
their lives, which made them feel more mature. Marriage indeed signified an
entry into adulthood as some previous studies have mentioned (Blum et al., 2009;
Rotkirch, 2000). The rush to grow up by entering adulthood and by getting
married could also be connected to the fear of becoming an ‘old maid’, which
Perelli-Harris (2008a) emphasises as one of the crucial pre-conditions for early
and universal marriage in Ukraine today.
Informants also associated the moment of receiving individual freedom from
their parents with receiving recognition of their marital choice. Although mar-
ital choice among the informants was typically portrayed as an individual one,
individuals still sought parental recognition, which I link to the expectations of
and reliability on parental help during early marital life. In this respect, parental
pressure regarding the decisions on early marriage, or fast transition to parent-
hood after marriage, as I show in Chapter 3, was followed by the expectations of
receiving parental support when the desired outcome was achieved.
However, the expectations of receiving this support and the degree of its pro-
vision di↵ered between the two localities. As an example, I present the case of
post-marital residence and individual expectations of residing with parents after
marriage or not. I observe that the informants from Kharkiv felt the need to
confirm their marital decisions with the parents, as many of them also expected
to reside with their parents for some time after marriage. Of course, these ex-
pectations could also be linked to the housing shortages at the time. However,
and as the examples of the Lviv informants show, even though state-provided free
housing was limited everywhere, informants always had the possibility to rent
an apartment. This option, however, was rarely considered among the Kharkiv
informants. Among the Lviv informants, on the other hand, a faster transition
to neolocal residence after marriage prevailed either through renting an apart-
ment or renting a shared apartment, or though applying early enough for a state
apartment. It could well be that the practice of neolocal post-marital residence,
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particular for Lviv informants, was linked to the availability of rental houses.
My analysis of family relationships illustrates that the informants’ expecta-
tions and practices of post-marital residence were linked to a di↵erent degree of
dependency on parental support, which I associate with the presence of paternal-
istic values in intergenerational relationships. An analogy here could be drawn
with the historical patterns of post-marital residence in the joint-family system
that prevailed in Kharkiv, where collective inheritance of parental property made
children longer dependent on their parents. In Lviv, where the nuclear-stem fam-
ily system historically dominated, the pattern of equally partible inheritance still
made children dependent on their parents but only until marriage after which
they received a share of parental property.
Of course, this continuity aspect should be studied further, but other studies
also suggest that patterns of post-marital residence in Eastern Europe are linked
not only to the availability of rented housing and family policy implications but
also to the character of intergenerational relationships (Ghodsee and Bernardi,
2012; Gruber and Heady, 2010b). Gruber and Heady (2010b) suggest that the
demand for rented housing could be connected to the culture of giving a dwelling
as a gift, which is more common today in urban areas in Eastern and Southern
Europe, where intergenerational residence of parents and their married children
is also the most prevalent across Europe. That said, if this historical continuity
in paternalistic intergenerational values can be connected to that of the socialist
state, which also exercised the same paternalistic values on young people, then
this connection could very well explain why universal and early family formation
patterns prevailed in Ukraine before, during, and after the collapse of the Soviet
Union.
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Chapter 3
Entrance into Parenthood
3.1 Introduction
One of the biggest puzzles of contemporary fertility behaviour in Eastern Europe
is that although there is a wide availability of modern contraception and di↵usion
of new family values, first parenthood still takes place relatively early in the life
course and in close proximity to marriage. In Ukraine, for example, the mean age
at first birth among women was 24.5 in 2011, while the mean age at first marriage
was 24.1, which today is among the lowest marriage ages in Europe (Eurostat,
2015b,a). Scholars often argue that pronatalist policies, uncertain economic condi-
tions and social anomie have encouraged early entry into parenthood in this part
of Europe (Billingsley, 2010; Frejka, 2008; Perelli-Harris, 2005, 2008a; Sobotka,
2004b; Thornton and Philipov, 2009). Others additionally suggest that the re-
productive norms particular for these regions also favour early first childbearing.
These norms include early motherhood as a biological necessity (Gabriel, 2005;
Mynarska, 2010), grandparental support with childcare (Gabriel, 2005; Rotkirch,
2000; Rotkirch and Kesseli, 2010), and first birth as the greatest achievement of
adulthood and womanhood (Blum et al., 2009; Rotkirch and Kesseli, 2010).
Although these explanations shed some light on recent developments in the
early transition to parenthood, they do not attempt to grasp the historical con-
tinuity of this trend, such as explaining why and how early first birth has been
a particular feature of fertility behaviour in Eastern Europe for at least the last
150 years, as historical demographic studies show (Coale et al., 1979). One vital
issue that needs to be addressed in this continuity behaviour is how the transition
to first parenthood occurred under the changing structural conditions imposed
by the USSR, particularly when the pronatalist policies of the Soviet Union, eco-
nomic uncertainty, and modern reproductive norms were just appearing in the
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1950s and 1960s. This chapter therefore examines individuals’ decision-making
on the transition to first parenthood in Ukraine at that time, and it pays particular
attention to family relationships in these processes.
The family constitutes the primary social environment for reproductive decision-
making. Moreover, in Eastern Europe, family relationships have been charac-
terised by strong ties over several decades. In the historical context, strong family
ties were reinforced though frequent intergenerational co-residence and patterns
of partible inheritance (Czap, 1982; Viazzo, 2010). Although during the Soviet
time changes in some traditional practices occurred, such as the abolishment of
private property and thus the discouragement of traditional inheritance and res-
idence patterns, traditional family values were still promoted by the state. This
especially holds true for the later period of Stalin’s regime (1935-1953) and the
de-Stalinization processes after 1953 both of which signalled a return to the tra-
ditional family values (Goldman, 1993; Lapidus, 1978). In practice, the state’s
promotion of these values meant that, like the historical context, the family contin-
ued to provide the major welfare for its members, especially in crisis situations,
such as child and elderly care. Moreover, post-war Soviet family policy repro-
duced paternalistic and pronatalist values that were also typical for historical
family systems in many Eastern European regions (Mezei, 1997). So far, how-
ever, little attention has been paid to understand how the continuity in family
values anchored in historical family systems has shaped the continuity in early
transition to parenthood in the Soviet context and more specifically what role
family relationships played in this transition. This chapter therefore asks: how
did family relationships influence decisions about the transition to first parent-
hood in Ukraine from around 1950 to 1975 when the pronatalist family policies
and modern reproductive norms emerged?
To detect family influences, I use the framework introduced in Bernardi (2003)
and later studies (Bernardi and Kla¨rner, 2014). I analyse 66 life history interviews
with men and women who were in their parenthood years during the 1950s, 1960s
and 1970s in the cities of Lviv and Kharkiv. The cities are the major centres
in western and eastern Ukraine, respectively, and were chosen for a comparative
analysis because they provided di↵erences in many socio-cultural aspects, such as
language, religion and historical family systems.
In the following section, I provide an overview of the ethnographic and histor-
ical literature on family relationships in Ukraine over time, and I compare them
for western and eastern Ukraine. I also discuss how I apply these influences to
detect cultural patterns of family relationships and values in relation to entry
into parenthood. In the third section, I describe the field sites, data collection,
and data analysis. In the fourth section, I address family influences on timing
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and decisions of first parenthood, including grandparental support provision with
childcare. In the concluding section, I discuss the links between the continuity in
early transition to first parenthood and family relationships in Ukraine.
3.2 Family relationships in Ukraine over time
In the territories of current western Ukraine,1 strong intergenerational depen-
dencies up until marriage and cooperative relationships between siblings after
marriage characterised families in this region. These family relationships largely
derived from the historical co-residence and inheritance patterns typical for the
region. As such, inheritance was historically partible and land was equally dis-
tributed among all sons at marriage (Behey, 2003; Kaser, 2002). After marriage,
a couple typically set up a nuclear household, separate from the parents, and
worked their land alone. Siblings could decide to merge their land if their own
parcels were too small.2 Only an oldest son and his family stayed with the par-
ents, worked the same land, and provided elderly care in later life. According to
Kaser (2002, 2006), a similar pattern of family relationships can also be observed
in parts of Romania, and it represents a mix of stem and nuclear family systems.
In the territories of current eastern Ukraine, such as the Sloboda Ukraine re-
gion,3 historical household and inheritance patterns were di↵erent from those in
western Ukraine, which also promoted di↵erent types of relationships between
family members. As sons transitioned to marriage, they did not move to their
own households but lived with their parents until their father’s death. The inher-
itance was collectively owned, meaning that the land was not divided between the
sons at marriage; however, they had the right to use it only if they got married
(Kaser, 2002; Kravec, 1966). Only after the father’s death would the sons be
allowed to divide the inheritance. However, the rules on whether they divided
it equally di↵ered from household to household, which was also the major cause
of conflicts between adult siblings. In this multigenerational household setting,
one’s social status strongly depended on age. Ethnographic studies have shown
that newly-wed women had the lowest status in the household and were often
subordinate to other kin members, such as mothers-in-law (Hilevych and Roter-
ing, 2013; Ivanov, 1898; Kis, 2012). However, when they became mothers-in-law
1Current territory of western Ukraine covers the areas of historical eastern Galicia, to which
belong today’s Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk and Ternopil provinces (oblasts).
2Austro-Hungarian laws encouraged collective ownership of the land because the land frag-
mentation in eastern Galicia became a crucial issue in the late 19th century. The peasants,
however, opposed these laws, and they have never been fully adopted (Franko, 1888; Kaser,
2002).
3Current territories of Sloboda Ukraine occupy the entire Kharkiv province, and parts of
Symmy and Lyhanks provinces (oblasts).
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themselves, they would acquire one of the highest positions in the household. As
a result, intergenerational dependency at least during the early years of marital
life was among the main characteristics of families in Eastern Ukraine. Scholars
suggest that this tradition of family relationships was also common in historical
Southern and Central Russia and is typically defined as a joint or communitarian
family system (Czap, 1982; Hoch, 1982; Polla, 2006; Todd, 1988).
When the Soviet regime was established in the early 20th century, these tradi-
tional household and inheritance patterns were discouraged. However, the Soviet
ideology still supported a communal lifestyle, like the communitarian model, yet
not necessarily between kin members. Some argue that traditional communal
lifestyle made adapting to the Soviet values easier in the regions where the com-
munitarian family systems prevailed, such as in parts of European Russia and in
Eastern Ukraine, and harder in the areas where stem family systems had prevailed,
such as in western Ukraine and the Baltic states (Todd, 1988, 1990).
After the 1950s, the Soviet state started a return to traditional family values,
and now the family, not the community, was seen ‘as a fundamental agency of
socialisation, as a supplier of essential productive, reproductive and emotional
services, and as a basic unit of decision-making that mediates the relation be-
tween public and private domains’ (Lapidus, 1978, p. 234). Moreover, the forced
industrialisation and rapid urbanisation that characterised the Soviet state in the
1950s and 1960s also facilitated the re-adoption of rural family values in Soviet
cities – a phenomenon typically defined as ‘ruralization’ (Blum, 2003). Studies
on urban families in Soviet Russia and Ukraine show that collective values and
reciprocal support between colleagues and neighbours, as well as strong inter-
generational relationships, constituted an essential part of people’s everyday lives
(Semenova and Thompson, 2005; Vinokurova, 2007). Studies on western Ukraine
also illustrate that in the 1950s and 1960s, the patterns of family relationships
that existed in the city of Lviv were also based on the local peasant family values
brought by migrants from the neighbouring rural areas (Bodnar, 2010). Some
additionally suggest that after the 1950s, the Soviet family policy started to im-
plement paternalistic and pronatalist values also particular for historical family
systems (Mezei, 1997), which reinforced the conservation of these values in so-
ciety. So far, however, little attention has been paid to how this continuity in
family values and relationships could have shaped the continuity in early transi-
tion to first parenthood in the Soviet context. This chapter therefore asks: how
did family relationships influence decisions on transition to first parenthood in
Ukraine from around 1950 to 1975 when the Soviet family policies and modern
reproductive norms emerged?
As discussed earlier, depending on which family values are important, di↵erent
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types of interdependencies in terms of power structures and support provision can
drive family relationships. In this respect, family members can wield direct or in-
direct influences on each other’s (reproductive) actions, decisions and attitudes to
reinforce certain interdependencies. Scholars define four such mechanisms, among
which social learning and social contagion are indirect influences, while social pres-
sure and social support are more direct influences (Bernardi, 2003; Bernardi and
Kla¨rner, 2014). For more on each of these influences, see Chapter 1. Moreover,
social support and social pressure may not only be expressed by family mem-
bers but can also be expected from a target person. For example, before getting
pregnant, a woman may have a certain idea of how her future childcare could
be arranged and who may be involved in it, such as the husband, grandparents
or friends. If she expects to receive support from any of these people, but the
person cannot fulfil her expectation, this situation may alter her decision to enter
parenthood. In this respect, expectations and actual provision of social support
are crucial in fertility decision-making.
3.3 Research methodology
3.3.1 Data collection
The life history interviewing is often used to collect retrospective data on complete
individual life courses or on parts thereof (Miller, 2000). For this study, this
method was used to collect 66 complete reproductive histories of men and women
who resided in the cities of Lviv and Kharkiv during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. I
spent 10 months conducting fieldwork in both cities: July to August 2012, March
to May 2013, August to November 2013, and February 2014. From October 2014
to April 2015, 20 interviews were conducted with the help of a research assistant
in Kharkiv.
The interviews were open-ended, direct and personal conversations that, on
average, lasted for two hours. In every interview, an individual’s experiences of
various reproductive events, including courtship, marriage, childbearing(s) and
birth control were uncovered. The interviews also addressed the meanings that
participants attached to significant others in their reproductive decisions, namely
those who influenced, helped with, or prevented them from making reproductive
decisions. Finally, it was important that the informants put their reproductive
choices in the broader context of influential historical events and policy regula-
tions, such as the introduction of abortion and maternity leave as well as other
social-economic conditions in the Ukraine?
Purposeful and snowball samples were used to recruit the informants. These
two sampling techniques ensured that informants came from economic and edu-
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cational backgrounds as diverse as possible (for the informants’ characteristic, see
Table1 in Chapter 1).
That said, this sample is not representative of the entire population of the two
cities. Moreover, because of its diversity and, thus, relatively small numbers of
individuals belonging to certain ethnic and religious groups, the sample does not
allow the exploration of these di↵erences in depth between the two localities. The
structure of the interviews, sampling techniques, and recruitment of informants
are more extensively discussed in Chapter 1. After every interview, life history
calendars (LHC) were filled in with every informant. The calendar method struc-
turally gathers biographical data on household composition, births, and marriages
while the informant’s career development and that of the informant’s spouse were
also recorded (Axinn and Pearce, 2006). Finally, I collected population statistics
and ethnographic literature on both regions. I used data on births and population
numbers to calculate crude birth rates for the regions (see Figure 3.1).
3.3.2 Data analysis
Given the specific nature of retrospective data, I did not try to detect the exact
reality or the truth behind every life story to answer my main research question.
Instead, I aimed to inform the general narrative by discussing various reproductive
experiences and the logic individuals attached to their decision-making and to
surrounding family relationships.
To perform the analysis, I used Atlast.ti qualitative software. I applied two
coding strategies to analyse the interviews. First, I carried out structural coding
(Saldan˜a, 2012) to identify life course transitions and their sequences in every
interview. Second, I performed domain and values coding (Saldan˜a, 2012) of the
transitions related to first parenthood: pregnancy, childbirth, abortion, miscar-
riage and childcare. After the coding, certain sub-categories emerged, such as
‘right timing of parenthood’, ‘decision-making on parenthood’, and ‘expectations
of parental support’. I then used the query tool to select the quotations according
to the groups of documents that were created beforehand (i.e. ‘families’ of docu-
ments): city (Lviv or Kharkiv) and gender (male or female). Finally, throughout
the analysis, I used the LHCs as a triangulation tool with which I could recon-
struct a biographical profile of every informant and link it to their narratives when
needed.
3.4 Setting
The cities of Lviv in western Ukraine and Kharkiv in eastern Ukraine are the
field sites in this study. Historically, western and eastern regions of Ukraine di↵er
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in many aspects, such as religion, language, economic development, demographic
behaviour, and traditions of family relationships.
In general, the city of Lviv was slower to industrialise and to adopt Soviet so-
cial reforms than Kharkiv, which was comparatively a more industrial and secular
city. The modernisation process in Lviv started in the mid-nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries when it was part of Austro-Hungary and later Poland. How-
ever, this process was slower than in Central and Eastern Ukraine, which at that
time fell under the rule of the Russian Empire. During the interwar period, Lviv
was a multicultural city where ethnic Polish and Jewish groups constituted the
majority of the population. Industrialisation was further reinforced when western
Ukraine became part of the Ukrainian SSR in 1939 and especially after the Second
World War. By 1959, Lviv’s city population had reached almost half a million
people (411,000), which made it the biggest city in western Ukraine (Bodnar,
2010). The city’s population also became more homogeneous in the aftermath of
the Soviet and German occupations during the Second World War. During the
1950s and 1960s, the rapid influx of migrants primarily from the neighbouring
rural areas and small towns meant that Ukrainians came to constitute the city’s
majority (60% in 1959) (Hrytsak, 2007). During this period, Russian immigrants
were the second largest minority in the city (27% in 1959) (Hrytsak, 2007); how-
ever, their percentage declined over the years. Female labour force participation
in Lviv also increased from 12.3% in 1950 to 42.3% in 1960 (Hyk, 1987, p. 193).
In contrast to Lviv, socio-economic development in Kharkiv followed a di↵er-
ent trajectory. Rapid economic development in the region started in 1919 when
the city of Kharkiv also became the capital of the Ukrainian SSR. From that
moment, the machine industry and various light industries started to develop.
The industrial developments during the interwar years, which later continued
during the 1950s and 1960s, led to a rapid influx of migrants to the city from
the neighbouring rural areas and from Russia. The city’s ethnic composition,
however, remained the same as before the Second World War. According to the
1959 census, Kharkiv was composed of 48.4% Ukrainians, 40.4% Russians, and
8.7% Jewish residents (Pikalova, 2004). In the mid-twentieth century, the city
became one of the largest in Ukraine with a population of 950,000 people in 1959
(Rachkov, 2011, p. 213). Female labour force participation during these years was
high. According to the state statistics, in 1950, the proportion of women among
blue-collar and white-collar workers was 46.9%.4
During the interwar period, the fertility transition was underway in Ukraine,
and by the 1960s, fertility fell below replacement level in some regions in eastern
Ukraine, including Kharkiv. In the Lviv region, the fertility transition started
4Department of demographic statistics of Kharkiv Statistical O ce, email request on April
2, 2014.
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Figure 3.1: Age specific fertility rates per 1000 women for Kharkiv and Lviv
provinces (oblasts) in 1960 compared to Hutterite ASMFR, 1921-1930. Sources:
Lviv oblasts – Department of statistics of Lviv Statistical O ce, acquired on
September 9, 2015; Kharkiv oblasts – Department of statistics of Kharkiv Statis-
tical O ce, acquired on April 5, 2013.
earlier, at the end of the 19th century, but it was more prolonged and below-
replacement fertility was reached only in the 1990s. The main consequences of
Ukraine’s post-war fertility decline were an even earlier entrance into parenthood
than in the interwar period, typically by the age of 25; considerable spacing
between births; and the tendency of stopping reproductive activities after first
birth (Steshenko, 2010). A decline in later-order births rather than postponement
of first birth also characterised the lowest-low fertility trend in the mid-1990s in
Ukraine (Perelli-Harris, 2005, 2008a; Sobotka, 2004b). Figure 3.1 illustrates that
on the regional level in 1960s, early entrance into parenthood, as well as the
majority of other births, took place before the age of 30. Moreover, compared to
Hutterite age-specific fertility rate (ASFR) in 1930 that represent the universal
pattern of uncontrolled fertility, the ASFRs in Lviv and Kharkiv were two to
three times lower for all age groups. This suggests that fertility was significantly
controlled in these areas.
In response to the general tendency of declining fertility during the post-war
years, the Soviet family policy took pronatalist and paternalistic measures to
boost fertility rates primarily by encouraging early first parenthood. In the 1950s
and 1960s, some significant parental benefits were introduced, such as granting
working mothers 112 days of paid maternity leave: 56 days before delivery and 56
days after delivery, and in cases of complications during delivery, additional days
3.5. RESULTS 67
could be added (Lapidus, 1978). Non-working mothers did not have any limits
on maternity leave and it was not paid. O cially, however, the state granted
any mother with children priority on the labour market (Lapidus, 1978). This
measure was meant to encourage women not to delay parenthood but to enter
it at an early age. Another legal mechanism that encouraged early age at first
parenthood was that married couples with children had priority in receiving state
housing. Moreover, the size of the apartment depended on the size of the family.
In some cases, it was also possible to receive a temporary apartment first before
getting a permanent one.
Another prominent event of the time was the re-legalisation of abortion in
1955. It is generally suggested that abortion legalisation negatively influenced
fertility in the Soviet Union (Blum, 2004). That said, it did not significantly im-
pact the timing of the entrance into parenthood because before first birth, abor-
tion was rarely practiced and even strongly discouraged by medical practitioners
(see Chapter 3). Discouraging abortion before first birth combined with a limited
knowledge and availability of alternative birth control methods also facilitated a
faster transition to first parenthood after marriage.
3.5 Results
Throughout the analysis, I observed two phases where family influences were
crucial: timing of and decision on first parenthood. The distinction between
these two phases is crucial in the context of Ukraine because the legalisation of
abortion allowed couples to make an actual decision about first parenthood after
conception took place. In this section, I address both phases in the context of
family influences, and the interdependencies in family relationships they implied.
In doing so, I discuss: 1) which social norms existed around the ‘timing’ and
‘decision’ on first parenthood; 2) family and peer influences on the formation of
these norms, namely ‘right’ timing of first parenthood, and how they motivated
the informants to follow these norms; 3) how the social influences, particularly
from the parents and spouses, formed certain expectations regarding support
provision with childcare; and 4) how these expectations were fulfilled.
3.5.1 First parenthood: the most important, yet rarely
planned event in life
Among all the informants, first parenthood was seen as one of the main events
in life. The importance of this event was linked to certain legal possibilities that
entrance into parenthood could reinforce: ability to apply for an apartment, and
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even an increase in the chances of getting a job. These possibilities were mainly
available to married couples with children, which would be ‘considered a family’,
as one informant put it (Maria, born in 1936, qualified worker, Lviv). Although
this phrasing could derive from legal terminology, it also conveys a social meaning
related to the change of social status upon entry into parenthood. Rotkirch and
Kesseli (2010) in their study on the post-Soviet period underline that for Russian
women, entrance into motherhood signifies achievement of womanhood. Others
additionally indicate that in Russia during the Soviet period, marriage and par-
enthood preceded the stages of leaving the parental home, establishing financial
independence and finishing educational training (Blum et al., 2009). Similarly, for
my informants in Ukraine, entrance into parenthood signified the transition from
youth to adulthood, and this was equally important to both men and women.
Remarkably, although first parenthood constituted one of the most important
events in life, it was rarely planned and the informants commonly claimed that
‘planning’ was not an appropriate term to describe their first parenthood deci-
sions. In fact, the absence of any planning habits was related to limited or no use
of birth control before first pregnancy, as well as few discussions between spouses
about it, as the following quotes illustrate:
It happened like it should. We did not plan it. No one planned
these things. It was legal, so to say. We were married (Andrij,
born in 1937, civil servant, Lviv).
It happened like it is, during our very first night together, at the
very first moment... It just happened. There were no birth control
methods at that time, nothing (Larisa, born in 1939, scientific
elite, Kharkiv).
These accounts show that first pregnancy not only took place but also had to
happen spontaneously. Some informants even expressed critical views on using
any means of birth control to delay first pregnancy and perceived this behaviour
as unacceptable and even selfish if practiced among married couples. The common
view was that when an individual married, it meant that s/he was ready to have
a child and thus to have a family:
It was supposed to be like that: once you’re married, you have a
child. If there is nothing, then you may start worrying. Generally,
it was like that in all families (Natalka, born in 1945, civil servant,
Lviv).
In this respect, not planning first parenthood complied with the understanding
of ‘right’ timing of first pregnancy – typically within a few years after marriage.
Surprisingly, among my informants, ‘right’ timing of first parenthood was not
linked to biological age, as previous studies find for contemporary Russia and
Poland (Gabriel, 2005; Mynarska, 2010), but was associated with a deadline for
marriage. Age limits for marriage were well defined, particularly for women: at
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the age of 25 and above a woman was considered an ‘old maid’ if she was not
yet married. In the following section, I show how these social norms around the
‘right’ timing of first parenthood were embedded in individual relationships with
family and peers.
3.5.2 The ‘right’ timing of first pregnancy in the context of
social relationships
To underline the importance of the ‘right’ timing of first pregnancy in one’s life
course, I start discussing it with the cases that deviated from the norm, namely
when first pregnancy did not take place within one year after marriage. The
following quotes from female informants illustrate these experiences:
Sveta (first child) was born in 1957. But I did not get pregnant
during the first year (after marriage). It worried me, and so I
decided to consult my gynaecologist, who said that everything
was fine and I just had to try more (Evgenija, born in 1930, civil
servant, Kharkiv).
I wanted to have a child soon after the marriage, but I didn’t get
pregnant for some time. His parents also worried. They worried
that I may not have children. But later I gave birth to Andriy
(Oksana, born in 1932, unskilled worker, Lviv).
As the quotes illustrate, the common concern behind a delayed first pregnancy
was that one of the spouses, typically the wife, could be sterile and thus unable to
have children. Such a diagnosis was seen as ‘a tragedy and often a social taboo’
(Rotkirch, 2000, p. 7) in Soviet society. Surprisingly, this issue would worry
not only the spouses but also the parents and the in-laws, as Oksana mentioned.
While first pregnancy was typically not discussed and some women mentioned that
they were too shy to tell anyone that they were pregnant until they showed, the
delayed pregnancy provoked discussion on this topic and could even cause spousal
and inter-generational tensions. These tensions were particularly apparent when
it was not immediately clear whether delayed first parenthood was a biological
inability or a purposeful delay. So, at this stage parents and in-laws would closely
supervise their children, as the quotes below illustrate:
It seems that they (parents-in-law) talked about it to him (her
husband), because once he told me: ‘We‘ve been living together
for such a long time, but nothing has happened yet’ (Sofia, born
in 1935, civil servant, Lviv).
She (wife) didn’t want to have a child right after marriage. And
my mother suspected her... But my wife knew all these tricks.
First, she wanted to finish her educational training, and then
she started with her work (Maxim, born in 1935, civil servant,
Kharkiv).
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Similar to Maxim’s wife, some females would purposefully decide to postpone
first pregnancy to pursue their educational or career goals first. But this was of-
ten considered selfish, and eventually it could imply less support from a husband.
This would automatically mean fewer opportunities for cooperation in birth con-
trol. Certainly, traditional female methods of birth control, such as sponges, the
calendar method or even abortions, could be used, but this behaviour would cre-
ate even more conflict in spousal and intergenerational relationships. Therefore,
a married woman trying to delay a first pregnancy was very likely to be exposed
to social pressure to submit to the ‘right’ timing.
Intriguingly, when the postponement of parenthood was a couple’s mutual
decision, less normative pressure would be attached to this behaviour, and a
couple would be allowed to exercise more agency in their decisions but, of course,
within certain time limits. This was especially true if a couple could justify their
decision with concrete reasons such as not having their own place to live (e.g.,
when residing with parents was not possible), living in separate residences after
marriage (e.g., husband was in military service), or explaining that they needed
some time to settle down as a couple, as the quotes below illustrate:
The first one was born two years after we got married. It was
not strict that it should happen right away, and moreover we did
not have a place to live. We did not have an apartment yet. But
when Lena was born, we received a room in a shared apartment
(Raisa, born in 1934, skilled worker, Kharkiv).
We did not want to have children right after marriage, as life only
starts at this stage, so we wanted to wait a bit. At that time,
it was not as if one had to immediately have a child. But when
we were ready for it, it was our mutual decision. Our daughter
was born in 1954 (one year after the marriage) (Markian, born in
1929, unskilled worker, Lviv).
Besides spousal and intergenerational relationships, peers and siblings also
exerted social influences favouring first parenthood to happen soon after marriage.
At the moment of marriage and entrance into parenthood, many male and female
informants were often close to completing their studies, or had just started to work
and, thus, they were often in close relationships with their peers. In addition, some
couples resided with their parents or other kin, such as aunts or older siblings,
during the first years after marriage, which also made them more inclined to have
closer relationships. Surrounded by peer and sibling environments, the informants
could observe how marriage and first parenthood took place in other couples, and
compare these experiences to their own.
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Within three years after we graduated from the institute, we all
got married. My friends also gave birth and we had many com-
mon interests, like children. For example, my friends [showing
pictures with them] this friend Lida gave birth to Sergey a bit
earlier. And all my friends were giving birth and we lived through
that together (Svetlana, born in 1941, civil servant, Kharkiv).
During the first few months we still lived at his parents and with
his siblings and their families. As sisters-in-law we used to help
each other and sometimes took care of each other’s children. The
oldest son of one of my sisters-in-law was half a year older than
my son, and children of other sisters-in-law were also born very
close to each other, so it was easy for us to help each other out.
However, soon thereafter we received our own place (Kateryna,
born in 1942, skilled worker, Lviv).
Through communication, support and spending leisure time together with
peers and siblings, the informants learned about the advantages of ‘right’ timing
of first parenthood. As Svetlana indicated, friends having children around the
same time was beneficial, as it allowed maintaining close friendships also after
marriage through sharing parenthood experiences. Friends might also form an
exchange network to swap children’s clothes and other things that were not easily
available as well as to consult each other with practical household issues (Rotkirch,
2000).
At a first glance, relationships with siblings(-in-law) implied similar influences
as those from peers. But, because siblings(in-law) are also related through kin
ties, they automatically put them into a certain social position with respect to the
parents and other kin. As Kateryna’s testimony illustrates, when siblings(in-law)
share a household, they might feel more obliged to help out each other with some
issues, such as childcare (see also Hilevych and Rotering 2013). Such support
may unconsciously impose feelings of sameness, as well as feelings of completion
between siblings(in-law) with respect to the timing of parenthood, which would
be especially crucial in a society where first birth is associated with achieving
adulthood.
In the following sections, I show that close parental supervision around the
timing of first parenthood eventually resulted in expectations of receiving grand-
parent support with childcare.
3.5.3 Looking for a safety net: deciding on first parenthood
and spousal expectations of receiving support with
childcare
In their testimonies of first parenthood, informants generally expressed confidence
and security in proceeding with first parenthood even though many still did not
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have their own apartment or a permanent job, and some even had to finish their
studies. Surprisingly, such attitudes contrast to those surrounding the transition
to second birth when material uncertainty was seen as the major obstacle for
proceeding with a second pregnancy (Hilevych, 2016). The informants actually
experienced economic uncertainty at both transitions, but they seemed to rely on
certain premises when entering parenthood. These premises seemed to compen-
sate for the uncertain material conditions. I observed a vivid illustration of such
premises in the cases where aborting the first pregnancy was considered but not
carried out, as the quotes below illustrate:
I told my husband that I got pregnant, and right away I asked,
‘What shall we do? You live there, and I live here. But once
the child is born, what then?’ At that time I didn’t live in Lviv
yet. And I worried a lot about how we were going to arrange
everything. I even thought of not giving birth at that time. But
he said, ‘You will definitely give birth’. He also discussed it with
his parents ‘What shall we do? We do not have a place to live in
Lviv’. I also didn’t have any work in Lviv. ‘Maybe we can stay
here, in Malynivka (a town in Lviv province)?’ I thought. But
he had to stay in Lviv because of his work. So, his parents said,
Immediately move me to Lviv. They were so wise. And then he
found a job for me, and so I moved (Halyna, born in 1943, civil
servant, Lviv).
Zoya: We talked about my first pregnancy with my mother-in-
law.
Interviewer: Did you discuss it?
Zoya: Of course, we needed to!
Interviewer: Can you describe what it was like?
Zoya: On the 14th of April (1954) we got married. We did not
live together yet. On the 1st of May (1954) we went to my village,
and there I got pregnant. Then, there was the question: whether
to abort it or not? We gathered with the three of us: my husband,
my mother-in-law and I. We thought, ‘So, what to do?’ She said,
‘Of course, give birth’. And I said, ‘But how? I still have to write
my thesis. It’s not only about going to university. Lectures and
writing the thesis, how will I cope with all of this?’ And she said,
‘Don’t worry, I’ll help you. You should not do it (abortion)’. And
I didn’t do it (Zoya, born in 1931, civil servant, Kharkiv).
As these testimonies show, considering pregnancy termination constituted an
actual moment of making a decision about first parenthood, and it implied a
di↵erent set of social influences. The moment of deciding on whether to terminate
first pregnancy or not was also often the moment when practical matters around
this event would be discussed. Although the practical aspects were the primary
concern of the spouses, these concerns would also be discussed with the parents,
as Halyna and Zoya described. This means that at the decision stage, couples
would start to seek cooperation with parents. By consulting parents, a young
couple would seek not only advice but also support with childcare. The promise
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of support with childcare seemed to be an important factor for not terminating
the first pregnancy but proceeding with it. When these expectations were not
met, the pregnancy would likely be aborted. However, among my informants the
termination of first pregnancy happened only in a few cases.
More importantly, I also observed expectations of receiving grandparental sup-
port with childcare among the couples that did not consider termination. These
informants indicated that they typically did not plan anything, neither pregnancy
nor childcare arrangements in advance, which may sound risky when one still had
to finish educational training or did not have a place to live. The reason for the
absence of such planning was often that there was an implicit understanding that
parents would always help.
You know, at that time we didn’t plan far into the future, not
really. I knew that the child would be born, but how life would be
afterward, whether I would defend my kandydatska [an equivalent
to the PhD thesis] and would build my career, I didn’t think about
it. I knew that I would have a child that I needed to take care
of. Besides, I thought that I might have some help. My mother
would help for sure, and maybe my parents-in-law would also help
(Daryna, born in 1939, scientific elite, Lviv).
During the first year after the marriage, we were renting the flat.
We wanted to enjoy life [laughing]. Later, our son was born and
we moved back to my parents. We lived with them for some
time until we received our own apartment (Andrei, born in 1934,
scientific elite, Kharkiv).
In the following section, I discuss how these expectations of receiving support
with childcare were fulfilled.
3.5.4 Provision of support with childcare
Surely, frequent post-marital residence with or close to parents or in-laws made
access to grandparental support easier. Even when residing separately, grandpar-
ents were still able to provide some support, yet not on a daily basis. In this
way, post-marital residence defined the degree of grandparental involvement in
childcare, which di↵ered between Lviv and Kharkiv.
In the context of Lviv in western Ukraine, couples commonly resided sepa-
rately from their parents before or shortly after marriage. Separate post-marital
residence made a couple primarily responsible for childcare, and complementary
gender roles were often practiced between spouses. A husband would be the main
source of income in the family, while the wife would stay with the child during
the first year(s). A woman would arrange a part-time work schedule or would
even resign from work for this period. When a wife had to return to work after
maternity leave, a couple would hire a nanny or would hand over their child to a
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nursery. In this respect, both spouses would still equally contribute to childcare
by sharing the time and material costs spent on it. In Chapter 5, I show that
because both spouses commonly contributed to childcare in Lviv, they chose to
have a second child soon after the first, saving childcare costs for both husband
and wife.
Even though spouses were primarily responsible for childcare, the role of grand-
parents or other kin was also important in this process. During the first months
after delivery, a woman would typically either reside with her family (separate
from her husband), or the maternal grandmother would visit the family during
the first few weeks. Bodnar (2010) indicates that the habit of staying at the
maternal grandparents was especially common among couples of rural origin. In
either way, the role of a grandmother or other female kin was to assist a wife with
childcare.
After delivery, my cousin took me to her place, and I stayed with
her for a few days. After that, I went to my sister in the village
and stayed with her for three weeks. My husband was in Lviv at
that time, and he visited me often. When I returned to Lviv, I
took care of my daughter until she turned eight months, and then
we handed her over to the nursery (Maria, born in 1936, qualified
worker, Lviv).
My mother came to help me at the beginning. She was with us
for around one month, and she showed me some essential things,
like how to bath and swaddle, and what I should or should not to
do during this process (Olena, born in 1925, civil servant, Lviv).
Despite that hospital midwives frequently consulted women on childcare, the
role of maternal kin was essential in providing assistance with bathing, swaddling
and breastfeeding, and the female informants very much valued these experiences.
The assistance, however, rarely implied that a grandmother or other kin would
entirely take care of the child if a wife stayed at home.
Not frequently, some of my Lviv informants also resided with parents after
marriage, and mother or mother-in-law would assist them with childcare. In
these conditions, a wife would still do most of the childcare duties herself, while
her mother or mother-in-law would take over this duty at later stages, i.e., after
maternity leave.
My in-laws stayed with the child afterwards. My mother-in-law
would stay with her during the day, and I would come to feed
her during the lunch break (her child) (Lybov, born in 1932, civil
servant, Lviv).
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I intended to take maternity leave for eight months, and I was
going to take some holiday hours for this. But my mother-in-
law said, ‘Why should both of us take care of one child?’ So,
eventually she took care of my first and also of my second one
(Nadia, born in 1938, civil servant, Lviv).
A similar way of arranging childcare was even more common among the infor-
mants from Kharkiv, as post-marital residence with parents after first birth was
widespread there. When a wife returned to work after maternity leave, she would
also be expected to carry most of the household and childcare responsibilities.
The support of the grandmother was essential under these conditions, as with the
birth of a(nother) child, the double burden on a young wife would increase (see
Chapter 5). Usually, the grandmother would entirely take over childcare duties
after maternity leave ended.
My children [twins] were born in May, so I had my maternity leave
throughout June, July and August, as I did not have to teach
during these months. When I returned to work, I had to teach
both day and evening classes, but I still could come in between to
feed them. My mother-in-law was my greatest supporter at that
time. We lived with her, and she stayed with them all the time
(Larisa, born in 1939, scientific elite, Kharkiv).
I had maternity leave, and I also saved some holiday hours. So,
in total I had three months of maternity leave after the deliv-
ery. After these three months, I had to go back to work and my
mother-in-law took care of my children, both of them actually.
Some women took their children to nurseries, of course, but it
is//that’s because they did not have anyone to help them (Naida,
born in 1936, unskilled worker, Kharkiv).
The couples from Kharkiv tried not to hand over their children to nurseries at
an early age, if that was possible. Grandparental support rather than their own
coordination of the process or husband’s involvement was preferred. Women often
tried to arrange a grandmother to be with a child even when they lived in di↵erent
cities. Handing a child over to the nursery after maternity leave was considered
rare and inappropriate if grandparents were available. When no grandparental
support was possible, a couple would ask their neighbours to help. Finally, in-
volving a husband in childcare was not only uncommon, but it was also not even
expected. Instead, women often felt that men could not properly handle children
and might even need care themselves. These attitudes towards and practices of
childcare in Kharkiv coincide with the observations Rotkirch (2000) drew about
the Soviet families in Saint-Petersburg, Russia. She observed that for Russian
women, maternal care implied not only taking care of her biological children, but
also taking care of ‘grandchildren, children of relatives and friends, husband, el-
derly parents and parents-in-law’ (Rotkirch, 2000, p. 118). Rotkirch calls this
phenomenon extended mothering. My observation is that this phenomenon as
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practiced in Soviet Kharkiv and Saint-Petersburg was part of the communitarian
family system, where a mother-in-law held great authority in the household.
3.6 Conclusions
In this chapter I showed that parents and spouses exerted mainly social pres-
sure and cooperation, while siblings and peers exerted social contagion and so-
cial learning to influence couples’ understandings that entrance into parenthood
should take place soon after marriage, which I defined as the ‘right’ timing for
parenthood. I also observed that the notion of ‘right’ timing of first parenthood
often coincided with the moment in life when a couple’s economic uncertainty
was high. Surprisingly, this uncertainty rarely discouraged the informants from
postponing or terminating the first pregnancy. On the contrary even, informants
experienced security and confidence when making a decision to enter parenthood
early. I showed that this feeling of security surrounding the entrance into first
parenthood is closely linked to the reliability on grandparental support with child-
care. If these expectations were not fulfilled, informants were likely to terminate
the pregnancy; however grandparents would often conform to these expectations.
The existence of such expectations and that they were often confirmed sug-
gests that paternalistic and protective values characterised intergenerational rela-
tionships in both Ukrainian cities during Soviet time. These paternalistic values
around intergenerational relationships also prevailed in historical family systems
in both regions, where in the nuclear-stem family system in Lviv parents had to
equally provide for their children until marriage. In the communitarian family
system in Kharkiv, this was also the case, even after marriage. After the Sec-
ond World War, these family values were reinforced by the Soviet state through
family policy. Furthermore, because the Soviet political-economic system was
characterised by shortages in everyday goods, food and housing, that state por-
trayed the family, rather than the community, as primarily responsible for the
socialisation and raising of children. This made grandparental support essential.
Additionally, grandparental support with childcare was also perceived as more
desirable than other types of childcare possibilities, such as those provided by
the state. When grandparents are still young and employed, they are also likely
to have more resources and possibilities to provide su cient material and non-
material support to their children and grandchildren. Therefore, in contemporary
scholarship early childbearing is often seen as a livelihood strategy to overcome
economic uncertainty by receiving parental support (Gabriel, 2005; Perelli-Harris,
2005; Rotkirch and Kesseli, 2012).
Although family relationships in both Lviv and Kharkiv were based on pa-
3.6. CONCLUSIONS 77
ternalistic intergenerational relationships, the degree of reliability on their help
depended on post-marital residence. When a couple resided separately from par-
ents or in-laws after the marriage, they would also take the greatest responsibility
for childcare and, thus, grandparental support would become an additional and
temporary option. This behaviour I observed in Lviv in western Ukraine. It
also complies with the pattern of post-marital residence typical for the nuclear-
stem family system where only an oldest son and his family stayed with parents
while family’s other sons formed independent households based on the resources
the parents provided them. However, when a couple resided with either of the
parents after marriage, the couple also tended to rely more on parental support
with childcare, as observed in Kharkiv in eastern Ukraine, where communitarian
family systems had historically prevailed. Under the conditions of prolonged post-
marital residence, childcare would become a shared responsibility of a woman and
her mother(in-law), rather than that of the couple.
Rotkirch (2000, p. 118) links these aspirations to a phenomenon she calls ex-
tended mothering – when maternal care implied not only taking care of biological
children but also taking care of ‘grandchildren, children of relatives and friends,
husband, elderly parents and parents-in-law’. She finds this care pattern to be
particular for Russia, and I also find it relevant for eastern Ukraine. However,
this shared responsibility did not always imply cooperation between female gen-
erations, and it may also have resulted in conflicts, particularly between mothers-
and daughters-in-law, as was showed in an earlier study (Hilevych and Rotering,
2013). The culture of submissive, subordinate and in some societies even abu-
sive relationships between mothers- and daughters-in-law is widely discussed in
anthropology. As such, evolutionary anthropologists suggest that intrafamilial
conflict of interest between mothers- and daughters-in-law could especially arise
in the context where reproductive competition is likely to happen (e.g., when re-
marriage and widowhood are part of the demographic regime) (Voland and Beise,
2005). Cultural anthropologists additionally suggest that this phenomenon has
geographic boundaries stretching from the Mediterranean to the Pacific, where
co-residence with in-laws is widespread and which forms the so-called ‘the great
mother-in-law belt’ (Brown, 1997).
With regard to sibling and peer relationships in the case of Lviv, siblings
also encouraged the ‘right’ timing of first parenthood, while in Kharkiv similar
influences were coming more from peers. Although this assumption should still
be more closely examined in the future, I suggest that these di↵erences could be
linked to more cooperative relationships between siblings in Lviv, which are in
line with the tradition of partible inheritance discussed earlier. In Kharkiv, closer
relationships with peers than with siblings could be an outcome of collective
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inheritance where siblings historically had to compete for its division before and
after the father’s death. In my earlier study, I show that the competitive nature
of sibling relationships was also crucial for the transition to second birth when
the expectations of receiving grandparental support were high in Kharkiv, but
parents had to choose whom to help (see Chapter 5).
Based on the discussed earlier dichotomy between parental authority versus
conjugal authority in the decision-making, my findings additionally suggest that
the character of intergenerational relationships shapes not only the character of
couple relationships but also that of sibling and peer relationships. This aspect
should be taken into account in future studies focusing on how family ties shape(d)
fertility behaviour in Eastern Europe.
Chapter 4
Birth Control and Abortion1
4.1 Introduction
Throughout the second half of the twentieth century, Eastern Europe had the
world’s highest abortion rates. The re-legalisation of abortion in the USSR in
1955, underdeveloped medical care and generalised social tolerance of the prac-
tice are commonly cited as the primary drivers of these high abortion rates (David
and Skilogianis, 1999a; Remennick, 1991), which rose above birth rates – a phe-
nomenon often referred to as an ‘abortion culture’ (Stloukal, 1999). Outside state
and medical policies, however, it is not entirely clear how this abortion culture
was fostered. This chapter examines the role of local gender regimes and women’s
agency in that change and, specifically, regional di↵erences in the frequency of
abortion between two cities in Ukraine.
Many scholars have addressed the relationship between patriarchal gender
regimes and women’s reproductive activities. Some argue that, within a pa-
triarchal context, women have little possibility to exercise reproductive choice,
and therefore abortion often becomes the only option (Browner, 2000; McIntosh,
2000). Others argue that women practise abortion to exercise their reproductive
freedom (Cook, 2000; Mackinnon, 2010).
This question becomes even more complex when it comes to the Ukrainian
Soviet context where female empowerment was encouraged in the public sphere,
while traditional patriarchal gender roles prevailed within the household. This
combination of legal abortion and informal patriarchy may indicate that Ukrainian
women could have used abortion as a way to counter male authority in the same
way as women in Yugoslavia did (Morokvasic, 1984). It has, however, also been
1This chapter is based on Hilevych, Y. (2015). Abortion and gender relationships in Ukraine,
1955-1970. The History of the Family, 20(1), 86-105.
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documented that some women sought abortion to maintain traditional gender
roles and not to challenge men’s authority in birth control matters (Drezgic´, 2010;
Paxson, 2002). The main question I address in this chapter is therefore: What
was the role of women’s agency in abortion decisions?
In order to answer this question, I reconsider the relationship between individ-
ual agency and abortion practice from the perspective of spousal power relation-
ships. By looking at how spousal dynamics shape the perceptions and practices of
fertility-limitation methods, I aim to uncover how these dynamics may promote
or discourage women’s agency in these decisions. By studying two urban localities
in western and eastern Ukraine – the cities of Lviv and Kharkiv, respectively –
I also address regional patterns in abortion behaviour which have been noted for
present-day Ukraine (Levchuk and Perelli-Harris, 2009), but whose origins have
seldom been examined for the historical period. I employ original qualitative
sources, in-depth biographical interviews, and both qualitative and quantitative
archival data to address these issues.
I start with an overview of the existing debate regarding birth control and
spousal power relationships in Europe. The second section discusses the meth-
ods and sources of the study. The third addresses the sociocultural contexts of
the study locations, based on an analysis of secondary literature. Soviet policy
concerning abortion and sexuality is discussed in the fourth section. The fifth
and sixth sections, based on in-depth biographical interviews, analyse the gender
aspects of birth control practice, and how abortion perceptions and practices were
shaped by di↵erent spousal power dynamics. Finally, I compare the impacts that
spousal power dynamics had on men’s and women’s agency in abortion practices
in the two cities.
4.2 Birth control and spousal power relationships
The use of birth control is a complex decision-making process in which both hus-
band and wife are involved, either as active or passive decision-makers (Carter,
1995). Condoms, the birth control pill, intrauterine devices and medical abor-
tions are often referred to as ‘birth control methods’, as are traditional arrange-
ments such as periodic abstinence and coitus interruptus. Practising and ar-
ranging any of these methods requires a certain degree of cooperation between
spouses. Spousal cooperation is influenced by individuals’ perceptions regarding
who should be responsible for birth control, and by the way that family-size deci-
sions are communicated and disagreements are resolved (Greene and Biddlecom,
2000). These behaviours are established in gender-specific rights and obligations.
This collectively results in di↵erent patterns of gender power relationships, which
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can generally be referred to as a ‘gender system’ (Mason, 2001).
It is generally argued that, in traditional patriarchal gender systems, women’s
reproductive activities are controlled by men due to the substantial reliability of
‘male’ birth control methods, such as coitus interruptus (Folbre, 1983; Mason,
2001). Fisher (2006), in her study of birth control practices in Britain between
1918 and 1960, questions whether women who were compelled to use coitus in-
terruptus indeed felt sexually restrained. She finds that although men practised
their authority through the use of coital-dependent methods of birth control and
often initiated sexual intercourse, their behaviour was not perceived as oppressive
by women. In Fisher’s view, birth control was considered a male’s duty, sexual ig-
norance and passiveness were integral components of female identity, and women
were not passive victims, despite the perpetuation of an apparently patriarchal
regime of reproductive control. Their acceptance of male authority also suggests,
as Fisher (2006, p. 2) contends, ‘women’s confidence that most men would concur
with the need to keep one’s family size relatively small’.
However, what happens if there is a conflict of interests and women begin to
demand a greater role in reproductive decisions? For many women in Western
Europe, abstinence was an important means of reproductive self-assertion until
the introduction of modern female contraception. As Fisher (2006), Seccombe
(1992), and Szreter and Fisher (2010) demonstrate, in Britain during the nine-
teenth century and until the 1960s, abstinence was often exploited by women as a
type of resistance towards potential unwanted pregnancies. This resistance helped
make husbands aware of wives’ reproductive wishes, which ultimately facilitated
spousal cooperation.
This adaptation of traditional patriarchal-type gender relationships in Western
Europe towards more cooperation and sharing became even more pronounced in
the second half of the twentieth century (Finch and Summerfield, 1999). On the
one hand, men became more cooperative in family-size-limitation issues. On the
other hand, women found a suitable way to accept male authority, as Fisher’s
(2006) study also shows. Recent studies show that, within these sharing marital
relationships, the role of women’s agency in accepting modern female birth control
methods was, however, crucial.
The modernisation of patriarchal gender relationships, however, can occur in
di↵erent ways (Therborn, 2004). After gender equality was introduced in the pub-
lic sphere by socialist regimes in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, traditional
patriarchal gender roles within the family remained unchallenged (Drezgic´, 2010).
As women achieved equal rights in the labour market, they were faced with the
reality that they must carry a double, or even triple, burden of being a working
woman, housewife and mother. Moreover, in these parts of Europe, motherhood
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remained an integral element of womanhood, and women faced the strong ex-
pectation that they continue carrying the greatest responsibility for childbearing
and childrearing (Drezgic´, 2010; Morokvasic, 1984; Paxson, 2002; Rotkirch and
Kesseli, 2010). Men, on the other hand, still held the major responsibility for birth
control. Paxson (2002, p. 315) describes this model of gender relationships as one
where ‘men play the active role in initiating sexual relationships, while moral
women either resist their advances (when unmarried or with no intention to com-
mitment) or submit (according to the sacrament of marriage)’. The stringent
division of gender roles within the household seems to provide little opportunity
for women to challenge traditional power dynamics. The question is, then, if and
how they resisted and challenged the tradition.
Within the strictly patriarchal set of gender roles, abortion provided a means
of post-coital family limitation that could be practised without involving the hus-
band, which made it a convenient way (if not the only way) of eliminating an
unwanted pregnancy without risking spousal conflict. This method may thus
encourage a traditional patriarchal gender order (Paxson, 2002), and scholars
often associate high abortion rates with a low level of female autonomy within
marriage (Browner, 2000; McIntosh, 2000; Szreter, 1996), although some (Cook,
2000; Mackinnon, 2010) contend that it can also indicate women’s power over
male pronatalism. It is therefore not yet clear how regional patriarchies can influ-
ence women’s agency in abortion decisions, especially in societies where abortion
rates are high.
In this chapter I take up this puzzle by reconsidering the relationships between
agency and abortion practice from a conjugal dynamics perspective. By look-
ing at how spousal cooperation shapes the perceptions and practices of fertility-
limitation methods, I aim to uncover how these dynamics may promote or limit
women’s agency in abortion decisions. With regard to agency, I consider women’s
conscious actions undertaken to control their own fertility within ‘the broad util-
itarian sense of balancing means and ends’ (Carter, 1995, p. 65).
4.3 Research methodology and sources
The primary subjects of analysis are men and women who were born between
1929 and 1941, married between 1949 and 1965, and were resident in the cities of
Lviv and Kharkiv, with whom I conducted in-depth, biographical semi-structured
interviews. In total, I collected 30 in-depth interviews – 16 from Lviv and 14
from Kharkiv, in July-August 2012, August-October 2013 and September-October
2014. The Lviv informants comprised 4 men and 12 women, among which were 2
couples. The Kharkiv informants comprised 12 women and 2 men, among which
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was one couple. In the case of couples, the husband and wife were interviewed
separately. I found it di cult to recruit couples for this study as, at the time of
interviewing, many of the women whom I approached and interviewed were al-
ready widowed. Purposeful and snowball samples were employed to recruit infor-
mants. These two sampling techniques were used to ensure that the subjects came
from as diverse economic, educational and ethnic backgrounds as was possible.
Amongst the informants from Lviv, 10 had a university qualification and worked
as civil servants, while the rest were skilled or unskilled workers. In Kharkiv, 7
of the informants were university graduates and worked as civil servants, and 7
were trained or unskilled workers. I recruited the informants via purposeful sam-
pling and with the assistance of non-profit organisations working with the elderly,
through Internet advertisements, and with the help of local people encountered
during my fieldwork.
The interviews, based on a topic list, were open-ended, direct and personal
conversations that, on average, lasted for two hours. In every interview, I at-
tempted to uncover individuals’ experiences of various reproductive events such
as courtship, cohabitation, marriage, pregnancy, abortion and birth control. I also
addressed the meanings that participants attached to significant others in their
social network, which influenced, helped with or prevented them from making
reproductive decisions, as well as influential events, socio-economic conditions,
policy regulations and other structural conditions. The interviews were collected
and transcribed in the original language (Ukrainian or Russian). Analysis was
performed with Atlast.ti qualitative software in English, and primary coding was
done in Ukrainian and Russian.
Abortion is not an easy topic to discuss, since it requires building a certain
level of trust with an informant. Being a young female researcher helped me to
build trust with both the male and female informants. However, some of the
informants tried to use ‘we’ and ‘you’ rhetoric, highlighting the regional di↵er-
ences in Ukraine, which remain a sensitive issue. In such situations, I tried to
position myself as belonging to the younger generation, rather than being from
another region; all of the informants knew that I originally come from west-central
Ukraine. This approach to the interviewing process allowed me to emphasise the
importance of conducting an interview with a generation that has seldom been
studied previously. This, in turn, motivated many of the informants to be more
specific and elaborate more about their past experiences.
When broaching intimate topics such as birth control and abortion, I intro-
duced them by using non-personalised questions regarding the general popularity
of di↵erent contraceptive methods within society and other people’s experiences.
A number of the informants, in this flow of conversation, subsequently revealed
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their personal experiences. A few preferred to keep their personal experiences pri-
vate; I nevertheless analyse their attitudes regarding abortions in general and the
circumstances amongst their friends. There were also women who had had many
abortions and could not remember the conditions surrounding all of them. Often,
only the memories of the first few were retrievable. These memory and silence
issues form part of the analysis inasmuch as they indicate individuals’ attitudes
towards abortion practice.
In order to locate abortion and birth numbers, I gathered hospital, Ministry of
Health and statistical o ce reports from the city archives. These reports provided
the data on abortion and birth numbers from 1949 and 1970, and some accounts
from district gynaecology departments. Based on the data from these reports,
I calculated abortion ratios for Lviv and Kharkiv (see Figure 4.1). The gynae-
cology departments’ reports provided detailed information on how contraception
prescriptions worked, in practice, during the 1950s and 1960s. Some of the Min-
istry of Health and statistical o ce reports containing information on abortion
numbers in Kharkiv were declassified only after I requested them, meaning that
they have not been previously studied. I thus exploited this data to support or
question the arguments in the existing literature.
Lastly, during the interviews, some of the informants referred to magazines
that contained information on contraceptive measures. I investigated the contents
of one of these magazines – Zdoroviye (literally means health) – in order to gain
an understanding of the type of information they o↵ered about birth control. The
magazine was established in 1955 and is still published under the same name. I
studied the contents of the 76 available issues published between 1957 and 1970,
and refer to some of this information in the text where it provides additional
relevant information.
In the following sections, I will first discuss some background information on
the study localities based on the literature and archival research. I then present
the analysis of the interviews.
4.4 Setting
The cities of Lviv and Kharkiv are located more than 1000 kilometres apart.
Although they have been under the same political rule since 1939, they have
strikingly di↵erent demographic patterns and behaviour, which might have been
influenced by the historical development of the regions. Regional variations
in reproductive behaviour, including abortion behaviour, have been addressed
for present-day Ukraine (Levchuk and Perelli-Harris, 2009; Perelli-Harris, 2005,
2008a). However, the historical di↵erences and changes that took place during the
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first demographic transition have largely been neglected. This makes the period
immediately after the Second World War, and the cities of Lviv and Kharkiv,
interesting laboratories to explore regional variations in reproductive behaviours.
In general, Lviv may be thought of as slower to industrialise and adopt Soviet
social reforms than Kharkiv, which was comparatively more industrial, secular
and educated, and had a more gender-balanced workforce.
The western city of Lviv only became part of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist
Republic in 1939. During the interwar period, Lviv province, as well as the entire
region of Galicia, belonged to the Second Polish Republic, which emerged as a
result of the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. At the time of Lviv
province’s annexation to the Soviet Union, Galicia was predominantly agricul-
tural. Ethnic Ukrainians constituted the majority of the rural population but a
minority in Lviv, which contained large Polish (64.8%) and Jewish (24%) com-
munities (Lozynskyj, 2005). Before the Second World War, Roman Catholicism
and Judaism were thus the major religions in the city, while Greek Catholicism
prevailed in rural areas.
By the 1950s, the percentage of Polish people living in the city had decreased
to 3.4%, as a result of post-war forced ethnic mobilisation processes initiated
by the Soviet government, and rapid industrialisation and collectivisation pro-
grammes, which led to increased rural-urban migration flows within the region
(Bodnar, 2010). By 1959, the population of Lviv as a city had reached almost half
a million (411,000), which made it the largest city in western Ukraine. Ukrainians
primarily originating from neighbouring rural areas constituted the majority of the
population (74.3%) (Bodnar, 2010). Although religion was o cially banned and
discouraged, Ukrainian peasants coming to Lviv after the Second World War re-
tained their traditionally strong religiosity and, during this period, Greek Catholi-
cism became the major religion in Lviv (Bodnar, 2010). Unfortunately, because
the Soviet government did not collect statistics on religious a liation, it is not
possible to provide percentages with regard to religion in Lviv during the Soviet
rule.
The Soviet government brought new industries to Lviv – mainly machinery,
textiles and food processing. This resulted in labour force participation opportu-
nities not only for men, but also for women. In 1950, the proportion of women in
the labour market of Lviv was only 12.3%; by 1960, it had reached 42.3% (Hyk,
1987, p. 193).
Kharkiv, which is located in the east of Ukraine, became part of the Soviet
Union in 1919, when it was proclaimed capital of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist
Republic. Beginning in the early 1920s, Kharkiv developed a machine industry
and various light industries. Women in the early years of the Soviet regime were
86 CHAPTER 4. BIRTH CONTROL AND ABORTION
perceived as an essential foundation of the new communist society, and their par-
ticipation in the workforce was greatly encouraged. In 1950, the proportion of
women amongst blue-collar and white-collar workers was already 46.9% (com-
pared to 12.3% in Lviv).2 Following the Second World War, the ethnic composi-
tion of the region remained approximately the same and, according to the 1959
census, Kharkiv was composed of 48.4% Ukrainians, 40.4% Russians and 8.7%
Jews (Pikalova, 2004). Kharkiv was one of the largest cities in eastern Ukraine,
with a population of 950,000 in 1959 (Rachkov, 2011). Similarly to Lviv, Kharkiv
also experienced an enormous influx of migrants between 1950 and 1970 – both
from the surrounding rural areas and from Russia – as a consequence of rapid
economic development.
With regard to demographic behaviour, there were striking regional di↵erences
between the locations. In Lviv province, the decline in fertility that emerged at
the beginning of the twentieth century was slow and protracted, with fertility
achieving replacement level only in the late 1990s. In Kharkiv province, fertility
started to decline in the 1930s, but fell much more abruptly and was already near-
ing replacement level in the 1960s. Regional variations in abortion behaviour were
also conspicuous. In Kharkiv, abortion numbers in 1959 were substantially higher
than the number of live births: 2621 abortions for every 1000 live births. Lviv
had a much lower rate of 850 abortions for every 1000 live births (see Figure 4.1).
Lviv and Kharkiv developed extremely dissimilar reproductive behavioural
patterns, despite having similar Soviet-instituted social and medical policies. This
suggests the importance not only of economic factors, but also of sociocultural
factors, such as religion and culturally anchored family values (Stloukal, 1999),
where spousal relationships play a key role. Before discussing spousal relationships
and family-limitation methods amongst couples in Lviv and Kharkiv, I will briefly
address the policy conditions in which they were situated.
4.5 Soviet politics of contraception and sexuality
In June 1921, abortion was legalised in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic,
and women gained the right to request an abortion free of charge at any medical
institution. The policy was intended to advance women’s emancipation, allow-
ing for their incorporation into the labour market, which was a required step in
building a new socialist state. The Soviet government did not, however, see legal
abortion as a means of freeing women from childbearing; instead, it wished ‘to
demonstrate its commitment to women’s equality yet not to condone limitation
of birth’ (Rivkin-Fish, 2003, p. 290).
2Source: obtained on April 2, 2014 at the main Department of Statistics in Kharkiv oblast.
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Figure 4.1: Abortion ratios for Lviv and Kharkiv, city and province levels, 1949-
2000. Source: Lviv city, 1950-1957: Lviv State Archive, fond P-312 and fond
283; Lviv province, 1955 – 2000: Population Yearbooks for 1991 – 2001; Kharkiv
city, 1949-1965: Kharkiv State Archive, fond P-5125 and fond P-1962; Kharkiv
province, 1950 and 1955: Kharkiv State Archive, fond P-5125 and fond P-5231,
respectively; Kharkiv province, 1990, 2000: obtained on April 2, 2014 at the main
Department of Statistics in Kharkiv oblast.
The pronatalist Soviet state understood population growth as a necessary ele-
ment to ensure rapid industrial development (David and Skilogianis, 1999a) and,
in the context of declining fertility, the government soon began to perceive abor-
tion as a problem. As a result, some restrictions were introduced in 1924, and a
special commission was created to grant permission for free abortions (Popov and
David, 1999).3 In this manner, the state attempted to prevent declining fertility,
yet retain working women in the labour market.4 With Stalin’s rule (1934-1953),
many pronatalist actions were taken to encourage population growth. Amongst
these were policies designed to create an insu cient number of contraceptives and
a complete re-criminalisation of abortion, with punishment for both physicians
performing operations and women attempting to procure them.5 Stalin’s rule
generally coincided with a broad reassertion of the traditional patriarchal gender
3Amongst the main restrictions was that single mothers and factory workers were uno cially
a↵orded priority in receiving permission (Blum, 2004).
4Abortion and birth statistics, however, indicate that the fertility decline in Ukraine contin-
ued at a rapid pace. The total fertility rate decreased from 5.38 in 1925 to 4.61 in 1928 (Lutz
et al., 1990, p. 6), while the abortion rate simultaneously increased almost threefold from 3.0 in
1924 to 8.4 in 1927 (Shreider, 1930, p. 3).
5Physicians arrested for performing an illegal operation could be imprisoned for one to two
years, while women attempting to terminate their pregnancies were to be reprimanded on the
first o↵ence, and, if the attempt was repeated, fined up to 3000 roubles – approximately an
average yearly income (Popov and David, 1999).
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system: maternity benefits were significantly augmented, and childbearing was
declared one of women’s primary responsibilities, in addition to maintaining the
household and full-time employment (Popov and David, 1999). The Soviet state
did not interfere with the existing gendered division of labour within the house-
hold, where all duties and childcare remained a woman’s responsibility, while the
man was considered to be the principle breadwinner (Ashwin, 2000). Shortly
after Stalin’s death, in 1955 the government once again legalised abortion in ac-
cordance with the 1921 regulations – free of charge at any point up to 12 weeks
gestation.6 After 12 weeks, abortions were only allowed for medical reasons – a
generous policy (by European standards of the time) (Popov and David, 1999).
In the 1960s, women who underwent an abortion were also allowed to take unpaid
sick leave of up to five days. These conditions made abortion a convenient means
of pregnancy regulation for many women, especially in circumstances where other
birth control methods were either not reliable or required additional e↵ort.
Family planning centres did not exist in Soviet Ukraine, and it was only possi-
ble to obtain technical birth control information from gynaecologists, who rarely
prescribed female contraceptives, forcing many women into abortion. Intrauterine
devices, for example, were perceived by gynaecologists to be harmful to women’s
health (Popov and David, 1999). Oral contraceptives imported from Hungary and
Czechoslovakia (from the late 1960s) were high-dosage pills with numerous side
e↵ects. Their use was thus prohibited for contraceptive purposes and only permit-
ted for specific therapeutic reasons (Popov and David, 1999). Hospital medical
reports from Lviv and Kharkiv indicate that only in the late 1960s did some
gynaecologists begin to provide information on di↵erent contraceptive methods
such as cervical caps, sponges, and the birth control pill.7 These consultations,
however, were arranged primarily with women who were advised not to give birth
due to health problems or who were older than a specified age, usually 30 – 35,
and had already borne two children (Popov and David, 1999).
Obtaining information from other sources was not easy, as issues regarding
sexuality and contraception were omitted from the public discourse, and sex edu-
cation only appeared in secondary school programmes in the 1980s (Rivkin-Fish,
2003). During the 1950s and 1960s, a number of magazines were, however, pub-
lishing articles on the disadvantageous aspects of abortion. In 1957, for example,
Zdoroviye published an article on the film ‘Why Did I Do It?’ (see: Zdoroviye,
6Some contend that a small fee of 5 roubles (at a time when the average monthly salary
was 120-160 roubles) was charged for an abortion (Savage, 1988). Hospital reports from Lviv
show that, indeed, during the 1950s and 1960s, hospitals collected some money for performing
abortion operations. This money was later used for the hospitals’ needs – for example, to
purchase cots. See Lviv State Archive, fond P-312, opis 2, dokument 572, 225.
7Lviv State Archive, fond P-312, opis 2, dokument 646; Lviv State Archive, fond P-312, opis
2, dokument 84.
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Issue 2, 1957). It is the story of a woman who becomes infertile after aborting her
first pregnancy, and then gradually convinces another woman not to use a referral
to an abortionist. However, neither in this story nor in other Zdoroviye stories
on the downsides of abortion published between 1957 and 1970 was information
provided on modern methods of preventing unwanted pregnancy. In other arti-
cles, the main alternatives to abortion were rhythm method and abstinence as the
most accessible methods for every woman (see: Zdoroviye, Issue 9, 1963; Issue 2,
1966). To know about other methods, a woman was encouraged to consult her
gynaecologist (see: Zdoroviye, Issue 8, 1957).
During the 1950s and 1960s, men and women were limited to methods with
extensive failure rates, such as withdrawal, vaginal douches, the rhythm method
or Soviet-made condoms, which were known for their poor quality (Remennick,
1991). The lack of reliable contraceptives and information can, to some extent,
explain the high abortion rates during the 1950s and 1960s, yet it can hardly
provide an explanation for the regional variations presented in Figure 4.1. The
following section addresses these regional di↵erences, referring to the examples of
Lviv and Kharkiv.
4.6 Results
4.6.1 Spousal cooperation in birth control practice
Zoya got married in 1954 at the age of 23 and gave birth one year later. At
the time, she was completing her final year at the university in Kharkiv, as was
her husband. Zoya’s pregnancy was a surprise and, because both she and her
husband were still studying, raised some concerns. They nevertheless decided to
keep the child, with the understanding that Zoya’s mother-in-law would assist
with childrearing. When I asked Zoya about birth control methods she and her
husband were using prior to their first child, she claimed that, in her life, modern
contraception did not exist:
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Zoya: I got married in 1954 and moved out of the dormitory,
which was a mistake because I would have completed my studies
better in peace. I moved to the in-law’s . . . to my mother-
in-law . . . But these were hard times for me. But the positive
thing is that I gave birth soon after marriage. We did not know
how to prevent pregnancy; we simply did not know how to do it.
So, soon after I got pregnant.
Interviewer: Did you use any birth control methods after you
gave birth?
Zoya: There was no information about it. There were no con-
doms, neither was the pill available. These were the ‘dark ages’ .
. . No one, not my mother-in-law, no one was telling us anything
. . . We all lived like that. We tried to be careful . . . He
would pull out and that’s it (Zoya, born 1931, married 1954, two
children, two abortions, Kharkiv).
Zoya’s story reveals a few critical issues that are distinctive for her generation.
A deficiency of contraceptive knowledge resulted in limited or no birth control
prior to a woman’s first pregnancy, and coitus interruptus appeared to be the
primary remedy for controlling later births. However, how did spouses cooperate
regarding these matters? This section discusses spousal cooperation regarding
birth control and, particularly, what roles men and women played in acquiring
birth control knowledge and taking responsibility for it.
The lack of contraceptive knowledge and methods resulted in general igno-
rance, particularly amongst women. As Fisher (2006) writes for Britain, before
the 1960s, sexual ignorance was a central element of female identity. This also
appears to have been the case for Ukrainian women who, similarly to the British,
referred to their lack of birth control knowledge as not merely the result of a
shortage of information, but also as a way to be a virtuous woman. Amongst
the Ukrainian women, sexual ignorance often also meant not interfering in their
husband’s sphere of responsibilities, which included methods to prevent her from
becoming pregnant. One of the respondents – Toma from Kharkiv, a researcher
at the city’s university – clearly expressed this:
Why should I have thought about that [birth control]? He should
have thought about it (Toma, born 1931; married 1965; one child;
no abortions, Kharkiv).
In Soviet Ukraine, however, sexual ignorance appeared to have been less cor-
related with class than, for example, in Britain, where Fisher (2006) contends
that sexual ignorance was a crucial component of womanhood amongst working-
class women in particular. Toma and Zoya both completed higher education and
were white-collar workers. Yet Aglaia, also from Kharkiv and an unskilled factory
worker, had a similar experience:
4.6. RESULTS 91
I did not know anything about the methods he used. I was even
shy to ask about it. At that time we did not even feel comfortable
to pronounce the word ‘condom’. It was close to profanity to say
it (Aglaia, born 1931; married 1951; 2 children; 18 abortions,
Kharkiv).
Aglaia’s quote, as well as other oral testimonies, indicates that women often
relied on their husband fully with regard to birth control matters. Men’s methods,
such as coitus interruptus and, sometimes, condoms, appear to have dominated
marital contraceptive practice, as Larisa’s case also reveals:
We sometimes used condoms, but he did not like them much, so
more often it was, as people call it, ‘(coming) on the side’ (Lar-
isa, born 1939; married 1966; two children (twins); no abortions,
Kharkiv).
Relying on men’s methods was a long-standing tradition in Ukraine. Ac-
cording to a medical survey conducted in 1929, nearly 72% of married Ukrainian
women residing in rural locations relied primary on male-dependent methods such
as coitus interruptus, and less on condoms (9%) (Hurevych, 1931). By 1999, the
percentage of married women relying on these methods had decreased to 34.9%,
but they were still the most favoured methods (Levchuk and Perelli-Harris, 2009).
These percentages and the testimonies above may suggest that women were rather
passive in birth control matters. However, in order to understand what a woman’s
behaviour was, behind the socially accepted role of a virtuous woman, one needs
to understand how spouses approached birth-control-related issues, and what they
did if a woman was not satisfied with her husband’s primary arrangements.
During their marital life, certain couples discovered that withdrawal and Soviet-
made condoms were unreliable and sought other options. Although birth control
was generally regarded as the husband’s responsibility, some women demanded
alternatives, especially those who rarely communicated with their husbands. Vik-
torija, from Kharkiv, got married at the age of 18 to her classmate from university.
Afterwards, she worked as a chemistry teacher and her husband as an engineer.
They had 3 children, and Viktorija had 15 abortions. However, communication
regarding birth control issues between the spouses remained di cult throughout
their married life:
Viktorija: I did not discuss it with my husband. After intercourse
I would usually take a shower and use a bulb syringe with vinegar
afterwards.
Interviewer: And how did you get to know about it?
Viktorija: That’s obvious. From other women. Not from the
doctors, of course. I didn’t go to them (Viktorija, born 1931;
married 1949; 3 children; 15 abortion, Kharkiv).
Viktorija received information on traditional post-coital methods from other
women who were not necessarily her closest friends but co-workers or acquain-
tances. As other informants mentioned, this information was commonly shared
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in the form of gossip rather than discussion amongst friends since, even between
friends, sharing intimate issues was considered shameful.
Some of the informants, however, approached birth control as a mutual agree-
ment between spouses. Daryna, a former research assistant at the university in
Lviv, said:
We started to be careful later in order not to have a baby shortly
after the first child was born. But not before that . . . Honestly,
at that time I did not know that it might occur. I did not even
know that I might get pregnant (Daryna, born 1939; married
1964; two children; one abortion, Lviv).
In fact, amongst the Lviv informants – more so than in Kharkiv – mutual
agreement about birth control choices (usually in favour of male methods) was an
essential element of marital life. Women, despite their general ignorance of birth
control, often knew which methods their husband used, and men’s consideration
of their wives’ wishes appears to have been deemed an integral component of male
identity. Vasyl and Nadia, a couple from Lviv, got married in their thirties at
a time when both of them were working – he as an engineer at the bus factory
and she as a nurse in a kindergarten. Vasyl mentioned that he sought reliable
methods:
Vasyl: Maybe she has told you this before, but she was terrified
of abortion and we actually had no need for it.
Interviewer: Were there some religious reasons for it?
Vasyl: I don’t know, I have never asked her, but I knew that she
was scared of having an abortion.
Interviewer: So, how did you manage not to have children be-
tween 1968 and 1974?
Vasyl: Well, we relied to a great extent on contraception.
Interviewer: Which one do you mean?
Vasyl: I used to go to Poland quite often, and it was possible
to get some there . . . It happened sometimes, of course, that
at customs they checked the baggage . . . and these were quite
inconvenient situations, you know.
Interviewer: Do you mean because they might have found con-
doms in the baggage?
Vasyl: Yes, yes, yes!
Interviewer: Were there no condoms here?
Vasyl: Well, sometimes it happened that there were no condoms
in the pharmacies and, moreover, the quality of them was pretty
bad. . . . So, sometimes I was also asked to bring some for
my colleagues, you know (Vasyl, born 1938; married 1966; two
children; no abortions, Lviv).
Vasyl took primary responsibility for contraception but also demonstrated
awareness of his wife’s concerns regarding the risks of abortion. Although reliable
methods were not readily available anywhere in Ukraine, amongst the informants
from Lviv, spousal cooperation in birth control helped them to find alternative
solutions, in contrast to the situation in Kharkiv. Spousal cooperation played an
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integral part in birth control practice, especially because both spouses often held
similar views on these matters.
4.6.2 A backup plan or a birth control method: abortion
and women’s agency
In both Lviv and Kharkiv, couples conformed to the generally accepted view
of women being ignorant in sexual matters and men being responsible for birth
control. In practice, however, spousal cooperation was implemented di↵erently
in the two cities. While couples in Lviv often sought more cooperation in birth
control matters, in Kharkiv birth control was practised as a solely male concern,
although women who were dissatisfied with their husband’s arrangements often
sought alternatives themselves, with little cooperation from their husband. Like-
wise, coping with an unexpected pregnancy was primarily a woman’s issue, where
she sought a solution herself, which often entailed abortion. In this section, I in-
vestigate how spousal cooperation could have shaped the perception of abortion
practice amongst the couples in Lviv and Kharkiv – as either a backup plan or a
proper birth control method.
When a decision about pregnancy termination was under consideration, both
the men and women informants from Lviv stated that they approached this matter
together with their spouse. Fedir was a university lecturer and his wife a part-
time teacher at a school. They had three children together. Fedir recalled his
wife having two abortions, during one of which he supported her at the hospital:
We discussed it, and we decided to abort. It was a joint decision,
and I went with her to the hospital (Fedir, born 1934; married
1957; three children; two abortions; Lviv).
Fedir’s account suggests that his role in abortion decisions could have been
as important as, if not more important than, his wife’s. For nearly all of the
female informants from Lviv, their abortion decisions also had a joint character
and, even if some of them portrayed them as their own decisions, their husband’s
opinion still mattered to them. Oksana was working as a tailor in Lviv when she
got married. Later, she switched to working as a waitress in a hotel restaurant,
where she stayed until her retirement. She had two children and two abortions –
one after her first birth and one after her second birth. Oksana’s view on abortion
was rather di↵erent from the rest of the female informants from Lviv, as she tried
to portray it as her own choice. At the same time, in her account of her first
pregnancy termination, which occurred soon after her first birth, she testified
that it was discussed with her spouse:
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Interviewer: Did you tell your husband about it?
Oksana: Yes, I did! He knew about it and then he visited me in
the hospital.
Interviewer: But just after the consultation with the doctor,
when he said that you were pregnant, what did you say to your
husband? Did you consult with him about what to do?
Oksana: Well, I said, ‘I will have an abortion’, that’s it (Oksana,
born 1932; married 1957; two children; two abortions, Lviv).
More commonly, however, the women from Lviv reflected the same ideas about
abortion decisions as their husbands. They argued that it was a mutual choice,
where often the husband, but sometimes also a close relative such as a sister,
might have been asked to assist. Daryna, who was mentioned above and was a
former research assistant at the university in Lviv, sought one abortion where her
husband and sister supported her during this event:
Daryna: We always discussed these issues. It was our common
decision.
Interviewer: So, did you tell him that you wanted to terminate
the pregnancy?
Daryna: No, we had to discuss it first . . . I also told my sister
about it, and she . . . there was one person at her work . . . I
did not know where to go and, at my sister’s work, there was a
person who knew someone who could do it.
Interviewer: Where was it?
Daryna: He was in Lviv, and I went to his place to do it.
Interviewer: Did you take sick leave?
Daryna: No, there was no such thing. I stayed one day at home
and the next day I went to work.
Interviewer: Was your husband with you? How did you feel about
it? Weren’t you scared? Daryna: I think there was someone with
me. I think it was my sister there, yes, and her colleague took
us to the place. Of course I was, and I did not want to have
one again (Daryna, born 1939; married 1964; two children; one
abortion, Lviv).
Daryna’s testimony reveals that she had little confidence in seeking an abor-
tion. This, in turn, might have facilitated her to go to a private doctor. Therefore,
she sought support from her husband and sister to ensure that she had assistance
when having her abortion. Daryna expressed that abortion was not her preferred
method and she never had another one. At the same time, she made little e↵ort to
protect herself afterwards, as she said that she did not try to use any female birth
control methods – exercising her agency – and kept relying on her husband’s ar-
rangements. In this respect, Daryna’s testimony represents a commonly held view
on abortion found amongst the Lviv female informants, who seldom perceived it
as a female liberation choice. For them, it was, rather, a backup plan that was
used if the husband’s arrangements failed. Men, on the other hand, exercised
significant influence over their wife’s decisions, and thus often felt responsible to
ensure that their methods rarely failed.
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When it comes to the testimonies from Kharkiv, the female informants com-
monly mentioned abortion as being a woman’s issue that would rarely be discussed
with the husband. Moreover, in Kharkiv, the women were already certain of their
decision before informing their husband. Viktorija, who was mentioned above and
was a former schoolteacher from Kharkiv, never discussed birth control matters
with her husband. However, she mainly relied on his methods of birth control and
also used some traditional female methods privately. During her reproductive life,
she had 15 abortions, yet only a few of these were to her husband’s knowledge,
as she did not perceive abortion to be a matter of joint decision-making:
Interviewer: Did you tell him [the husband] that you wanted an
abortion?
Viktorija: No, we did not discuss it.
Interviewer: And did he know that you went to have the abor-
tion?
Viktorija: Well, of course he did. When I was already at the hos-
pital, he would obviously know about it (Viktorija, born 1931;
married 1949; 3 children; 15 abortions, Kharkiv).
Viktorija’s case was not an exception, but rather typical of women’s behaviour
in Kharkiv, where the majority of the female informants preferred not to discuss
their abortion decisions with their husband. For Kharkiv women, abortion seemed
to be a specifically female concern, about which women made their own decisions.
The view on the frequent use of abortion in the Soviet context was, however,
rarely questioned from a gender perspective. Particularly, how did men perceive
their wife’s abortion practices and what role did the men themselves play?
In the few accounts from Kharkiv men, I also encountered this lack of shared
decision- making regarding abortion. Viktor, a researcher at the Physics Research
Institute in Kharkiv, recalled that his wife had one abortion following the birth
of their first child. This was not discussed, as his wife was already certain of her
decision prior to informing him:
Interviewer: She did not have an abortion afterwards then [after
the first child], did she?
Viktor: Yes, she did. She had one . . .
Interviewer: Did you discuss it [the abortion] with her?
Viktor: Yes, this we probably discussed. Probably, yes. I mean,
she said that she got pregnant and will have an abortion. I did
not object.
Interviewer: Do you mean that she actually asked you to face the
fact that she was going to have an abortion?
Viktor: Yes, yes, yes (Viktor, born 1939; married 1960; two chil-
dren; one abortion, Kharkiv).
Viktor, however, had little, if any, objection to his wife’s decision. He shared
her concerns that having a second child right after the first one would have been
too much for her, as she was planning to continue with her work as a university
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lecturer. Because the women claimed to act independently in their decisions and
informed their husband, they may have been exercising their agency in making
reproductive decisions in favour of abortion to challenge the existing gender order.
However, in certain couples, the women preferred to keep abortion a secret
from their husband, as it might have caused tension, especially if abortions were
sought often, as in the case of Larisa.8 A former unskilled factory worker from
Kharkiv, her first child – a girl – died at the age of nine months as the result of
a stomach infection. Within one year of the child’s death, Larisa gave birth to a
second child. She then had 15 abortions and never gave birth again. From her
testimony, it became clear that she was not completely happy in her marriage
and showed little trust towards her marital partner. According to Larisa, she
did not discuss any of the abortion plans with her husband, as she did not want
to live through childbearing or child death again. In the interview with her
husband, Tolik, a former electrician, I discovered that he was aware of only one
of the abortions that his wife had had, and that this abortion was disclosed to
him by a neighbour.9 He suspected that Larisa might have had more abortions.
However, even the knowledge of just that one abortion had caused many quarrels
and general mistrust within the family, which eventually led to divorce.
Little consultation with husbands was often compensated for by discussions
with female friends and colleagues, whom women could ask for advice and/or
help, as Naida’s testimony also illustrates. Naida, a former unskilled worker and
later a brigade leader, had four abortions, three of which occurred after her first
birth. After her second birth, she had one more abortion, which was her last.
Naida claimed that the doctors had probably done something to her, as she was
never pregnant again; however, this did not really disturb her. In her narrative,
Naida stated a number of times that her decisions regarding abortion were rather
spontaneous, and she rarely mentioned her husband’s role in her choices. She also
mentioned that she did not want her mother-in-law to know about them. Instead,
abortion was something that she discussed and shared with a female co-worker:
Naida: When I went to have my second abortion, I think I was
in the second month already. When I had the abortion . . . it
was a midwife from the hospital who did that for me.
Interviewer: Did you know her from before?
Naida: No, she was a friend of a friend. And I actually went to
her with another woman.
Interviewer: Was she your friend?
Naida: Well, she was from my work. She also got pregnant, and I
said, ‘Let’s go?’ She said, ‘Let’s go!’ (Naida, born 1936; married
1959; two children; four abortions).
Naida had two abortions after bearing her first child, one in 1961 and two in
8Larisa, born 1948; married 1968; 1 child; 15 abortions, Kharkiv.
9Tolik, born 1941; married 1968; 1 child; 15 abortions, Kharkiv.
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1962, and at that time she was still living with her in-laws. She decided to go to
a private midwife as it was more confidential and did not require her to remain
in hospital for extra days, which would have raised suspicions at home. She was
especially scared that her mother-in-law would find out, which could also have
been a reason why she kept them secret from her husband.
Like Naida, the Kharkiv female informants typically experienced fear of clearly
asserting their reproductive wishes to their husband, as men’s authority was
strong in many Soviet households. These women, however, sought abortion in
order not to run into spousal conflict, and also to satisfy their needs to continue
working and contributing to the household budget. In other words, they not
only exercised their agency to fulfil their living needs, but also to submit to the
dominant patriarchal gender regime, as they understood it. They thus often used
abortion as the only reliable female method of birth control.
Additionally, frequent discussions with and support from other females helped
the women to accept abortion more easily. These broad female networks of col-
leagues and acquaintances, defined by Watkins and Danzi (1995, p.483) as het-
erogeneous networks, are ‘more likely to bring new information and to o↵er an
opportunity to consider a wider range of options for reproductive behaviour and
less pressure to conform to prevailing community norms’. They are thus very
likely to promote women’s agency. Conversely, strong bonds with their husband
and family of origin amongst the women in Lviv meant that these women sought
external support only if required. Limited communication with peers could have
thus resulted in little credibility being given to abortion as an alternative birth
control method, as homogenous networks are ‘more likely to support the prevailing
social norms rather than challenge them’ (Watkins and Danzi, 1995, p.483).
4.7 Conclusions
Previous research has emphasised the popularity of abortion practices in soci-
eties where strong patriarchal gender regimes prevail (Browner, 2000; McIntosh,
2000; Paxson, 2002; Szreter, 1996), as abortion is a convenient way to limit fam-
ily size and, at the same time, does not challenge “proper” gender roles (Drezgic´,
2010, p. 203). Some scholars, however, have found that, in some societies, women
seek abortion, as they use it as their power to resist men’s authority and thus
make their own decisions (Cook, 2000; Mackinnon, 2010). Dissimilarities between
patriarchal regimes (Therborn, 2004) led me to assume that women’s agency in re-
productive decisions can be shaped by the regional implementation of patriarchal
values and associated spousal dynamics. In other words, in di↵erent patriarchal
structures, women may have di↵ering needs and possibilities to exercise their
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agency in reproductive activities.
At first glance, the men’s and women’s testimonies from Lviv and Kharkiv
seemed to support similar patriarchal gender values. The generally accepted view
of men being responsible for contraception and women being ignorant in these
matters, which Fisher (2006) also found for pre-war British society was typically
recalled by the Ukrainian informants. However, by uncovering what people im-
plied by these norms and how they claimed to implement them, I revealed di↵erent
spousal strategies of coping with birth control and abortion issues amongst the
couples in Lviv and Kharkiv.
Amongst the Lviv informants, birth control practicalities were often agreed
on, and the details of arrangements were commonly taken for granted. This
was generally achieved through a husband’s awareness of his wife’s wishes. Both
spouses typically claimed mutuality where birth control was concerned; the men,
however, in particular, claimed mutuality and responsibility where it was a mat-
ter of abortion decisions linked to family size regulation, which, in a traditional
patriarchal society, is typically a man’s responsibility. This suggests that, behind
the public idea of spousal cooperation, the men actually exerted private domi-
nance and authority in reproduction and marital life. This, in turn, worked as a
discouraging factor for a woman to seek other alternatives. Further research is
needed to explore the origins of the spousal power relationships in Lviv and, in
particular, the influence of Greek Catholicism, which might have contributed to,
or even formed, the discourse of spousal mutuality.10
10In this study, some of the informants from Lviv considered religion to be an integral part of
their lives, although not in the sense of following the church postulates, but rather in existential
terms, perceiving di culties in marital life and unexpected pregnancies as part of fate, especially
amongst women. It is therefore hard to understand the link between religion and marital life.
However, in the Catechism of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, I found a section that speaks
about spousal relationships in the same manner as my informants did. This section describes
spousal relationships as cohesive, trustful and sharing with regard to all aspects of marital life.
This mutuality is especially emphasised in the birth control section, where abortion, for example,
is perceived as a guilt shared by both the wife and her husband (Cat, 2012).
Chapter 5
Transition to Second and
Later Order Births1
5.1 Introduction
Universal marriage, early entrance into parenthood, and early stopping with
childbearing have characterised the fertility transition in Eastern Europe since
the Second World War (Frejka, 2008; Perelli-Harris, 2005, 2008a; Philipov, 2003;
Rychtarikova, 1999; Zakharov, 2008). Stopping with childbearing after the first
child has also been argued to be the major cause of the recent lowest-low fertility
trend in this part of Europe (Perelli-Harris, 2005; Sobotka, 2004b). The dominant
explanation of this trend suggests that individuals decide not to have a second
child because of material and emotional uncertainties they face in the aftermath
of the collapse of the socialist regimes (Bernardi et al., 2015; Hollos and Bernardi,
2009; Mynarska, 2010; Rotkirch and Kesseli, 2012).
However, the exceedingly low fertility of the late 1990s and early 2000s was not
only an outcome of a rapid change in reproductive strategies under the di cult
economic and political conditions. Below-replacement fertility can be observed
in many Eastern European regions long before anyone could have predicted that
the socialist regimes would collapse. For example, the eastern regions in Ukraine
experienced rapid fertility decline just before the Second World War, and already
in the 1960s fertility reached below-replacement levels, especially in urban areas.
In other regions, such as western Ukraine, fertility decline started at the end of
the 19th century, but was more prolonged, reaching lowest-low fertility only in
the late 1990s both in urban and rural areas. These diverse trends, even within
1This chapter is based on Hilevych Y. (2016) Later, if ever: Family influences on the transition
from first to second births in Soviet Ukraine. Continuity and Change, 31(2),275-300.
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the borders of a single country, signal that even if declining post-war fertility
was a response to changing socio-economic standards, the process of adjustment
to these new standards varied between regions. Moreover, declining fertility after
the Second World War occurred mainly due to changing patterns of the transition
to second and later-order births rather than the transition to first birth, which
has always taken place at relatively young ages in Ukraine (Perelli-Harris, 2005;
Steshenko, 2010). However, not many studies have analysed the transition to
second birth on a regional level, mainly because of the scarcity of (statistical)
sources. This study examines individuals’ decisions regarding the transition to a
second birth during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s comparing two borderland cities:
Lviv in western and Kharkiv in eastern Ukraine.
Of the various social institutions, the family is one of the primary social envi-
ronments where the process of adjustment to socio-economic and political struc-
tures, as well as reproductive decision-making, takes place. In the context of
Soviet Ukraine, the ideological changes during the later years of Stalin’s regime
(1935-1953) and the de-Stalinisation processes after 1953 signified the return to
the traditional family (Goldman, 1993; Lapidus, 1978). Additionally, similarly
to other Eastern European countries, family in Ukraine has always provided an
essential network for support, especially during crisis and transitional life course
moments, such as marriage and childbearing (Gabriel, 2005; Rotkirch and Kesseli,
2010). This pattern of family relationships has long been contrasted with fam-
ily types in (North-)Western Europe, as in the ‘Hajnal/Laslett model’ (Hajnal,
1982; Laslett, 1988). In line with this model, recent studies show that in those
areas where multigenerational households and kin residence in close proximity
were historically common, such as in Southern and Eastern Europe, stronger ties
and support relationships between family members are still typical of family for-
mation behaviour even today (Gruber and Heady, 2010a; Jappens and Van Bavel,
2012; Robila, 2004b; Viazzo, 2010). The main argument that these studies put
forward is the path-dependence of patterns of family relationships in contempo-
rary societies. Scholars show that traditional norms of residence and inheritance
present a sense of how people should relate to each other, including both kin
and non-kin (Das Gupta, 1997, 1999; Therborn, 2004; Todd, 1988; Viazzo, 2010).
As such, even after the transformation or dwindling of these concrete households
and inheritance patterns, norms and values underlying the relationships between
generations, siblings and spouses, do not dissolve as socio-economic environments
change, but adapt to them.
Scholars suggest that in contemporary Ukraine di↵erences in family values may
be a vital explanation of regional reproductive trends. It was recently concluded
that the ‘western regions of the country have followed a more traditional, religious
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and nationalistic family orientation, (...) and the eastern part of the country has
remained under the influence of Soviet ideology’ (Perelli-Harris, 2008a, p. 1157).
However, these regional family values have seldom been explored thoroughly. How
these values shaped reproductive behaviour, such as the transition to second birth
was never examined on a micro level. This study therefore asks: how did family
relationships influence individuals’ decisions surrounding the transition to second
birth in post-war western and eastern Ukraine? In order to answer this question,
I analyse 66 life history interviews with men and women who were parents during
the period of the 1950s through the 1970s in Lviv and Kharkiv. To describe
family relationships, I refer to the mechanisms of social influence on reproductive
behaviour previously developed by Bernardi (2003), used also in other studies
(Keim et al., 2009, 2012; Rossier and Bernardi, 2009).2 I use this analytical
framework to trace the interplay between patterns of family relationships and
underlying the values, and individual reproductive decisions.
5.2 Research methodology
5.2.1 Data collection
Life history interviewing constitutes the primary research method of this study.
The interviews were conducted with men and women born between 1929 and 1948,
residing in the Ukrainian cities of Lviv and Kharkiv during the 1950s through
the mid-1970s, and their reproductive years also fall within this period, which
was characterised by the rapid decline of fertility rates in Ukraine. In total, 66
interviews were conducted: 33 from Lviv and 33 from Kharkiv. Fieldwork was
conducted between July 2012 and April 2015. For the general characteristics of
the informants and more on the interviews structures see Appendix E.
In addition to the interviews, I collected life history calendars (LHCs) by which
data on household composition, births, marriages, and employment history of the
informant and spouse were recorded.3 LHCs were filled in with every informant
after the interview. Information provided in Table 1 derives from the informants’
LHCs. Finally, I used published vital event and census data to calculate crude
birth rates for the regions, and reviewed ethnographic literature on historical
family systems in western and eastern Ukraine.
2For a recent overview of social influences on individuals’ fertility behaviour see: Bernardi
and Kla¨rner (2014).
3More on LHC see: Axinn and Pearce (2006)
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5.2.2 Data analysis
To perform the coding I used Atlast.ti qualitative software. I applied three coding
strategies to every interview in order to reveal the main sub-categories related to
the transition to second birth. First, I carried out structural coding aiming at
identifying life course transitions and their sequences in every interview (Saldan˜a,
2012). Then, I performed domain and values coding of the transitions related to
first and second births: pregnancy, childbirth, abortion, miscarriage and childcare
(Saldan˜a, 2012). My aim at this stage was to grasp the interpersonal connections
an individual developed at every life stage discussed in the interview, attitudes and
perceptions to the life course event itself, and structural conditions underlying this
event. During the final stage of the analysis, the relationships between di↵erent
codes were defined. Based on these relationships, the codes were grouped into sub-
categories, such as ‘readiness and second birth’, ‘uncertainty and second birth’,
‘companionate spousal relationships and childcare’. I then used the query tool
to select the quotations according to the groups of related documents that were
created in the previous steps (i.e. documents families): city (Lviv or Kharkiv)
and gender (male or female). Finally, I used LHCs as a triangulation tool to
reconstruct a biographical profile (life history) of every informant and link it to
their narratives during the analysis.
5.3 Socio-economic developments and traditions
of family relationships in western and eastern
Ukraine
Western and eastern Ukraine have been subjects of comparative research for
decades, primarily because of the persisting di↵erences in socio-cultural aspects,
such as religion, language and traditions of family relationships.4 The cities of
Lviv and Kharkiv located in the western and eastern Ukrainian borderlands, re-
spectively, therefore constitute interesting comparative sites in this respect.
Historically, Lviv was slower to industrialise and adopt Soviet social reforms
than Kharkiv, which was comparatively an industrial and secular city. The mod-
ernisation process in Lviv started at the mid-nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies, when it was part of Austro-Hungary and later of Poland. However, this
process was slower than in central and eastern Ukraine, which at that time was
situated under the rule of the Russian Empire. During the interwar period, Lviv
was a multicultural city where ethnic Polish and Jewish groups constituted the
4The results of the largest study comparing western and eastern Ukraine are presented in:
Hrytsak et al. (2007)
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majority of the population. Industrialisation was further reinforced when western
Ukraine became part of the Ukrainian SSR in 1939, and especially after the Sec-
ond World War. By 1959, the population of Lviv had reached almost half a million
(411,000), which made it the largest city in western Ukraine (Bodnar, 2010, p. 41).
The city’s population also became more homogeneous in the aftermath of the So-
viet and German occupations during the Second World War. During the 1950s
and 1960s, the rapid influx of migrants primarily from the neighbouring rural and
urban areas meant that Ukrainians came to constitute the city’s majority (60%
in 1959) (Hrytsak, 2007, p. 41). During this period, migrants coming from Russia
were the second largest minority in the city (27% in 1959) (Hrytsak, 2007, p. 41);
however their percentage declined over the years.
Lviv after the Second World War can thus be seen as an entirely di↵erent
city from how it was during the interwar period, as mainly Ukrainian migrants
populated the city. The Soviet government started the process of dissolution
of private property rights, and also started russification and sovietisation cam-
paigns in western Ukraine. These campaigns however were softer in comparison
to other Belorussian or Baltic regions at that time (Hrytsak, 2007). This facili-
tated Ukrainians of provincial origin to retain their more traditional habits, such
as strong religiosity, commonly within the Greek Catholic tradition, and strong
family ties. During the post-war years these values made a significant contribu-
tion to the formation of the city’s mentality, which even today is characterised by
religiosity, patriotism and family values (Bodnar, 2010; Hrytsak, 2007). Maintain-
ing relationships with family in villages and towns, as well as with those who also
migrated to Lviv, the newcomers were able to retain their traditional life styles,
and thus were slower in adopting new socialist norms (Bodnar, 2010). Reinforce-
ment of their often family-oriented values was also due to common opposition to
the Soviet regime in this area and the idea that personal information can only be
shared with those whom you could trust, usually relatives and family members.
Along with the importance of family relationships in their everyday lives, these
migrants’ personal values were built around the notions of autonomy and aspira-
tions of being able to sustain their own livelihood independently from their parents
(Bodnar, 2010). As ethnographic studies show, this notion of independence was
already typical in western Ukraine in the nineteenth century. After marriage, a
couple typically set up a separate nuclear household and worked their own land,
which they received from their parents. Only an older son and his family stayed
with the parents, worked on the same land and provided elderly care in later life.
Inheritance was typically partible and equally distributed among all the sons (and
occasionally among daughters as well) (Behey, 2003). A similar family system is
also typical for northern-central Romania and is defined by Kaser (1996, 2006) as
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a mix of a stem and a nuclear family system.5
In contrast to Lviv, patterns of historical family systems and economic devel-
opment in Kharkiv followed di↵erent trajectories. Rapid economic development
in the Kharkiv region started in 1919, when the city of Kharkiv also became
the capital of the Ukrainian SSR. Machine industry and various light industries
developed. The industrial developments during the interwar years, which later
continued during the 1950s and 1960s, led to a rapid influx of migrants to the
city from the neighbouring areas and from Russia. The ethnic composition of the
city, however, remained the same as before the Second World War, and according
to the 1959 census, Kharkiv was composed of 48.4% Ukrainians, 40.4% Russians,
and 8.7% Jewish residents (Pikalova, 2004, p. 452-457). In the mid-twentieth cen-
tury, the city became one of the largest in Ukraine with a population of 950,000
people in 1959 (Rachkov, 2011, p. 213).
As soon as the Soviet regime was established, Kharkiv became one of the
cities held up as an example of communist life. In fact, the tradition of communal
life, where the entire family shares the household goods obtained from working
together on the same land, was common in the Kharkiv area long before the So-
viet regime was established. In this respect, it was similar to traditional patterns
of family relationships found in central and southern Russia where joint family
systems prevailed (Czap, 1982; Hoch, 1982; Melton, 1987; Polla, 2006). An im-
portant aspect of the joint family system in the Kharkiv area is that it implied
co-residence of more than two married couples in one household, typically par-
ents with more than one married son (Kaser, 2002; Kravec, 1966). During the
nineteenth century, co-residence patterns started to change and only a younger
son’s family remained with the parents. However, in this region land was often
family-owned, meaning that inheritance was not partible, and even when residing
separately from parents, children still worked on the same land with their parents
(Kravec, 1966). These co-residence and inheritance patterns could lead to chil-
dren’s economic dependence on their parents not only before marriage, but also
in later life.
As described in historical perspective, the traditional patterns of co-residence
and inheritance rules in Lviv and Kharkiv could be the underlying factors form-
ing regional family values in contemporary Ukraine, described by Perelli-Harris
as having a ‘more traditional, religious and nationalistic family orientation’ in
western regions, and ‘as more community oriented in the eastern regions’ (Perelli-
Harris, 2008a, p. 1157). These connections, though plausible, are still vague, as
little is known about family relationships during the Soviet time. The analysis
5Kaser argues that the stem family in Eastern Europe was di↵erent from that in the Pyrenees
or Japan, mainly due neolocal post-marital residence, but yet with equally partible inheritance.
See: Kaser (1996, 2006).
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in this study addresses this lacuna. Before discussing family relationships in con-
nection to the transition to second birth as depicted in the interviews, in the
next section I address the main aspects of Soviet family policy during the post-
war years, as this provides the actual historical boundaries within which family
relationships and second childbearing took place.
5.4 Soviet family policy and fertility in Ukraine
After the death of Stalin in 1953, de-Stalinisation processes brought some relax-
ation in Soviet family policy, primarily that abortion and divorce became more
accessible. At the same time, some aspects of Stalin’s pronatalist policy were
still enacted, such as the e↵ort to promote the stabilisation of family in order
to increase fertility rates. The stabilisation of the family was mainly performed
through assigning women maternal responsibilities alongside labour force par-
ticipation. In order not to discourage women from participating in the labour
force, the new family policy proceeded from the assumption that ‘fundamental
biological di↵erences between males and females require the adaptation of work-
ing conditions to women’s distinctive needs’ (Lapidus, 1978, p. 123). The policies
introduced were the same for all provinces (oblasts) within the republic.
In addition to these ideological changes, women’s incorporation in the labour
market also started to change after the Second World War. Women started to
occupy more positions in education, health care and culture, where the working
week was shorter (33-39 hours), which allowed them de facto to perform part-time
working duties (Vinokurova, 2007). Compared to the 1920s Soviet ideological
thinking of women as being equal to men in labour force participation, the post-
war ideological shift stressed women’s duty as citizens to be mothers and wives,
which in many ways was similar to the trend in the capitalist Western European
societies (Carter, 1997; Reid, 2002). Scholars argue that the rising ‘male-female
income gap was more the result of the di↵erent distribution of men and women
in the occupational structure than of direct wage discrimination’ (Lapidus, 1978,
p. 127). These changes, however, did not impact the overall share of female labour
force participation which was high when compared to Western European countries
at that time and continued to increase. In 1950, the proportion of women among
blue-collar and white-collar workers was 46.9% in Kharkiv and 12.3% in Lviv
(Hyk, 1987, p. 193).6 Women’s employment in Lviv increased rapidly to 42.3%
in the following decade (Hyk, 1987, p. 193).
Overall, Soviet family policy after the Second World War became more sup-
portive to mothers than to women in general (Lapidus, 1978). As such, maternity
6Kharkiv Statistical O ce, requested via email on April 2, 2014.
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leave introduced in 1955 was only accessible for working mothers. Maternity leave
granted 112 days at full pay, 56 before delivery and 56 days after delivery. In ad-
dition, mothers could have an additional three months of unpaid leave. Those
who decided to stay at home with their infant for longer could return to work
in the same position within one year of childbearing; however, this right did not
always work in practice (Lapidus, 1978). The Soviet Union extended parental
life benefits to non-working mothers as well only in 1989 (Lahusen and Solomon,
2008).
Parents received additional support with infant care from the state-owned
nurseries, kindergartens, and milk-kitchens. These facilities were available for
both working and non-working parents. However, working parents often had
access to work-site nurseries or kindergartens. Milk-kitchens provided mothers
with baby food and milk during the first year after delivery, which allowed mothers
to stop breastfeeding early and leave even young infants at a nursery. The number
of milk kitchens, nurseries and kindergartens grew rapidly during the post-war
years. For example, in 1957, in the city of Kharkiv there were eight milk kitchens,
located in every city district, and 98 nurseries (Pavlova, 2004). By 1968, the
number of nurseries increased to 141.7 In Lviv, these facilities were also growing,
but still remained less developed than in Kharkiv. In 1950, Lviv had 1 milk
kitchen and 8 distribution points, and 12 nurseries per 6 city districts.8 By 1958,
the number of nurseries had increased to 28 (Muratov and Shamraj, 1970).9
As mentioned earlier, this pronatalist policy reflected an emerging problem for
Soviet society, the problem of fertility declining below replacement levels. The
fertility decline in Ukraine was rapid, but regional di↵erences persisted. As Fig-
ure 5.1 shows, the Lviv region entered the fertility transition in the late nineteenth
century, before it became part of the Soviet state. During the 1950s and 1960s fer-
tility was declining in the Lviv region, and especially in the city of Lviv. However,
during this time fertility still remained higher on average than that in Kharkiv, as
well as in comparison to Ukraine as a whole. In Kharkiv, fertility was declining in
the early twentieth century, and during the 1950s and 1960s fertility rates fell to
as low level as 13-15 births per 1,000. After the mid-1970s, the trend towards con-
vergence in fertility rates can be observed, which could be linked to the adoption
of a two-child family ideal (Sobotka and Beaujouan, 2014). However, the regional
di↵erences could still be observed after the 1970s and even more explicitly in the
late 2000s.
Demographers suggest that the post-war fertility decline in Ukraine was caused
by considerable spacing between births and by the tendency of stopping repro-
7Kharkiv State Archive, fond 5231, opis 15, dokument 316, 5
8Lviv State Archive, fond 406, opis 2, dokument 166, 9.
9Lviv State Archive, folder 312, opis 2, dokument 572, 30-31
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Figure 5.1: Crude birth rates, per 1000 people, for Lviv (city and
province), Kharkiv (city and province), and Ukraine,1861-2014. Sources: A.G.
Rashin, ‘Naselenie Rossii za 100 let (1813 - 1913) Statisticheskie ocherki’,
http://istmat.info/node/80 [accessed on 13 April 2015]; Franz Rothenbacher ‘The
Central and East European Population since 1850’ (Hampshire, 2013), 1244; The
Human Fertility Database: http://www.humanfertility.org/cgi-bin/main.php (ac-
cessed on April 2, 2015); Lviv State Archive, fond 312, fond 283 and fond
406; Kharkiv State Archive fond 1962, fond P-5125 and fond P-5231; Popu-
lation yearbooks 1991-2001; Main Statistical O ce in Lviv region databases:
http://www.lv.ukrstat.gov.ua [accessed on April 15, 2015]; State Statistics Ser-
vice of Ukraine documents publishing: http://ukrstat.org (accessed on April 5,
2015)
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ductive activities after first birth at the early age of around 25-30 (Steshenko,
2010). Before 1955, spacing and early stopping practices could have been caused
by the high infant mortality rates (IMRs) in the aftermath of the Second World
War.10 However after the mid-1950s, IMRs were steadily declining. In Ukraine,
the IMR was 36.6 in 1960, and in Lviv and Kharkiv provinces it was 33.0 and
26.6, respectively.11 In theory, this indicates that intentions to have more children
were more common in Kharkiv than in Lviv. However, in contrast, this does not
seem to be the case among the informants, as I discuss in the following section.
5.5 Results
In this section I discuss individuals’ experiences of the transition to second birth in
Kharkiv and Lviv between the 1950s and mid-1970s. I first explain what meanings
individuals attached to the transition, and then I show what role relationships
with family and peers played in the transition. To reveal how these relationships
influenced individuals’ decisions and attitudes regarding second childbearing, I
refer to the mechanisms of social influence, particularly social learning, social
pressure and social support, which are described in detail in Bernardi and Kla¨rner
(2014). Lastly, I focus on the role of social support with childcare in the context
of intergenerational and spousal relationships. The analysis for Kharkiv and Lviv
is presented separately in order to better emphasise regional aspects. For reasons
of confidentiality, the names of the informants are pseudonyms.
5.5.1 Eastern Ukraine: Kharkiv
5.5.1.1 Material uncertainty and the long transition to second birth
In the European Soviet republics, including Ukraine, the two-child family norm
became accepted in the 1960s (Rotkirch and Kesseli, 2012, p. 150). This vision
on family composition was also explicit in the Kharkiv informants’ narratives.
However, having two children was perceived as a maximum rather than a desired
number, which is similar to the contemporary situation in Ukraine and Russia
(Perelli-Harris, 2008a; Rotkirch and Kesseli, 2012). Both male and female infor-
mants commonly linked their aspirations of having a small family of one or at
most two children to the general material hardship and the costs of bringing up
a child, as male and female informants framed this concern:
10More on infant mortality rate in both regions see Chapter 1.
11Sources: (Demoscope, 2015a); Demograficnuy shorichnyk 2007, 68; Kharkiv State Archive,
fond 5231, opis 9, dokument 1154, 1-45.
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At that time having two children was, so to say, too many (...).
Because of the material provision issues and upbringing; it was
not easy (Vasilij, born in 1939, skilled worker, Kharkiv).
It is a lot of responsibility (to have a second child) and this made
it hard, also because everyone had to work (Svetlana, born in
1941, civil servant, Kharkiv).
For many, to have adequate material conditions meant to achieve financial
security, namely to have stable employment for both spouses and a residence
independent from that of their parents. These two steps are considered among the
major thresholds in the transition to adulthood. In Western European societies
these are historically perceived as steps that are integral to the forming of a union
(Blum et al., 2009). In the context of the Kharkiv informants, however, marriage
and first childbirth commonly preceded financial independence, and both men and
women married at an early age. After getting married, couples typically co-resided
with parents/in-laws before getting an independent place, and some still had
to finish their educational training. First, childbearing conventionally occurred
within one year of marriage, and often took place under close (grand)parental
supervision (Hilevych and Rotering, 2013). As such, a first child was typically
also seen as a responsibility of grandparents and their support with childcare was
common.
In the context of the Kharkiv informants, marriage and first childbearing
were the entry phases into adulthood, while material security and independence
from parents were subsequent steps. Before having a second child, many couples
still had to establish their own livelihoods, which often resulted in a prolonged
transition to second birth.
5.5.1.2 Social influences on birth postponement
When discussing with the informants the transition to second birth, it became
apparent that decisions to space childbirths were closely related to the character
of spousal relationships. Both male and female informants perceived childbearing
and infant care as a primary responsibility of the mother, or equally of both
parents. As such, men usually referred to the decision to have a second child as
made by their wives, even when it was discussed between spouses. The quote of
a male informant illustrates an example of the decision-making process:
Interviewer: When she got pregnant with the second child, did
either of you consider aborting it?
Viktor: No, she did not want to abort this time. On the contrary,
I first showed that I was not happy to have a child. But I told
her If you really want it, then do it. It was her decision, and she
gave birth. (Viktor, born in 1938, scientific elite, Kharkiv).
In women’s narratives, their husbands’ role in the timing of a second child
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was also often invisible, and the expectation of infant care was not common.
Men’s and women’s visions of childbirth and infant care were related to the ways
in which spouses arranged their relationships, especially with regard to fertility
control: while men held the major responsibility for birth control, they did not
participate in women’s abortion decisions, which in fact were closely related to
the timing of second birth (see Chapter 4). As such, the decision about when
to have a second child, and whether to have one at all, was mainly taken by the
woman.
In their reasoning about prolonging the timing of having a second child, female
informants typically linked it to the di culty carrying a double burden: combining
infant care and paid work. The female informants, regardless of their social-
economic position, commonly emphasised their need to work and contribute to
the family income in order to improve the material situation of the family. In this
context, postponement of a second child was a rational decision, typically made
by a woman, as a female informant frames it: ‘I could have had of course more
(children), but I had two abortions. It was necessary to get out of this misery. It
was necessary to work’.12 Women’s frequent attempts at pregnancy termination
certainly derived from their experiences of carrying a double burden. However,
women in Kharkiv also learned from other women’s experiences, as they closely
communicated with colleagues, neighbours and friends.
For women in Kharkiv, peer relationships played an important role in every-
day life, even after marriage (Hilevych and Rotering, 2013). These ties were not
necessarily strong and stable throughout the life course, and could change depend-
ing on place of work or residence. However, in those typically female close-knit
settings women tended to discuss their problems and seek advice, often on family
issues. In the fragment below, the female informant explains how communication
with other women helped her to make her own childbearing decisions:
At work, the women told me ‘Well, are you sure you can do it (to
have a second child)? Why would you do it? Your baby is still
too small!’ (...) My female friends also had two children. We did
talk about it, and all of them had abortions. We did not discuss
contraception, as it was an individual matter. But if one of us
got pregnant, we all would give her advice (Naida, born in 1936,
unskilled worker, Kharkiv).
The woman shows that her reproductive choices and aspirations were similar to
those of her colleagues who also had two children on average. What is important
to understand here is that having a second child, although it was a woman’s
decision, was not necessarily planned, given that methods of contraception were
unreliable, and often not carefully performed (see Chapter 4). The aspirations to
have fewer children, typically no more than two, were commonly achieved through
12Maria, born in 1929, unskilled worker, Kharkiv.
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prolonged birth spacing. Abortion was the most common method to achieve birth
spacing, at least in part because it was the most accessible. Female informants
discussed these matters. However, when seeking advice from their peers, they did
not learn from each other the benefits of having one or two children, as this would
be a long-term learning process. Instead, they learned the advantages of birth
terminations and how to choose the right moment to have a second child. For
many informants waiting for a perfect moment to have a second child took years.
In this context, the vision of abortion as the only remedy of birth termination
was often also reinforced through social pressure – ‘the force that leads individuals
to conform to accepted social norms’ in order to gain the approval of their peers
(Bernardi and Kla¨rner, 2014). In some female networks, peer judgment was a
strong controlling mechanism used against those women who ‘lived following their
pleasures’, as one of the informants described women who had frequent childbirths.
Social pressure also existed with regard to the age limit within which it was
considered appropriate to have a child. Most of the female informants with a
second child typically had them by the age of 35-40 (see Table1 in Chapter 1).
Among many female informants, this age was considered as a deadline for moth-
erhood, and some linked it to the idea that having a child after the age of 40 could
be dangerous for a woman’s health. This concern could have derived from the
Soviet medical discourse that favoured early motherhood. However, there seemed
to be another part to this prejudice, which carried more of a cultural interpreta-
tion of female’s reproductive age limit. As such, the deadline for motherhood was
related to the notion that parents’ and their children’s childrearing years should
not overlap, which is very likely to occur in the context where early marriage
and early first childbearing are practiced. This consideration, even unconsciously,
provided a clear understanding of a stopping moment for reproductive activities,
particularly among women, as a female informant describes:
We wanted more children, and I could have given another birth
at the age of 39. But Al’osha (an older son) at that moment was
married, and his wife Tamara already got pregnant. And only
this stopped me from having a third child, which my husband
and I really wanted (Zoja, born in 1931, civil servant, Kharkiv).
The deadline for motherhood and pressure to space births by using abortion
certainly facilitated the postponement of the transition to second birth to the mid-
thirties. After the first birth, there typically was no normative expectation about
when, at what age, to have a second child and a new family still had to establish
its own livelihood. At the same time, peers’ reproductive strategies o↵ered a
more convenient model of prolonged transition to second birth, which allowed
women to keep working for a longer time. By the age of 35, women started to
realise that if they did not give another birth in the next few years, they may not
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have another child at all. This reproductive strategy of delaying the second birth
due to persistent economic uncertainty is di↵erent from what demographers call
birth spacing, though birth spacing and postponement are not mutually exclusive.
According to (Agadjanian, 2005, p. 628), birth postponement can be described
as a ‘waiting’ strategy. Among the couples in Kharkiv, this waiting strategy was
characterised by frequent pregnancy terminations, due to material uncertainties.
Female informants from Kharkiv typically gave birth first before or during their
mid-twenties and had their second birth closer to the mid-thirties. The average
gap between first and second births was between 7 to 15 years, and in some cases
a second birth never occurred. This behaviour signifies that the transition to
second birth was not planned and intentions changed depending on material and
emotional circumstances. What is important to address further in this respect,
is whether the postponement of a second birth was solely linked to the lack of
husbands’ help and women’s di culty of carrying a double burden. In the next
section, I argue that in addition to those two factors, material uncertainty was
also related to the available grandparental support with childcare for the second
child.
5.5.1.3 Seeking grandparental support with childcare
In Kharkiv, female informants usually arranged and provided infant and child
care. They typically did not stay at home with a child after maternity leave ex-
pired, and most of them returned to work after the 56-day paid maternity leave
was finished. Although nurseries and kindergartens during the 1960s were avail-
able all over the city of Kharkiv, the majority of the informants rarely considered
these options as adequate alternatives for infant care. Some informants would
have tried to make special part-time arrangements at work, but most commonly
they would first seek support from their parents or from their in-laws. Grand-
parental help was typically seen as the major source of support in this matter, as
a female informant describes:
First I did not even think about having a second child, and later
when I did want one, I had some health issues. All in all, there
was always this problem of who will take care of a child. For my
mother it was hard to do it, as she had to take care of Irina’s
Lesha (her sister‘s child), and two children would have been too
much for her (Varvara, born in 1938, civil servant, Kharkiv).
Although during the first childbearing many couples easily acquired grand-
parental support as many of them still lived with their parents, this support was
not always possible with a second child, when a couple typically lived separately
from their parents. When the informants finally considered having a second child,
often while in their thirties, grandparents were not easily available. They were
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more likely to be helping out with other siblings’ children, were too old, not in
a good health, or lived far away. In the interviews I observed that the lack of
grandparental support with infant and/or childcare was the major reason behind
postponing having a second child and eventually having one at all, as the quotes
of two female informants describe:
I spoke with my mother-in-law about whether to keep a child
or to have an abortion. But she said, ‘You both should decide
yourself. You are adults and do what you think is possible.’ That
was it. I had an abortion (Raisa, born in 1934, skilled worker,
Kharkiv).
After my father told me that if we decided to have a second child
it would be that we should count on ourselves only, and that we
cannot expect any substantial help from them. (Svetlana, born
in 1941, civil servant, Kharkiv).
The post-war period phenomena of postponing a second birth, which in some
cases resulted in early stopping, led to the establishment of the one-child family
norm in the Kharkiv region. This phenomenon could be a key explanation for
why fertility declined so fast and substantial there during the 1950s and 1960s,
and then only slightly increased during the mid-1970s. More detailed analysis of
this process however is still needed.
5.5.2 Western Ukraine: Lviv
5.5.2.1 Early self-independence and the faster transition to second
birth
Among the Lviv informants, material conditions, such as housing issues and
women’s temporary unemployment, were also mentioned among the reasons to
prolong the transition to second birth. However, this reasoning was typically in-
dicated along with the desire to wait until the first child was older, as the following
male and female informant quotes illustrate:
My wife and I did not have any objections regarding not having a
child after the second one was born. Therefore, we did not think
in the categories that we would not have one afterwards, as we
did not reject the possibility. And even when my wife had an
abortion, there was only one reason for it – that the pregnancy
occurred too soon after the second child, meaning, we wanted a
third child to happen at the right moment. It was a time-related
decision (Fedir, born in 1934, scientific elite, Lviv).
I did not want another child yet, because the first one was still
too small. But then I got pregnant, and I thought, What should
happen, shall happen (Oksana, born in 1932, unskilled worker,
Lviv).
The Lviv informants claimed to be more open towards having a second or a
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third child. Many stated that for them having two children was ‘a must’ and that
‘one child is not a child’. Lviv couples often portrayed a second or even third
birth as planned. It may have been the case that even when a pregnancy was not
expected, spouses were likely to accept the fact.
The readiness and willingness of Lviv couples to have a second child shortly
after the first could be linked to material independence from parents near the time
of marriage. Both male and female informants often worked when they got mar-
ried, and some even lived independently from their parents. The necessary level
of material security, which implied independence from the parental family, could
have also been achieved if a woman married a man who had stable employment
at the time of marriage. This was more likely when the husband was older than
the wife. Among the Lviv couples, a fairly large spousal age di↵erence, with men
being older than women, was more common than in Kharkiv. In this context,
marriage, first and later order births typically took place when at least one of the
spouses was economically secure. These two transitions – marriage and economic
security – also signified entrance into adulthood.
5.5.2.2 Social influence on the establishment of the two-child family
norm
The strong proscription against having a single child was one of the central motives
among Lviv couples to have at least two children. Informants typically justified
this motive by saying that they perceived it important for a child’s development to
have siblings. Here are the quotes of a male and female informant that illustrate
this aspiration:
If having only one child, than all attention goes to him or her,
and so to say the child will be egoistic. But when there are two,
then there is some collaboration going on between them and they
have to take care of each other as well (Svyatoslav, born in 1941,
civil servant, Lviv).
My parents also had two children. Later, my mother-in-law also
told me One child is not a child. You should have a second one.
I did not have a husband but had two children. One child is no,
no, never (Zoya, born in 1938, civil servant, Lviv).
The informants often related the advantages of having siblings to their own
experiences, as many of them grew up in families with more than two siblings.
Throughout the life course, relationships with siblings played a crucial role, and
the role of older siblings was particularly important. An older brother or sister
was often a primary source of material support for the younger ones, and typically
helped to pay education fees or to find a job. The ideal of having a larger family
was also transmitted from the parents as part of the socialisation process or from
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in-laws during marital life. The last quote above illustrates how strong social
pressure from her mother-in-law influenced the woman’s vision that having one
child is not good.
Compared to their Kharkiv counterparts, the Lviv informants had more prona-
talist views with regard to childbearing. However, a more rational approach to
birth control, particularly after a second birth, signifies that the perception of
the two-child family norm was becoming more and more accepted in this region
as well. This implied using more reliable, typically male-controlled, methods of
contraception. Among the methods commonly used were coitus interruptus and
condoms, which worked e↵ectively for many couples. A pro-natalist stance can
also be inferred from avoidance of abortion, which was typically used only in ur-
gent occasions rather than as a means of birth control. Overall, average abortion
rates in Lviv were half those in Kharkiv (see Chapter 4).
Another factor that a↵ected the establishment of the two-child norm in Lviv
was that sometimes women’s aspirations to limit fertility after a second child were
stronger than those of their husbands. Even though spouses often communicated
about these matters, some women started to oppose their husbands’ pronatal-
ist wishes. The quotes from the interviews with a male and female informant
illustrate this aspiration:
We did talk about having another child, but she... Well, we al-
ready had two daughters and our first son died. She said We
cannot make it with more (children) [...] I don’t know, sometimes
it happens that a husband has an opinion, but the mother may
think di↵erently (Petro, born in 1933, unskilled worker, Lviv).
I gave birth to a girl first. She is four years senior than the
son...four years and two months. After her the son was born. I
then did not want any more children. I wanted to work (Bohdana,
born in 1933, civil servant).
Women’s aspirations to limit fertility after their second birth were often linked
to their intentions to return to work. In Lviv, the Soviet ideological norm that
a woman has to contribute at least in part to the family income was commonly
supported. However, this norm in practice was implemented di↵erently than in
Kharkiv. As stated earlier, Lviv society did not experience the radical actions
regarding intense women’s incorporation in sectors, such as heavy-, machine-,
and light industries taking place in the Soviet Union in the 1920s and 1930s.
Instead, the post-war Soviet ideological shift of seeing women primarily as moth-
ers and wives, and only secondarily as workers, conformed with the patriarchal
tradition of complementary gender relationships existing in Lviv. This type of
gender relationships, where a husband performs a breadwinner role and a woman
is responsible for the household duties, fitted well with Lviv couples’ ideals of
marital live. This normative gender order also created less pressure on women
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who took an extended maternity leave and stayed with children longer, typically
until kindergarten or even school age.
In addition to women’s aspirations to return to the labour market, social pres-
sure regarding a deadline for motherhood was also pronounced in Lviv. Female
informants typically had their first birth after their mid-twenties and their second
(or even third) birth by their mid-thirties. This allowed for an age gap between
births of a maximum of five to seven years. As such, having two children born rel-
atively closely together helped couples preserve financial independence from their
parents. Although women typically stayed at home during the first few years af-
ter delivery, and could even have resigned from work for this purpose, the shorter
birth spacing still allowed them to return to work more quickly. To understand
the logic and necessary self-control of this strategy, in the next section I review
how infant and childcare responsibilities were arranged.
5.5.2.3 Spousal responsibilities for childcare
The Lviv couples presented childbirth decisions and the arrangement of childcare
as a shared responsibility of both spouses. In practice, men held the major role
in decision-making, while women typically conformed to their husbands. For
example, couples perceived birth control as the male’s primary responsibility, and
a decision to abort was commonly discussed with the husband (see Chapter 4). At
the same time, women performed most of the infant and childcare duties. Even
though some husbands could have helped their wives, couples more commonly
hired a nanny who would help the wife within the household and/or with infant
care. Because women usually stayed at home during the first year(s) after delivery,
or switched to a more flexible work schedule, they were able to perform childcare
duties themselves. A male and female informant describe their experiences in this
realm:
She was at home with the child for about two years. Then she
I found her a job at the laboratory. It was just across the road,
so she was able to come home for a short moment any time she
needed. And the child was then in kindergarten (Markian, born
in 1929, unskilled worker, Lviv).
I was at home with Myroslav (second child) for some years as well.
We went to the village to my family and lived with them for some
time. When he got older, I brought him to the kindergarten. It
was right before the school started. At the hospital I had patients
starting at 8am, so I often was able to finish by mid-day. When I
had home visits, which sometimes were shorter, only three hours,
I could drop by the kindergarten first and bring him home. Then
the boys were taking care of themselves (Natalka, born in 1945,
civil servant, Lviv).
Contrary to Kharkiv, in Lviv I did not observe informants’ expectations of
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receiving grandparental support with infant and childcare. Although grandpar-
ents could provide some support, it was not arranged on a daily basis because
many couples resided separately. Sometimes, however, as a female informant also
indicates above, a wife could have stayed at her parents’ place for few months
during the infant care period. This made infant care easier for a wife, as she did
not have to cook and clean. However, after a short while a woman would typically
return to living with her husband.
Even though in Lviv spouses performed di↵erent roles with regard to infant
and childcare, they both felt equally responsible for this process: a husband in
providing material support to the family, and the wife in taking care of children.
This type of spousal cooperation can be seen as the underlying factor behind a
short-term spacing strategy in the transition to second birth. On the one hand,
this reproductive strategy allowed spouses to save material and time resources
spent on childcare. On the other hand, it permitted them to internalise the norm:
to have at least two children.
5.6 Conclusions
The findings indicate that socio-economic standards, Soviet family policy and
related material uncertainty were indeed crucial factors for couples’ reproductive
decisions in Soviet Ukraine. However, how these conditions were practiced in
family life and, hence, in individual reproductive strategising about a second
birth, di↵ered between the regions. I associate these di↵erences with the patterns
of family relationships historically predominant in the Kharkiv and Lviv regions:
the joint and nuclear-stem family systems, respectively.
It is argued that in the context of strong parental authority and prolonged
multigenerational residence, which were prevalent in the joint family system in the
territories of historical Kharkiv, spousal relationships are less important because
negotiations of livelihood strategies constitute a concern for all family members
living in the household and sharing its goods (Das Gupta, 1999). This, in turn,
facilitates less cooperation between spouses, also with respect to reproductive
decisions, and produces interdependencies between generations. I also observed
this pattern of intergenerational relationships among the Kharkiv couples in the
1950s-1970s. Strong intergenerational ties often surrounded the transition to first
birth and continued even after the family started to reside separately from the par-
ents or in-laws. The expectation of receiving grandparental support with second
childcare existed among many informants despite the separate residence. How-
ever, when it was clear that grandparents would not be able to provide immediate
help because they were taking care of other grandchildren; or had health issues,
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were far away, were still working, or experienced other constrains, it contributed
to increasing uncertainty, particularly among women. An important aspect of
this family pattern was that a grandmother rather than the husband was seen as
a major helper with infant care. As a result, the realisation of limited possibilities
for receiving grandparental support in case of a second birth, which also coincided
with other uncertainties related to a female double burden, motivated many of
the female informants from Kharkiv to adopt a waiting strategy of delaying the
transition to second birth, with abortion among the main means of birth control
(Hilevych, 2015). Additionally, women often also learned from each other about
the benefits of adopting a waiting strategy.
Many of the Kharkiv informants practiced this waiting strategy until they
reached the social deadline for parenthood, typically in the mid-thirties, and this
is when the second birth was likely to take place. As such, the adoption of the
waiting strategy often led to more prolonged birth intervals between first and
second children, sometimes as long as 7 to 15 years. Scholars define the waiting
strategy as postponement, in contrast to spacing (Agadjanian, 2005; Timæus and
Moultrie, 2008). Additionally, those women still feeling insecure about proceeding
with another birth could become early stoppers if the waiting period went on
too long. The appearance of early stoppers in the 1950s-1960s contributed to
the emergence of a one-child family norm that undoubtedly facilitated the rapid
decline in fertility rates in the Kharkiv regions at that time. Scholars argue that
the postponement strategy and one-child families became even more widespread
in the 1990s and early 2000s, which eventually led to the occurrence of the lowest-
low fertility decline (Perelli-Harris, 2008a).
When a new family does not reside with the parents, or intends to reside in-
dependently shortly after marriage, such as in the stem and nuclear-stem family
system typical for the territories of the historical Lviv region, intergenerational
cooperation and dependency in livelihood strategies would eventually become less
strong and spouses themselves would tend to make primary decisions about their
economic, social and emotional issues (Das Gupta, 1999). I also observed this
behaviour among the Lviv informants, where the spouses would negotiate and ar-
range childbearing and childrearing responsibilities together. To do so, the Lviv
informants often adopted a traditional male-breadwinner model at least at some
stage of their reproductive careers. This model was based on a temporary practice
of complementary gender relationships where a husband earns most of the income,
while the wife either does not work or works part-time while taking care of the
children. Some husbands also helped their wives with childcare. More often, how-
ever, the Lviv couples hired a nanny for this purpose. Sometimes, grandparental
help with childcare was also available, but it was not central, unless the genera-
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tions resided together. As such, childcare can be seen as increasing material and
emotional costs for both spouses, and not only for women. Negotiations of these
costs between spouses were a reinforcing factor for many couples in Lviv to adopt
a shorter birth spacing strategy. At the same time, this strategy reinforced the
solid establishment of the two-child family norm in practice, which possibly also
helped to stabilise fertility rates in the region in the 1950s-1970s.
All in all, these findings contribute to the recently introduced debate by Agad-
janian (2005) and Timæus and Moultrie (2008) on spacing as contrasted to post-
poning reproductive strategies. In the context of Eastern Europe, this distinction
is particularly important as up to the present many countries in this region have
been characterised by a relatively early and universal entrance into parenthood,
while fertility decline mainly occurred due to changes in the transition to second
and later births. While the analysis here is of a more explanatory nature on this
matter, further research may use this argument to formulate hypotheses that will
cover other geographic areas in other Eastern European regions, as well as in
other time periods and delving more into ethnic and religious backgrounds.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Discussion:
Strong Families and
Declining Fertility
6.1 Introduction
The rapid changes in fertility behaviour that took place in Ukraine during the
first three decades after the Second World War signified the end of the First
Demographic Transition, as fertility in Ukraine reached the below-replacement
level of 2.05 in the 1960s. Some suggest that in this part of Europe the period
after the 1960s also witnessed the start of a latent depopulation and that this was
later followed by an evident depopulation in the 1990s and 2000s, also referred
to as the lowest-low fertility decline (Vishnevskij, 2009). However, this fertility
decline that already begun to manifest itself in the early 1920s gained speed within
only a few generations as those who were born in families of six siblings in the
1920s and 1930s had only two children themselves in the 1950s, the 1960s and the
1970s.
A significant body of literature has focused on describing these demographic
changes on a macro-level for the Soviet and post-Soviet periods by typically link-
ing these changes to the processes of modernisation and transformation (Billari
et al., 2009; Blum, 2003; Bu¨hler, 2004; Lutz et al., 2002; Perelli-Harris, 2005,
2008a; Philipov, 2003; Philipov et al., 2006; Sobotka, 2004b; Vishnevskij, 2006,
2009; Wesolowski, 2015b,a; Zakharov, 2008). In this dissertation, I argue that the
impact of modernisation and transformations on reproductive behaviour should
be understood through the analysis of social relationships and changes occur-
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ring within them alongside these transformations, as together they contribute to
the formation of social (in)equalities both within and outside the household that
eventually shape individual reproductive choices.
The focus on the role of social relationships in reproductive behaviour is par-
ticularly important in the context of Eastern Europe, where family relationships
have provided welfare in critical situations, such as childbearing, child and elderly
care both in the past and today (Czap, 1982; Gruber and Heady, 2010a,b; Hajnal,
1982; Jappens and Van Bavel, 2012). Similar to Southern Europe, the prevalence
of strong family ties in Eastern Europe is also often connected to the high fertility
rates before the Demographic Transitional (Czap, 1982; Hajnal, 1982) and to the
rapid fertility decline to the lowest-low level in the 1990s and 2000s (Heady and
Kohli, 2010; Heady and Schweitzer, 2010). The lowest-low fertility phenomenon
is often referred to as a paradox of strong family and low fertility (Dalla Zuanna
and Micheli, 2004; Micheli, 2000). Moreover, in the specific context of Ukraine,
where regional di↵erences remain pronounced in many aspects of social life, it
has been suggested that regional variations in fertility could also be linked to
the local family values (Perelli-Harris, 2008a). Therefore, to better understand
and to predict the course of fertility decline in this part of Europe, it is essential
to understand these complex connections between family relationships, including
their continuities and e↵ects on changes in reproductive behaviour, through a
comparative regional perspective during the post-war fertility decline in Ukraine.
Consequently, the main research questions that I addressed in this study were the
following:
(1) How did family and social relationships influence individual reproductive
careers in Soviet Ukraine from around the 1950s to the 1970s? (2) How can local
family systems and their associated power dynamics and social interdependencies
help to understand fertility decline in Soviet Ukraine?
To answer these questions, I used first-hand interviews with and the accompa-
nying life history calendars of men and women who were in their reproductive age
from the 1950s to the 1970s. The interviews were collected in the two Ukrainian
borderland cities of Lviv in the western part of the country and Kharkiv in the
eastern part of the country. These two sites allowed me to observe di↵erences
and similarities both in how family relationships were organised there and in how
these relationships shaped the informants’ reproductive decisions. Additionally, I
also collected population statistics on vital events at the city and provincial lev-
els, such as marriage, birth, abortion and infant mortality rates, and ethnographic
literature on historical family systems in two regions.
In this concluding part I discuss my main findings with respect to the two
research questions. I also discuss the theoretical and methodological implications
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of my findings. I then discuss the limitations of my study and suggest the avenues
for the future research. Finally, I hope to illuminate the societal relevance and
policy implications of this study.
6.2 The role family relationships in individual re-
productive careers
So, what did we learn about how family and social relationships influenced in-
dividual reproductive careers during the post-war fertility decline in Ukraine?
By focusing on individual reproductive careers, I studied the whole set of life
course transitions that are related both to reproduction as a process and pathway
(Hobcraft, 2007; Townsend, 1997), and to the timing, pace and order of reproduc-
tive events (Johnson-Hanks, 2002, 2007). Chapters 2-5 described each transition
belonging to this reproductive pathway, namely marriage, entrance into parent-
hood, birth control and abortion, and transitions to second and later births all in
the context of family and peer relationships. In this section I briefly review each
transition with respect to the first research question.
Marriage and family formation
Chapter 2 addressed the transition to marriage. As appeared from the in-
terviews, three related sub-transitions surrounded marriage: a short betrothal
stage, the decision to marry, and the marriage celebration. Together, these sub-
transitions were also seen as parts of family formation and entry into adulthood.
Despite the immense importance of family formation in the life course, both male
and female informants rushed from the betrothal phase into marriage even though
they were often not yet materially secure. At the same time, those who did not
marry in time were perceived as inexperienced in real matters of life.
Rushing into marriage was certainly understandable for women and men as
getting married also meant entering womanhood and manhood (Gabriel, 2005;
Rotkirch, 2000; Rotkirch and Kesseli, 2010). This association is already prescribed
in language use, both in Ukrainian and Russian, as the words ‘woman’ and ‘wife’
have the same meanings, as do the words ‘man and ‘husband’. Additionally,
marriage was also the guarantee to achieve more legal and social freedom. On
the one hand, these were freedoms related to receiving a housing allowance from
the state, higher chances of getting a better job, and a legal reason for staying
with a spouse after finishing educational training instead of doing compulsory
state service in another city or village. On the other hand, marriage also granted
individuals, particularly women, more independence from their parents as well as
parental recognition of becoming mature.
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Parental control over pre-marital sexual experiences of daughters was strong.
In Ukrainian society, the issue of female virginity is frequently emphasised in
the context of the stigma attached to illegitimate births in historical times, as
an illegitimate birth could bring dishonour not only to a woman but also to her
entire family. Although during the Soviet time many rights and possibilities were
granted to single mothers, the stigma around giving birth out of wedlock was
still very strong. This stigma especially increased after the introduction of the
1944 Family Edict that labelled out-of-wedlock births as illegitimate, in this way
victimising unwed mothers and their children (Lapidus, 1978).
Under these circumstances, the main social influence on men’s and women’s
courtship decisions was exerted by parents through social control mechanism. So-
cial control mechanism was reinforced through sanctions, e.g. parental restrictions
on time by when a child has to be back home, that forced young men and women
to submit to their parents’ wishes. Sanctions are also relevant in the context of so-
cial and normative pressure mechanisms (Bernardi and Kla¨rner, 2014). However,
in contrast to social pressure, where the sanctions are usually accompanied by
individual rewards, in the context of social control these sanctions were primarily
sought to keep behaviour in a certain order for the sake of both a family’s and an
individual’s life being. As such, parents controlled pre-marital sexual behaviour
to avoid the shame of pre-marital birth for the family and to secure a decent
future for their children and their grandchildren. In fact, this control was a par-
ent’s main means of ensuring a secure future for their intergenerational family.
Moreover, livelihood security was also associated with a successful marriage and
the right choice of a marital partner.
This strong parental control before marriage was not without consequences as
it seems to have created an imaginary dependency of children on their parents.
A clear appearance of this intergenerational dependency was the need to have a
marriage celebration. For the informants, a marriage celebration seems to have
been the main means to justify and gain recognition of their relationship from the
family and the community. One of the main rationales behind the celebration was
that many young couples expected to receive some support from their parents or
even to reside with them during their early years of marital life. Post-marital resi-
dence with parents was more common among the Kharkiv informants than it was
among their Lviv counterparts. In Kharkiv, couples commonly resided with par-
ents or in-laws while waiting for social housing or cooperative housing, a housing
form where many families combined their resources and contributed to the build-
ing of a block of flats. In contrast, the Lviv informants considered post-marital
parental support as an additional resource rather than as a primary one. More-
over, many of these informants practiced neolocal residence before or shortly after
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Figure 6.1: Family influence on entrance into parenthood in Lviv and Kharkiv
marriage either by typically renting a (shared) apartment or by applying early
enough for social housing from the state. I argue that these di↵erent responses
to the lack of housing and the di↵erent co-residence patterns that derived from it
may largely be explained by the diverging intergenerational interdependencies in
both localities.1
Entrance into parenthood
During later reproductive events, the dependency between generations and
the paternalistic family values were also prominent. As discussed in Chapter
3, relying on parental support was one of the reinforcing factors to enter first
parenthood shortly after marriage, typically within one year. The value that
informants attached to this transition was also linked to achieving adulthood. In
contrast to marriage, parenthood signified achievement of adulthood. Transition
into first parenthood was characterised by two sub-transitions: the understanding
of the ‘right’ timing of first parenthood and the actual decision about giving birth
or terminating the pregnancy (Figure 6.1). I suggest that the latter was possible
due to the legalisation of abortion.
The ‘right’ timing for parenthood meant that entrance into parenthood should
1Other studies also suggest that patterns of post-marital residence in Eastern Europe are not
solely linked to the availability of rented housing and family policy implications but also to the
character of intergenerational relationships (Ghodsee and Bernardi, 2012; Gruber and Heady,
2010b). Gruber and Heady (2010b), in particular, suggest that the demand for rental housing
could be connected to the culture of giving a dwelling as a gift. This practice is more common
today in urban areas in Eastern and Southern Europe, where intergenerational residence of
married and married children is also the most prevalent than it is in the rest of Europe.
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take place soon after marriage, and as Figure 6.1 shows, right timing was of-
ten shaped by social pressure from parents(in-law), by the cooperation between
spouses, and by social learning/contagion from peers/siblings. Social pressure
from parents(in-law) occurred when one of the spouses, typically the woman, ei-
ther wanted to postpone first parenthood or experienced di culties conceiving,
which also suggests that traditional gender connotations were attached to re-
production. In Kharkiv, friends were also a source of social learning about the
advantages of early parenthood. Among the Lviv informants, however, this niche
of influence was more likely to be occupied by siblings(in-law); in addition to
the close ties that siblings may have, siblings(in-law) are also related by blood,
which immediately gives them a certain hierarchical position with respect to their
parents. This relatedness through kinship that is supported by co-residence often
imposes supportive relationships. As such, even providing some minor support to
a sibling, for example, through childcare, imposes cooperative but also competing
feelings, especially in a society where first birth is associated with entrance into
adulthood.
Social influences to meet the ‘right’ timing of first parenthood often coincided
with the moment in the life course when a couple’s economic uncertainty was high,
for instance, when a person still had no stable income or was still undergoing edu-
cational training. Surprisingly, this uncertainty rarely encouraged the informants
to postpone or terminate the first pregnancy. On the contrary, they even ex-
perienced security and confidence when making a decision to enter parenthood
relatively early. I showed that this feeling of security surrounding the entrance
into first parenthood derived from earlier social influences surrounding the timing
of parenthood, as well as courting and marriage practices, all of which eventually
lead to high degree of dependency on their parents. Similar to the pressure to
marry that I described earlier, social pressure in earlier stages of life resulted in
expectations of receiving parental support in later stages of life. As Figure 6.1
indicates, if these expectations were not fulfilled, a woman would likely terminate
her pregnancy. However, grandparents would often reinforce these expectations.
This again suggests that the paternalistic family values surrounding intergenera-
tional relationships were crucial in promoting early entrance into parenthood in
the two localities.
At the same time, I observed that although family relationships both among
the Lviv and Kharkiv informants were based on paternalistic values underlying
intergenerational relationships, the degree of dependency on parental help di↵ered
between the two localities. I associate this di↵erence with the intra-familial logic
of post-marital residence. If after marriage a couple lived alone, they would
also take greater responsibility for childcare, and grandparental support was an
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additional and temporary option, as was often the case in Lviv. However, when
spouses resided with either set of parents, they tended to rely more on the parents
in terms of childcare, which I more often observed in Kharkiv and less in Lviv.
Under the conditions of prolonged post-marital residence, childcare became a
shared responsibility of the woman and her mother(in-law) rather than that of the
couple. This phenomenon of intergenerational female cooperation Rotkirch (2000,
p. 118) captures in the term extended mothering – when a woman’s maternal
care includes not only taking care of her biological children but also taking care
of her ‘grandchildren, children of relatives and friends, husband, elderly parents
and parents-in-law’. However, because the boundaries of who cares for who were
not clearly defined within family, intrafamily female cooperation also frequently
resulted in competition and conflicts between daughters- and mothers-in-law.
Birth control and abortion
The di↵erence in cooperation between generations and spouses in the two lo-
calities became even more pronounced in birth control and abortion practices
discussed in Chapter 4. I observed that spousal cooperation on these matters was
related to the birth control methods used to space second and third births but
these methods were rarely used before a first birth. Amongst the Lviv informants,
birth control practicalities were often agreed upon, and the details of arrange-
ments were commonly taken for granted. This was generally achieved through a
husband’s awareness of his wife’s wishes. Both spouses typically claimed mutual-
ity where birth control was concerned; however, the men, in particular, claimed
mutuality and responsibility where it was a matter of abortion decisions linked
to family-size regulation, which, in a traditional patriarchal society, is typically
a man’s responsibility. This suggests that, behind the public idea of spousal
cooperation, the men actually exerted private dominance and authority in repro-
duction and marital life. This, in turn, worked to discourage women from seeking
alternative birth control.
Conversely, for the female informants from Kharkiv, abortion was often the
only reliable measure for limiting family size, and it was perceived as solely a
woman’s responsibility. Kharkiv women did not consider themselves at an im-
passe when contemplating abortion as they exploited abortion as their natural
and legal right. In practice, however, these women still tended to rely completely
on their husbands in birth control matters, even though they commonly employed
coital-dependent methods that tended to fail, as the region’s high abortion levels
indicate. The women made little e↵ort to change this situation since discussions
about birth control rarely occurred between spouses and most often these issues
were discussed with female peers. As such, in getting an abortion, these women
did not intend to resist their husbands’ authority. Instead, they exercising their
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agency to seek abortions to maintain the patriarchal gender system, while per-
haps also aiming to fulfil not only their sexual needs but also those related to
work and education. Therefore, the abortion practiced contrary to any pre-coital
method did not question a man’s ability to reproduce, which is essential in pa-
triarchal society, while the actual decision whether to proceed with a pregnancy
was left to the woman who was the main childcare provider. In conditions where
women were carrying a double burden by being a working-woman and a full-time
housewife/mother, abortion seems to have been a suitable life strategy for them.
Transition to second and later order births
These di↵erences in practices of birth control and in how women exercised
their agency within spousal relationships had consequences for the transition to
second or later births, which is discussed in Chapter 5. Similar to the entrance
into parenthood, transition to second birth was also characterised by two sub-
transitions: the timing of and decision about second birth. Unlike the transition
to first birth, the di↵erences in family and other social influences were more
pronounced between regions.
The sub-transition of timing was closely connected to the practices of birth
control and abortion, as these were typically used after the transitions to first and
second births. As Figure 6.2 shows, the timing of a second birth among the Lviv
informants was often spontaneous since coitus interruptus or male condoms were
not always e↵ective. Abortion was an indication of planned second birth. The
term ‘planning’ was rarely used with respect to childbearing; yet, the informants,
primarily males, referred to it when they wanted to justify the decisions to termi-
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nate the pregnancy. Overall, the informants were open about accepting a second
and sometimes a third pregnancy, as the objections to having a single child were
strong. The motives for having at least two children in Lviv were often embedded
in the informant’s own experiences of growing up in a family with siblings (social
learning).
The spousal cooperation on the timing of a second birth among the Lviv in-
formants also seems to have been one of the main situations where spouses would
start to negotiate and to identify possible childrearing responsibilities and possi-
bilities. As indicated in Figure 6.2 , expectations of support with childcare often
coincided with the actual support provision between spouses. In arranging sup-
port, the Lviv informants often adopted a traditional male-breadwinning model
at least at some stage of their reproductive careers. This model was based on
a temporary practice of complementary gender relationships where the husband
earned most of the income, while the wife either did not work or worked part-time
while taking care of children. Some husbands also helped their wives with child-
care or a couple would hire a nanny for these purposes. Grandparental help with
childcare was also sometimes available, but it was not central unless the couple
resided with the grandparents.
In this context of complementary gender relationships, material and emotional
costs of birth control and childcare can be seen as a responsibility shared between
the spouses. Negotiating these costs was often a reinforcing factor for many
couples in Lviv in order to adopt a shorter birth spacing strategy, which also
allowed a woman to return to work faster. Moreover, the transition to a second
birth often coincided with the normative deadline for parenthood, especially for
women.
Among the Kharkiv informants, the timing of second birth was also often
spontaneous, and abortion was practiced more regularly given the frequent lack
of spousal cooperation, as Figure 6.3 indicates.Strong intergenerational ties, how-
ever, often continued even when a family started to reside separately from the
parents or in-laws, who, in turn, would continue living with another (married)
child. As such, the dependency on and the expectations of receiving grand-
parental support with childcare was still high among the Kharkiv informants,
particularly women, even despite a separate residence. However, if grandparents
were not able to provide immediate help for one reason or another, such as they
were taking care of other grandchildren, were having health issues, were far away,
were still working, or were experiencing other constraints, this would consistently
a↵ect women, in particular, as they held the major responsibility for childcare
and had the largest expectations of receiving this help. Subsequently, the lack
of intergenerational support often increased uncertainty among women, who were
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already facing a double burden.
Under conditions of uncertainty stemming from both structural and family
environments, women would start adopting a waiting strategy through a frequent
abortion practice. They would also learn from each other about the benefits of
this strategy. For many women in Kharkiv, the waiting strategy was practiced
until reaching the social deadline for parenthood, typically in the mid-thirties.
At this time, the second birth would likely take place. As such, adopting the
waiting strategy seems to have resulted in a more prolonged interval between first
and second births, sometimes 10 to 15 years, which in other studies is defined as
postponement in contrast to spacing (Agadjanian, 2005). However, those women
who did not meet the deadline for parenthood because they were still feeling too
insecure to proceed with another birth never had a second child.
6.3 Continuity and change of intrafamilial depen-
dencies and their role in fertility decline
My analysis of family and social relationships across individual reproductive ca-
reers illuminated that in early reproductive events, family relationships shaped
individual reproductive careers to comply with conventional patterns of reproduc-
tive behaviour. This was similar in both regions. In later reproductive events,
however, family relationships in the two contexts resulted in dissimilar responses
to the uncertain economic conditions that eventually impacted individual repro-
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ductive strategies around these events. I suggest that the similarities in conven-
tional reproductive practices in the early life course and the dissimilarities in later
reproductive decisions derived from patterns of intrafamilial power dynamics and
social interdependencies. Specifically, the di↵erences in intrafamilial power dy-
namics and social interdependencies in the two localities were characterised by
the predominant importance of conjugal relationships in western Ukraine versus
intergenerational relationships in eastern Ukraine, which conclusively could be
defined as horizontal and vertical intrafamilial dependencies.
Horizontal intrafamilial dependency was observed to be more prevalent among
the Lviv informants and occurred when spouses were the main unit of decision-
making. In this context, economic uncertainties seemed to occur between and
primarily a↵ect a husband and wife. At the same time in the context of Lviv,
spouses still depended on their parents in the early stage of a life course for social,
material and emotional support, while the older they got, the more independent
they became socially and materially. This close connection between generations
during the early life course seems to have contributed to the maintenance of close
intergenerational, sibling and kinship ties over the entire life course. Consequently,
because the Lviv informants continued to emotionally depend on their family, they
had less need to include non-family ties into their close personal network.
In contrast, vertical intrafamilial dependency was more predominant among
the Kharkiv informants and primarily occurred between parents and children. In
this respect, intergenerational ties were of primary importance and parents were
equally, or sometimes even to a greater extent involved in their children’s liveli-
hood decisions than the parents of the Lviv informants. Subsequently, economic
uncertainties would chiefly a↵ect intergenerational relationships. In Kharkiv, eco-
nomic uncertainty was indirectly associated with a lack of support between gen-
erations in later life. This lack of support was partially replaced by creating
stronger ties with distant kin or even non-kin members, such as peers, colleagues,
and friends.2 In this respect, cooperative relationships and closer ties were also
2In the ethnographic literature on marriage celebrations and bridesmaid choice, I observed
some relevant examples of such di↵erences in close ties and relatedness with peers in the Kharkiv
and with siblings in the Lviv regions. According to general Ukrainian tradition, during wedding
celebrations in the 18th and 19th centuries, a bride had a certain number of bridesmaids, who
were usually unmarried females of approximately the same age; they helped the bride before and
during the wedding celebration and were referred to as her sacral sisters (Oxrymovych, 1892).
In the Kharkiv region, all unmarried females present at the wedding were referred to either as
sisters or as bridesmaids (Kalynovskyj, 1772). In the Lviv region, however, a bride had no more
than two bridesmaids, who were referred to as ‘the first bridesmaid’ and ‘the second bridesmaid’,
respectively, and these were often her unmarried sisters or cousins. All other unmarried females
present at the wedding were referred to as ‘girls’ and they did not have any sacral connection to
the bride (Oxrymovych, 1892). In a previous study on the Soviet period, these types of women’s
network configurations were described as peer-oriented in Kharkiv and family-oriented in Lviv
(Hilevych and Rotering, 2013), which falls in line with the vertical and horizontal dependency
distinction.
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more likely to occur outside these groups.
The questions is now whether and if so how the abovementioned power dy-
namics and social interdependencies can help to understand fertility decline in
Soviet Ukraine when they are placed in a historical perspective of local family
systems? I shall review this question in the light of socio-economic conditions
existing shortly before and during the post-war fertility decline.
As was observed in this study, economic uncertainty constantly surrounded
individual reproductive careers from the 1950s to the1970s. However, the infor-
mants felt more secure when entering marriage and first parenthood than they
did when proceeding to the second or third births. The reason for this seems to be
that parental social control of their children’s pre-marital sexuality formed certain
expectations about receiving parental support during early life, such as material
support and post-marital residence. Eventually, the social control exerted by par-
ents and a feeling of security from the children’s side, which I characterised as
paternalistic intergenerational relationships, motivated young couples to submit
to the dominant norm of early and universal marriage and first parenthood. I use
the term dominant because here I clearly observe the continuity not only in the
demographic pattern but also in the character of intergenerational relationships
as practiced in the pre-transitional and later in the Soviet context.
The mixed nuclear-stem family system in Lviv and the joint family systems
in Kharkiv also promoted paternalistic intergenerational relationships, as ethno-
graphic studies suggest (Kis, 2012; Mayerchyk, 2011; Smolyar, 1998). The primary
feature here was the dependency of the younger generation on their parents in
the transition to marriage, as this is when the parental property could o cially
be passed to the next generation (Behey, 2003; Hrymych, 2013). In the context of
inheritance, non-married individuals in both family systems were discriminated
against as these individuals usually received a smaller share of their parents’ in-
heritance than their married siblings or no inheritance at all.
Similar paternalistic and pronatalist premises were later adopted and repro-
duced by the Soviet state (Goldman, 1993; Kligman, 1998; Mezei, 1997), especially
after the 1950s. At this time the state started to grant housing and job possi-
bilities primarily to married couples with children, while those who did not have
children often did not receive the aforementioned privileges and even had to pay a
tax for childlessness. Moreover, women who gave birth but did so out of wedlock
were socially stigmatised (Lapidus, 1978). Under these circumstances, the Soviet
state partly recreated the need for parents to secure their children’s livelihoods at
least at the early stages of life. The continuity in intergenerational paternalistic
relationships at early life also explains the earlier interpretations of the prevalence
of early marriage and parenthood in this part of Europe (Gabriel, 2005; Perelli-
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Harris, 2008a; Rotkirch and Kesseli, 2010). These interpretations suggest that
when grandparents are still working and relatively young, they can provide some
essential support to their children, which eventually facilitates early entrance into
parenthood in many Eastern European countries even today.
An important question is why these intergenerational paternalistic relation-
ships did not expand to the transition to second and later births? Answering this
question is crucial to understand the specific trajectories of fertility decline in
the two regions and the patterns that are associated with these, such as spacing,
postponement, and stopping of birth, all of which started to appear when, for the
first time, fertility declined to below-replacement level in the 1960s.
An important contextual factor here is that although the Soviet state promoted
paternalistic values, the modernisation processes did not allow families to perform
social exchange between kin over the entire life course in the way that it used
to do in the pre-Soviet past, especially in the urban areas. Moreover, housing
design began to focus on nuclear families (the so-called khrushchyovkas), and
frequent migration and residence far from kin, among other factors, motivated
families to develop new adaptation practices to secure their livelihoods. These
adaptation practices combined with the attempts to at least partially maintain
some conventions of social exchange between kin certainly shaped family ties and
the influences they provided.
Every informant participating in this study acknowledged that for him/her
the transition to second birth was characterised by a high degree of material
uncertainty, such as di culties to make ends meet and to cope with a double-
burden of working and raising children, especially for women. These problems
were discussed with respect to the timing and decision on having a second and
third child. Here I started to observe attempts for di↵erent reproductive strategies
between the informants in the two localities.
In Lviv, economic uncertainties seem to have partially stimulated spouses to
practice complementary gender relationships over the life course. However, these
spousal dynamics were already practiced before the Soviet regime was estab-
lished.3 The ethnographic literature indicates that in the pre-transitional context
in western Ukraine, where Lviv is situated, couples typically became indepen-
dent from their parents immediately after marriage and siblings were often equal
with regard to inheritance share (Behey, 2003; Kis, 2012), which was a distinct
feature of the nuclear-stem family system (Kaser, 1996, 2002, 2006). Moreover,
while married children sometimes continued to reside with their parents and sib-
lings for some time after marriage, they often had their own piece of land from
3O cially, western Ukraine became part of the Soviet Union in 1939. However, only after
the Second World War did the Soviet-type modernisation start in the region.
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which the new family would sustain itself.4 This tradition obviously stimulated
more negotiations between spouses, as the major decision-making unit, as well
as between siblings. In short, the role of parents in their children’s livelihoods
in western Ukraine declined over the life course, and only the older married sons
who stayed with their parents would share livelihood decision-making with them.
As such, in most of the families under this type of family system, all the costs,
including those related to children, were primarily shared between the spouses.
In the post-world war period, the practice of complementary gender relation-
ships and the changes in this habit over time are also visible in the 1950s and the
1960s through the low percentage of female labour force participation at the onset
of the Soviet industrialisation: 12.9% in 1950 (Hyk, 1987, p.193). However, this
percentage more than tripled by 1960, reaching 42.3%. During the same decade,
changes in the Soviet policy also started to occur and these were associated with
the liberalisation of the regime that now started to promote the complementary
gender relationship model. This mainly took place through encouraging women to
occupy positions in education, health care and culture, where the working week
was shorter (33-39 hours) (Vinokurova, 2007). This shorter working week also
allowed women de facto to work part-time when needed (Lapidus, 1978).
Families in Soviet Lviv continued to practice the traditional couple-centred
family relationships. However, this was not possible throughout the entire life
course because women were sometimes obligated or pressured or they simply
needed to return to the labour market. For this reason, alongside early entrance
into parenthood, families in Lviv also started to adopt relatively short spacing
intervals between the first and second child, and sometimes also between second
and third births. In practice, short spacing meant that women first stayed at home
with their children and later resumed working either part-time or at more flexible
jobs to continue taking care of the children. Even when a husband or nanny
assisted with childcare, a wife was still responsible for coordinating everything
and therefore her presence in the household was essential. Subsequently, because
the Soviet policy also partially discouraged traditional gender roles and because
some women felt pressured to return to the labour market, many women stopped
having children after the second or third child. This stopping moment also often
4It should be mentioned that that by the end of the 19th century, severe land fragmenta-
tion started in western Ukraine, including the Lviv region, and put many families into a crisis
situation (Behey, 2003; Franko, 1888). To overcome this crisis, which could eventually lead
to food shortages, the Austro-Hungarian government tried to impose an impartible single-heir
inheritance system. However, this system was not socially accepted and peasants continued to
equally split their lands between all the heirs (Franko, 1888). This economic constraint related
to the lack of land could also have been one of the preconditions for the changes in the perceived
costs of children, which under this inheritance rule subsequently could have facilitated the be-
ginning of fertility decline in the region, which also started in the end of the 19th century (see
Figure 1.4). This issue however needs more investigation.
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coincided with the normative age deadline for parenthood, which also motivated
some not to have a third child.
Overall, the practice of couple-centred and traditional male-breadwinning gen-
der relationships seems to have helped prevent the fertility rate in Lviv from falling
to below-replacement level from the 1950s to the1970s and to remain relatively
stable and the highest in Ukraine. At the same time, the adaptation of this type
of family relationship to Soviet modernisation, particularly female inclusion in
the labour market, facilitated the establishment of a two-child family norm in
the region. This norm is still accepted and practiced there today (Perelli-Harris,
2005).
In Kharkiv, the modernisation changes seem to have had a di↵erent impact
on family relationships and hence on reproductive strategising in the post-war
period. So what family ties were primarily challenged and how? Since the pre-
transitional time, the major decision-making unit in the family was not only a
couple but also the parents, who still headed the household even after their sons
had gotten married and had brought their wives to the parental house. The
inclusion of parents in the decision-making had to do with the succession rule
that inheritance had to be divided between typically the male children at the
father’s death (Hrymych, 2013; Smolyar, 1998). This is typically seen as one of the
primary characteristics of the joint family system in Eastern Europe (Czap, 1982;
Kaser, 2002) including the eastern Ukrainian regions where Kharkiv is located.
However, while all male children had the right to inherit, the father decided
how to divide his inheritance. As such, this inheritance rule contributed to a
prolonged dependency of married sons on their father who wanted to improve
their inheritance by continuing to rely on their fathers’ authority. However, this
rule could also create conflicts between the siblings after their father’s death, as
the inheritance was not always equally divided (Hrymych, 2013; Smolyar, 1998).5
Additionally, daughters-in-law were also dependent on their mothers-in-law in
many household decisions, at least up until they acquired the same authority
with age. Overall, and as mentioned earlier, the authority of the older generation
did not mean only dependency and submissiveness but also protection (Kis, 2012).
In short, while parents were still alive, they assisted their children in managing
5In the 19th century, in some families sons tried to separate from their fathers earlier than the
expected norm, which scholars typically associate with the nuclearisation of complex families.
However, the inheritance rule remained the same. When a married son wanted to separate
earlier, provided that he had supported his father before, his father would give him his share of
the inheritance based on the number of successors in the family. This split, however, implied that
after the father’s death, the inheritance would be re-divided between all the children, including
those who were still not married and who remained under the protection of a married sibling.
The re-division of inheritance typically caused many conflicts between siblings who now had the
opportunity to claim a bigger share than they had first received from their father (Hrymych,
2013; Smolyar, 1998). Women could also inherit the so-called ‘materyzna’ ; however, this was
only passed through the maternal line.
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their everyday lives, but after their death they continued to help by having equally
divided their inheritance among all their married male children.
Intergenerational ties also remained strong in both rural and urban areas after
the communist rule was established in the Kharkiv region in 1919. In rural areas,
intergenerational ties were reinforced through work and living on the collective
farms that the new regime had introduced. In urban areas, both kin and non-kin
ties were fortified by the communal housing that had also been established by
the communists. Moreover, in the country, although collective farming abolished
private property, the new regime still allowed traditional inheritance rules since
parental housing and limited land property could still be inherited (Constitution,
1936, 1977). In both areas, thus, the intergenerational and non-kin patterns of co-
residence still allowed individuals to secure their livelihoods by a mutual exchange
of social support and, in some cases, material resources.6
It should be mentioned that the Soviet regime already began to challenge
the traditional spousal relationship model in the 1920s, when compulsory female
participation in the labor force was introduced, and divorce and abortion became
legal. These moves, however, did not seem to have had much impact on fertility
rates in the Kharkiv region, compared to Lviv, for example, as the crude birth
rate remained high and stable during the inter-war period (Figure 1.4). In the city
of Kharkiv, the crude birth rate was 26.2 in 1926, and it remained stable until the
post-war period (Figure 5.1). The real decline in fertility in the Kharkiv region
took place after the Second World War, when fertility declined to 13.3 in 1950
and continued to decline thereafter (Figure 5.1). Additionally, the rural-urban
di↵erences in birth rates in Kharkiv after the 1950s were significant, compared to
Lviv, where they were almost the same.
Subsequently, the rapid decline of fertility in Kharkiv coincided with a chal-
lenge to both spousal and intergenerational and neighbourhood ties by several
factors including the Soviet nuclear-family housing policies, which were linked to
the rapid influx of migrants in the cities after the Second World War (Rachkov,
2011). That said, the new social housing, i.e., khrushchyovkas, neither allowed
families to practice co-residence with kin over the entire life course nor did it allow
kinship ties to be replaced by relations with neighbours. As such, the economic
developments taking place after the 1950s seem to have strongly constrained the
availability of parental protectiveness in the later life course. The grandparents –
themselves still involved in the labour market, yet residing only with one of the
married children – could not provide simultaneous childcare to all of their grand-
6Some authors also suggest that because the values surrounding communal farming and other
Soviet regulations were already anchored in the joint family system, the new Soviet rule was
better accepted in the areas where these types of families prevailed, such as Russia, but also
eastern Ukraine (Heady, 2003; Todd, 1988).
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children. Therefore, those married children residing with parents or in-laws would
receive primary support with childcare, while those residing separately would re-
ceive either less or no support at all, which also seems to have caused inequalities
between siblings.
Additionally, women in the Kharkiv families not only provided the majority
of the childcare but also contributed the same amount as men to the household
income. Therefore, women tended to take the maximum paid maternity leave (112
days), after which the grandmothers would step in with childcare arrangements,
if they could. However, when a woman knew that her mother(in-law) would
not be able to help, she would start to employ a waiting strategy that resulted in
postponement of the transition to second birth and sometimes in having no second
child at all. The appearance of the early stoppers seems to have contributed to
the emerging one-child family norm that undoubtedly facilitated the rapid decline
of fertility in the Kharkiv region after the 1950s. This strategy became even more
widespread during the lowest-low fertility decline in the 1990s and early 2000s
(Perelli-Harris, 2005; Sobotka, 2004b,a).
⇠⇠⇠
A similar link was also observed between conjugal-based and generations-based
ties and their distinct impact on fertility behaviour in some other recent studies.
For example, the results of the European Kinship and Social Security (KASS)
study also suggest that close ties within versus outside family divides Northern
and Western Europe, on the one hand, from Southern and Eastern Europe, on
the other hand (Heady and Kohli, 2010). These findings seems to serve as a
clarification and an empirical prove of the earlier argument by Reher (1998) about
the predominance of weak family ties in the North-West of Europe and strong
family ties in Southern and Eastern Europe.
Importantly, KASS findings showed that it is not only the strength of kin
ties but also the strength of non-kin ties that matters in our everyday lives.
Applying and developing further this idea, Heady (2016) recently suggested that
in communities where conjugal autonomy is important, people are more likely to
move away from their families of origin and make the links to friends and social
class more important than kinships ties. In his study of the historical fertility
decline in Britain, Szreter (1996, 2015) makes a similar observation. Subsequently,
what Heady and Szreter suggest is that these loose connections to kinship likely
facilitated the faster onset of fertility decline in the past but more stable fertility
rates in the context of emerging uncertainties today. By contrast, when the
connection to the kin and community in general is strong, the situation will be
more complex as the response to the social change would not only derive from
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the conjugal relationships, but it would also depend on the community and kin
(Heady, 2016). In this respect, when a rapid social change from an agricultural
to an industrial economy occurs, it leads to a decline in community collaboration
and subsequently to a collapse in psychological support within the community
and/or between kin members.
In my findings, I observed some similar processes happening in Ukraine at
the ones of the transition from family-based agriculture to industrial and planned
economy, which coincided with the fertility decline. Unlike Reher’s, Kass’s and
Heady’s study, however, my findings show that the distinction between the conjugal-
based and kin-based ties is not as black and white as they may appear. Both
conjugal-based and kin-based ties could characterise the societies where family
relationships are of primary welfare-provision. In the context of Ukraine, the ef-
fects of the so-called strong family ties, which I observed in both localities, on
reproductive strategies depended not only on the organisation of the kinships ties
and their underlying values, but also on the life course stage that they surrounded.
Additionally, the focus on interdependencies, rather than on ties or networks as
neutral characteristics of the web of relationships, allows more sensitivity to dif-
ferent levels and degrees of intrafamilial inequalities over the life course.
To conclude, my findings continue the long-lasting debate on that some general
societal processes, such as fertility declines across Europe, cannot be explained
without considering the similarities underlying them as has been done in earlier
theories and projects, such as the First and Second Demographic Transitions
Theory (Davis, 1945; Lesthaeghe, 2010; Notestein, 1945; Van de Kaa, 1987), the
Princeton Fertility project (Coale et al., 1979; Coale and Watkins, 1986), the
‘Hajnal/Laslett model’ (Hajnal, 1982; Laslett, 1988), Reher (1998) and the KASS
project (Heady and Kohli, 2010; Heady and Schweitzer, 2010). Broadly speaking,
it could be argued that these studies seem to derive their scholarly premises
from the general assumption that ‘while the actual structure changes, the general
structural form may remain relatively constant over a longer or shorter period
of time’, which Radcli↵e-Brown (1940, p. 40), suggested more than 75 years ago.
Specifically, he suggested that by searching for underling structures, anthropology
and presumably other social sciences could strive to be more systematic. Radcli↵e-
Brown was and is highly criticised for this. However, this argument of keeping
in mind the importance of some main underlying principles and logic that keep
general structure together, which Szreter (1996, 2011, 2015) suggests to define as
‘communicating communities’, is still valid today. That said, as scholars we need
to apply and probe more critical and case-specific methodologies to identify what
is actually important for the formation of a general social structure in a given
context, whether it is social class, religion, ethnicity, kinship or yet something
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else. This identification could primarily be done by studying the nature of social
relationships – an approach that this study has tried to develop and undertake.
6.4 Reflections on the theoretical-methodological
approach and the main empirical findings
This dissertation illustrates how to bring together the continuity and path-
dependency of local family systems and the associated values in the past, on the
one hand, and family influences on reproductive behaviour in more recent con-
texts, i.e. after changes in traditional household and inheritance patterns started
to occur, on the other hand. In this respect, I treated both the individual so-
cial network and individual agency as two main agents of reproductive behaviour
change. By doing so, I saw how individuals interpret and transformed cultural
symbols though social interactions, practices, and conversations regarding repro-
ductive events (Bernardi and Hutter, 2007; Kertzer, 2005) within a certain social
structure that built a framework of opportunities for the individual and his/her
network actions to take place.
In addition to this major theoretical contribution, this dissertation also illus-
trated the theoretical benefits of studying individual reproductive behaviour as
a process (Gillis, 1992; Hobcraft, 2007; Johnson-Hanks, 2002; Townsend, 1997).
This anthropological-demographic perspective on reproduction allowed me to
study not only how vital events occur throughout individual life courses and
the social influences around these, but also what the particular sub-transitions
could be for a certain local context. For example, I identified for Ukraine the
di↵erences between timing and decision of parenthood, between an abortion as
a back-up method and as proper means of contraception, and finally, between
spacing and postponement of the second birth. As my analysis illustrated, the
explanations for the changes in reproductive behaviour during fertility decline
should be sought in these local level practices of reproductive behaviour that
emerge as an interpretation or response to the rapid socio-economic changes.
This dissertation also showed the applicability of retrospectively studying so-
cial influences on individual reproductive careers. Overall, the retrospective ap-
proach to study reproductive behaviour has several downsides. Probably the
largest one is that individuals tell their past experiences from the perspective of
today. To cope with this methodological issue, I distinguished individual life sto-
ries from life histories by using the approach suggested by Rosenthal (1993, 2006).
At the same time, I also observed that informants’ present perspective on their
behaviour and social relationships in the past served as an additional approach
to reveal the continuity in family values.
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The main benefit of a retrospective approach is, however, that it allows seeing
a complex picture of how certain developments take place over the entire life
course. In the context of this study, a retrospective perspective provides a better
understanding of why certain actors of our individual personal networks can be
more influential at one life course stage and less at another. This complex view
on social influences also allowed me to disentangle an additional mechanism of
social influences, namely social control.
6.5 Limitations and avenues for further research
The main findings of this dissertation suggested that in western and eastern
Ukraine family relationships that were organised based on horizontal or verti-
cal intrafamilial dependency were the primary locus of exchange, or ‘communi-
cating community’ as Szreter (1996, 2011, 2015) would call it. Through these
intrafamilial dynamics social changes, such as modernisation, urbanisation, and
industrialisation and related material, economic, and social uncertainties, seemed
to a↵ect individual reproductive decisions and hence the course of fertility decline
in the two regions at the end of the First Demographic Transition. Although
I provided some hints on possible implications of these horizontal and vertical
dependencies in family relationships at the onset of the fertility decline, more
research should be done to understand how these regional dependencies within
family relationships a↵ected the beginning of the Demographic Transition in the
two regions. Similarly, these intrafamily dependencies should be further exam-
ined to help us understand and to predict fertility behaviour and emerging health
inequalities today as well to frame relevant family policies for the future. Addi-
tionally, these intrafamilial interdependencies could be a novel lens to grasp and
to explain the persisting regional di↵erences in elderly health and in longevity,
especially between genders.
Another line of research that the findings of this dissertation brought to light
is the study of paternalistic culture in Ukraine. This topic has previously been
addressed from a political economy perspective and from the question of how
the Soviet state contributed to forming this culture (Susak, 2007b,a). My study
showed that continuity of paternalistic culture in Ukraine has deep historical roots
and that family relationships are organised based on the paternalistic intergen-
erational values. While my study showed the connection between paternalistic
intergenerational values and early entrance into marriage and parenthood, future
research should address the implications of these values for the provision of el-
derly care. It could be that in the later life course, the paternalistic and protective
behaviour would now derive from children towards their parents. In this respect,
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protectiveness, which in contrast to solidarity does not necessarily imply emo-
tional bonds, could also be one explanation for older adult loneliness common in
Eastern Europe (Gierveld et al., 2012).
In addition to the areas of research that stem directly from my findings, there
are also several aspects that this study could not address but that might be
interesting to discuss in future research. One of these is the deeper investigation of
the birth control culture in the Soviet Union and how it was connected to spousal
and intergenerational relationships. While I here addressed more conventional
birth control methods, I did not address abstinence as a means to regulate fertility,
especially in later life. For example, the Soviet state-owned magazine Zdorovie
(The Health) started to promote abstinence as a means of birth control in the
mid-1960s (see Zdorovie, Issue 2, 1966). But to what extent abstinence was used
in practice and what the roles of family and spousal relationships were in this the
matter are questions yet to be answered.
Another methodological restriction of this study was that it did not provide a
comparative view on di↵erences and similarities between various ethnic and reli-
gious groups, or between the informants originating from rural and urban areas.
Since throughout my analysis these categories were less pronounced than regional
and gender di↵erences and incorporating these lenses would require enlarging the
sample as well as combining qualitative data with quantitative data analysis, I
did not attempt to do it in this study. However, this certainly opens up new
possibilities to identify alternative communication communities that mattered in
fertility decline and reproductive health in Ukraine.
Another part of the population that I did not entirely cover in this study were
single and/or childless. Although I interviewed several of them in both localities,
I did not systematically compare them with those who had children and what
role family relationships played in their lives. Throughout the analysis, however,
I particularly addressed the issue of stigma attached to childlessness in Ukraine.
In this respect, Ukraine constitutes a unique setting to also study the role of kin
in assisted reproduction because, similar to what Inhorn and Birenbaum-Carmeli
(2008) suggest, the issue of how infertility is handled is particularly relevant in
societies where it is highly stigmatised and the role of the family can be very
crucial here as well.
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6.6 Societal relevance and policy implications of
the study
“Ukraine has one of the most generous, but least e↵ective family
policies in the world.”
Perelli-Harris 2008a, p. 1167
The findings of this study emphasised that ever since the first modern state
regulations of family and reproductive life were enacted during the Soviet time
in Ukraine, the necessity for regional, intergenerational and gender sensitivity of
these policies has been essential. This PhD dissertation illustrated that the same
Soviet family policy regulations, including the major ones of abortion legalisation,
maternity leave, and state childcare arrangements, were di↵erently practiced de-
pending on the region, but not exclusively, and local family values played a large
role in this process.
As this study observed the continuity and path-dependency in values under-
lying local family relationships, studies analysing family policies in Soviet and
present-day Ukraine also indicate that clear path-dependency took place in this
realm. Namely, the continuity on the policy level was realised through a con-
stant adaptation of pronatalist programs that aimed to tackle the consequence of
the problem, i.e., to boost fertility rather than to address the factors underlying
this fertility change (see, for example, Frejka and Gietel-Basten 2016; Wesolowski
2015a.
During the Soviet time, these factors included state investments in maternity
leave for mothers and in new kindergartens and nursery houses. In present day
Ukraine, these measures mainly amount to increasing the birth allowance (Frejka
and Gietel-Basten, 2016). At the same time, and as the above quote by Perelli-
Harris (2008a) suggests, although these measures have often been generous, they
were also the least e↵ective. So, what could be done di↵erently in the policy
approach to family, fertility and reproductive health in Ukraine today based on
what we have learned about the continuity of local patterns of family relationships
and their e↵ects on reproductive behaviour?
First of all, it should be recognised that changes in reproductive practices that
took place in the course of fertility decline were accompanied by changes in family
relationships. Soviet-type industrialisation and modernisation caused changes in
how families arranged and secured their livelihoods. As such, nuclearisation of
households in the course of modernisation and fertility decline did not imply the
weakening of family ties. However, the lack of investment in helping to maintain
these ties was visible, which certainly had its direct impact on reproductive be-
haviour. In this respect, the family policies in Ukraine must take into account
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not just the direct practical needs of the individuals and the state itself, ‘but also
and maybe even more importantly the patterns of relationships underlying them’
(Kohli and Heady 2010, p.407).
Subsequently, this implies that policy makers should consider not only the
object that certain policies address, but also the impact it has on relationships
between close kin. Thus, family and reproductive policies have to be articulated
with the regional and national cultures of kinship to be e↵ective (Kohli and Heady,
2010, p. 408). At the same time, these policies should be sensitive to how kinship
patterns react to socio-economic change, and they should see kinship as an actor
rather than only as a social environment.
Finally, the public policy in Ukraine should be designed through a relativist
perspective to target and assist not only those in need of help but also those who
support them in the Ukrainian context, mostly grandparents. In this respect,
policy would make a contribution to provide better social security for society,
especially in the later life course, which is particularly important in the context
of the current political crisis in Ukraine, as well as for the long-run development
connected to an ageing society.
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Appendices
A Transcribing guidelines
When first mentioned : full name (e.g. Inna Vasylivna)
Thereafter : initials (e.g. I.V.)
Pause: ...[sec] (three dots and number of seconds in brackets)
Sentence not finished : ...(three dots)
When correcting him or herself : / (slash)
When being interrupted by another person: // (double slash and start new para-
graph)
When new person joins the interview :mark as Person 1, 2,3.
When word/phrase is not clear : [not clear, t ’ ’ ] (in bold and in brackets indi-
cate ‘not clear’ and the exact time of the saying)
B Interview guide
Introduction: Hello! My name is [Yuliya] and I currently work on my disserta-
tion in the fields of ethnography and history. I study parenthood experiences and
family relationships of people born before the war and who leaved in Lviv/Kharkiv
in the 1950-1970s, meaning their adult lives started in either of these cities, but
the place of birth doesn’t matter for me. As we spoke about it previously, your
life corresponds to these criteria, so we agreed to have this conversation today. I
should mention that your name and other people’s names you mention would be
changed. Our conversation is anonymous. I however will record it for analysis
purposes. Let’s start.’
First narrative question: ‘Could you please tell me briefly in which family
you were born? Who were your parents, in terms of occupation and educational
backgrounds? When they were born and got married? With whom did you live
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during your childhood? You may also tell me briefly what happened to your family
during WW II and other important things that happened with you before you got
married/started your job/university/left parental home.’
Second narrative question: ‘Now I would like to hear the story of your marital
life.’
(In the informant doesn’t know from where to start, I add the follow-up questions)
‘When did you get married? How many children do you have?’
OR
‘Back to that time, tell me about the birth of your first child’
Reproductive careers (RC) events*
*[The order of the events should be set by the informant him/herself. An
interviewer however should remember what issues should be discussed in the flow
of the interview and they are stated below]
Questions to be asked discussed around each RC event (also in LHC):
Who were close to you during this time?
-Relationships within the household
-Relationships with the spouse
-Relationships with the in-laws
-Relationships with the kin of origin
-Relationships with any other kin members
-Relationships with non-kin (colleagues/friends/neighbours)
Attitudes towards childbearing
-The di↵erence to have one, two, three children
Life priorities at this stage
-Avoiding pregnancy (When? Why? How?)
Gossip or negative experiences related to marital life and childbearing/-rearing
RC events
Courtship and premarital relationships
-Dating
-Spousal choice influences (Who? Why? How?)
-Views on marriage and childbearing
-Attitudes to childless people
-Ideal spouse/ marital life
-The role of parents and other kin in marital life and infant/childcare
-What did informants liked about his parents family relationships? What infor-
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mant wanted to keep in his/her own family?
Wedding
-When?
-Church and state registration; people present; witnesses
-Organisational responsibilities (Who? Where?)
Cohabitation
-Where? How long?
-Personal attitude/ general attitude
-If not experienced personally: other people examples
Marital life/relationships
-Division of roles
-Degree of closeness (a husband/wife is a friend/partner)
-Family and friends gatherings
First/Second/ pregnancy
-Help of husband (duties & responsibilities) / help from other kin/non kin
-Timing
-Miscarriage or abortion prior pregnancy
-Duties and responsibilities
-Expectations of help/support
First/Second/childbearing
-Where? Who were present/ visited?
-If in the hospital, what were the general rues of hospitalisation/visits
-Medical patronage
Infant’s care
-Knowledge on infants’ care
-Help and support
-Di culties
Baptising
-When?
-Choosing Godparents
-Who initiated baptising?
Childcare
-Notions on childcare (ideal)
-Notions on a child independency
Planning of further children
-Contraception use
-Attitudes towards having children
-Health issues
-Avoiding pregnancy
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Divorce
-Reasons
-Support/help/consultations
Intimate topics
If an informant did not address any of these topics him/herself, I would start
probing them after I feel the connection with the informant is well established (I
feel that s/he is open)
Pre-marital sex
-Fear of getting pregnant before marriage and avoiding it
-General attitudes and peers experiences
-Personal attitude and experiences
-Where?
Miscarriage’
-When?
-With who discussed/got help
Abortion
-Abortion practice within the informant’s environment
-Informant’s notions of how is was practiced in the Ukrainian society in genera
-Awareness of abortion policy and other available contraception
-Personal experience
Contraception use
-Available methods
-Practice within the informant’s environment
-Views on contraception use (Why? When? Who?)
Expectations from family relationships at the present life stage:
-Expectations from children: help, support, frequency of communication, co-
residence
-Informant’s role as a parent in his/her children lives
-Relationships with children
-What informant’s parents expected from him/her
(These are usually the final questions to conclude an interview)
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Life history calendar _example 
Name: Maria Date and place: July 12, 2013 
 
Education « »- time period 
Year 19___45____ 19___55____ 19_______ 19_______ 19_______ 19_______ 19_______ 
School (mark with « ») x       
Where Kharkiv       
Other___university__________  x      
Where  Kharkiv      
Other_____________        
Where        
Work « »- time period 
Year 19__56_____ 19_______ 19_______ 19_______ 19_______ 
Position teacher     
Full time (« ») x     
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Part-time (« »)      
Marital life M=married,    A= living AWAY from spouse,   D= Divorced,   W= Widowed 
Year!!! 19__56_____ 19____57___ 19__99_____ 19_______ 19_______ 19_______ 19_______ 
Month!!! Jan Mar      
1________Oleh_____ M A W     
2_____________        
3_____________        
4____________        
5____________        
Children (A= Adopted),     B= Born,        S= finished school,       W= started to work,          X=moved from parents 
 
Year!!! 19___57____ 19___67____ 19___67____ 19__86_____ 19_______ 19_______ 19_______ 
Month Feb May Sep Oct    
1___Katia_______ B S W X    
2_____________        
3_____________        
4____________        
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Brother/sisters B=born (A= adopted),  X= left home,   M=married,   C1/2/3/…=1/2/3/… child born,   D= divorced 
Year (month) 1937 (Jun) 1947 1947 1948 1952     
1____Olia___ B X X C1 C2     
Year (month)          
2_______          
Year (month)          
3_______          
Year (month)          
4________          
Year (month)          
5_________          
Year (month)          
6__________          
Year (month)          
7__________          
Year (month)          
__________          
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Year 19_39_-
19_41___ 
19__41_-
19___47_ 
19__47_-
19__56__ 
19_56__-
19__66__ 
19__66_-
19__76__ 
19_87__-
19__86__ 
19_86__-
19_96___ 
19_96__-
2006___ 
2006-
2016__ 
19___-
19____ 
H
ou
se
ho
ld
 c
om
po
si
ti
on
 (
co
-
re
si
de
nc
e)
  Mother, 
father, 
parental 
grandparen
ts, older 
sister 
Mother, 
grandmoth
er, older 
sister  
Mother Husband 
In-laws, 
daughter  
Husband 
In-laws, 
daughter 
Husband Husband, 
Daughter, 
Granddaug
hter  
 
Husband 
(99), 
Daughter, 
Granddaught
er  
 
Daughter 
(2008), 
Granddaug
hter  
 
 
 
 
Work of the spouse 
(year of 
birth__1935__) 
« »- time period 
Year 19___50____ 19__55_____ 19_______ 19_______ 19_______ 
Position Factory worker Electrician (factory)    
Full time (« ») x x    
Part-time (« »)      
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Religious views: 
At birth: atheist 
At marriage: atheist 
Present: Orthodox 
 
Nationality (subjective): Russian 
Citizenship: Ukrainian 
Sex: female 
Date of birth: 10.09.1939 
Place of birth: Kharkiv 
 
 
Political views: 
In the past: communist (party) 
Today: communist 
Political activism: 
In the past: party 
Today: no 
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D Codes sample from Atlas.ti
Report: 84 quotation(s) for 26 codes
______________________________________________________________________
HU: analysis_v19.12.15
File:  [\\vmware-host\Shared Folders\Documents\Atlas analysis\analysis_v19.12.15.hpr7]
Edited by:Super
Date/Time: 2016-03-13 03:31:31
______________________________________________________________________
Codes falling under the scope of the research question regarding the timing of first birth:
BC (prior 1): contraception/termination->no
BC (prior 1): yes
BC (prior 1)_AT: was not acceptable
CB (1): planned->yes
CB (1)_AT: before->security (flat and job)
CB (1)_AT: when studying->no children
CB (1)_DECISION: postpone->husband is the away
CB (1)_DECISION: postpone->own accom
CB (1)_DECISION: postpone->time for herself
CB (1)_DECISION: postpone->wife's edu
CB (1)_DECISION: postpone->wife's work
CB (1)_STILLBIRTH_after: to have child soon
CB (1)_WHEN: before 25
CB (1)_WHEN: could not get pregnant after M
CB (1)_WHEN: during edu
CB (1)_WHEN: follows marriage in 1 year
CB (1)_WHEN: follows marriage in 2 years
CB (1)_WHEN: follows marriage in 3 years
CB (1)_WHEN: follows marriage in less than 1 year
MARRIAGE_AT: material independence/edu before marriage
MARRIAGE_CO-RES: at parents'/kin
MARRIAGE_CO-RES: own accom
MARRIAGE_CO-RES: rent accom
PAR.MODEL: confirm other d-in-l->timing
PAR.MODEL: M and CB1 should go together
PREGNANCY_AT: if late (>25), can be hard to deliver
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Name Sex year
of
birth
spouse
year
of
birth
1st
marriage
year
2nd
marriage
1st
birth
2nd
birth
3rd
birth
number
of
children
abortions
mis-
carriages
/died
under
one
social
status
education origin
(r/u)
Natalka (wife of Anrij) f 1945 1937 1965 – 1967 1970 – 2 – –
civil
servant
medical
university
rural
Andrij (husband of Natalka) m 1937 1945 1965 – 1967 1970 – 2 – –
civil
servant
technical
university
urban
Vasyl (husnad of Nadia) m 1934 1938 1966 – 1966 1974 – 2 – –
civil
servant
technical
university
rural
Nadia (wife of Vasyl) f 1938 1934 1966 – 1966 1974 – 2 – –
civil
servant
pedagogical
college
urban
Sofia f 1935 1935 1957 1969 1961 – – 1 – –
civil
servant
college urban
Halyna f 1943 1933 1965 – 1966 1977 – 2 – –
civil
servant
technical
university
urban
Agafya f 1936 1935 1958 1967 1960 – – 1 – –
civil
servant
university urban
Lydia f 1938 1926 1964 – 1965 – – 1 – –
scientific
elite
technical
university
urban
Daryna f 1939 1944 1964 – 1965 1972 – 2
1967,
1969
–
scientific
elite
university rural
Fedir m 1934 1937 1957 – 1958 1964 1970 3
1958,1965,
1968
–
scientific
elite
university rural
Olena f 1925 1918 1949 – 1952 1955 – 2
1951,1954,
1957
–
civil
servant
medical
uni
urban
Petro (husband of Maria) m 1933 1936 1961 – 1962 1963 1968 2 1966 1963
working
class
7 grades rural
Maria (wife of Petro) f 1936 1933 1961 – 1962 1963 1968 2 1966 1963
working
class
college rural
Oksana f 1932 1932 1957 – 1958 1963 – 2
1961,
1966
–
working
class
10 grades rural
Bohdana f 1933 1929 1954 – 1955 1956 1960 2 – 1955
civil
servant
pedagogical
school
rural
Lubov f 1932 1928 1954 – 1955 – – 1 – –
civil
servant
university rural
Khrystyna f 1931 1928 1966 – 1967 1968 – 2 – –
working
class
10 grades rural
Varvara f 1935 1932 1957 – 1958 1963 – 2
1967,
1971
–
working
class
evening
school
rural
Markian m 1929 1932 1952 – 1954 1963 – 2
1955,
1957
–
working
class
school (10
grades)
urban
Zoryana f 1935 1935 1961 – – – – 0 – –
civil
servant
university rural
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Yuliya f 1929 – – – – – – 0 – –
civil
servant
technical
college /
university
rural
Kateryna (wife of Mykola) f 1942 1938 1966 – 1967 1967 – 1 – 1967
working
class
technical
college
urban
Mykola (husbandof Kateryna) m 1938 1942 1966 – 1967 1967 – 1 – 1967
working
class
art college urban
Zoya (wife of Svyatoslav) f 1938 1941 1964 – 1966 1973 – 2
1967,
1968,
1969
–
civil
servant
technical
university
urban
Svyatoslav (husband of Zoya) m 1941 1938 1964 – 1966 1973 – 2 – –
civil
servant
technical
university
urban
Daria f 1932 1919 1950 – 1951 1954 1957 3 – –
working
class
6 grades rural
Martha f 1933 1928 1954 – 1957 1965 – 2 – –
working
class
10 grades rural
Lidia f 1929 1930 1958 – 1960 – – 1 – –
civil
servant
medical
university
rural
Anna f 1930 1927 1952 – 1955 1960 – 2
1956,1957,
1961,
1963,1964
1953
working
class
college rural
Hruhoruy m 1931 1930 1953 – 1955 1956 1959 3 – –
civil
servant
technical
university
rural
Nina f 1930 1928 1952 – 1953 1962 – 2 1965 –
working
class
10 grades urban
Oleh (husband of Vasylyna) m 1929 1928 1954 – 1957 1962 – 2 – –
civil
servant
university rural
Vasylyna(wife of Volodumur) f 1928 1929 1954 – 1957 1962 – 2 – –
civil
servant
university rural
Table 2: Lviv informants
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Name Sex year
of
birth
spouse
year
of
birth
1st
marriage
year
2nd
marriage
1st
birth
2nd
birth
3rd
birth
number
of
children
abortions
mis-
carriages
/died
under
one
social
status
education origin
(r/u)
Naida f 1936 1936 1959 – 1960 1966 – 2
1961,
1962,
1964,
1970
–
working
class
school rural
Natalija f 1933 1928 1960 – 1961 1965 – 2 – –
civil
servant
technical
university
urban
Zoya f 1931 1931 1954 – 1955 1961 – 2
1955,
1963
–
civil
servant
university rural
Svetlana f 1941 1939 1965 – 1967 – – 1 – 1966
civil
servant
technical
university
urban
Maria f 1929 1928 1952 – 1955 1962 – 2 – 1952
working
class
school rural
Zinaida f 1939
1939,
1943
1961
1970,
2001
1963 – – 1 1975 –
working
class
technical
college
urban
Aglaia f 1931
1914,
1927
1951 1974 1952 1954 – 2 around 18 –
working
class
school rural
Viktoija f 1931 1924 1949 – 1950 1956 1962 3 around 15 –
civil
servant
pedagogical
university
urban
Toma f 1931 1931 1965 – 1966 – – 1 – –
scientific
elite
university urban
Larisa f 1939 1937 1966 – 1967 – –
2
(twins)
– –
scientific
elite
university urban
Viktor m 1938 1939 1960 – 1965 1970 – 2 1969 1960
scientific
elite
university urban
Larisa (wife of Tolik) f 1948 1938 1969 – 1969 1970 – 1 around 15 1969
working
class
school urban
Tolik (husband of Larisa) m 1938 1948 1969 – 1969 1970 – 1 around 15 1969
working
class
school rural
Evgenija f 1930 1933 1956 – 1957 1959 – 2 1961 –
civil
servant
university urban
Maksim m 1935 1935 1958 – 1959 1962 – 2 –
civil
servant
university urban
Lida f 1932 – – – – – – 0 – –
civil
servant
technical
university
urban
Maria f 1938 1929 1961 – 1962 – – 1
1967,
1972
–
working
class
technical
college
urban
Rita f 1926 1924 1945 – 1948 1959 – 2 –
civil
servant
medical
university
urban
Raisa (wife of Vasilij) f 1934 1939 1959 – 1961 – – 1
1964,
1967
–
working
class
college rural
Vasilij (husband of Raja) m 1939 1934 1959 – 1961 – – 1
1964,
1967
–
working
class
technical
college
urban
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Varvara (wife of Vladimir) f 1938 1937 1963 – 1964 1979 – 2
1959,
1961
–
civil
servant
technical
university
urban
Vladimir (husband of Varvara) m 1937 1938 1963 – 1964 1979 – 2
1959,
1961
–
scientific
elite
technical
university
urban
Yeva (wife of Ivan) f 1935 1933 1958 – 1961 – – 1 –
civil
servant
technical
university
urban
Ivan (husband of Yeva) m 1933 1935 1958 – 1961 – – 1 –
scientific
elite
technical
university
urban
Anya f 1930 1930 1957 – 1959 1963 1964 3 1967 –
working
class
school rural
Galina f 1934 1933 1956 – 1957 1969 – 2 around 4 –
working
class
technical
college
rural
Vera f 1934 1930 1960 – 1962 – – 1 – –
scientific
elite
technical
university
urban
Maksim m 1935
1936,
1947
1965 1973 1976 – – 1 around 5 –
civil
servant
technical
university
urban
Yelena f 1938 1938 – – – – – 0 – –
civil
servant
technical
university
urban
Stalina f 1941 1941 1961 – 1962 1973 – 2 – –
working
class
technical
university
rural
Masha f 1941 1941 1962 – 1962 1971 – 2 1967 –
working
class
technical
college
rural
Adelaida f 1939 1937 1962 – 1965 1970 – 2 – –
civil
servant
technical
university
urban
Andrei m 1934 1938 1963 – 1965 – – 1 – –
scientific
elite
technical
university
urban
Table 3: Kharkiv informants
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Summary
This dissertation focuses on the role of family and social relationships in individu-
als’ reproductive careers during the fertility decline in Soviet Ukraine from around
1950 to 1975. These three decades after the Second World War signified the end
of the First Demographic Transition in Ukraine and other European republics of
the Soviet Union, and some even define the period after the 1960s as the start of
a latent depopulation in this part of Europe. However, this fertility decline that
had already begun to manifest itself in the early 1920s gained speed within only a
few generations as those who were born in families of six siblings in the 1920s and
1930s had only two children themselves in the 1950s, the 1960s and the 1970s.
Previous research has discussed these demographic changes on a macro-level
for the Soviet and post-Soviet periods by typically linking these changes to the
processes of modernisation and transformation. However, this singular focus on
structural changes ignores the fact that relationships between people also adjust
to politico-economic changes according to the social and family values that al-
ready exist in society. As a result, old and new social (in)equalities, both outside
and within the household, (re-) emerge alongside the politico-economic moderni-
sation, which, in tandem, contribute to the formation of di↵erent demographic
realities on a micro-level and di↵erent fertility trends on a macro-level. In this
respect, social relationships should be seen as playing an intermediary role in
the interplay between the formation of interpersonal inequalities and the politico-
economic reality. Because they surround our everyday lives and choices, social
relationships form a coherent social structure that helps us to interpret, to under-
stand and to adjust to everyday reality, including state legal regulations, political
ideology, and economic crises. The primary aim of this dissertation is to study
the e↵ects of family relationships and their continuities on changes in reproduc-
tive behaviour through a comparative regional perspective in Ukraine during the
post-war fertility decline.
The role of social relationships in reproductive behaviour is particularly impor-
tant in the specific context of Ukraine as well as in the broader context of Eastern
Europe, where family relationships have provided welfare in critical situations,
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such as childbearing, childcare and elderly care, both in the past and today. Sim-
ilar to Southern Europe, the prevalence of strong family ties in Eastern Europe
is also often connected to the high fertility rates in the pre-transitional context
and to the rapid fertility decline to the lowest-low level in the 1990s and 2000s.
The lowest-low fertility phenomenon is often referred to as a paradox of strong
family and low fertility. Moreover, in the context of Ukraine, where regional dif-
ferences remain pronounced in many aspects of social life, regional variations in
fertility could also be linked to local family values. Considering this, the main
research questions that I address in this dissertation are the following: (1) How
did family and social relationships influence individual reproductive careers in
Soviet Ukraine from around the 1950s to the 1970s? (2) How can local family
systems and their associated power dynamics and social interdependencies help
to understand fertility decline in Soviet Ukraine? Focusing on these post-war
decades is also relevant for our understanding of historical and contemporary fer-
tility decline in this part of Europe because these three decades were significant
for the beginning of the Cold War, general liberalisation of the regime and the
introduction of some family policies that are still enacted today.
On the theoretical level, I frame the empirical analysis of family and social
influences on individual reproductive careers in a broader framework of local con-
tinuities in family relationships and values, the so-called family systems. In this
respect, individual reproductive careers are studied as processual characteristics
of reproductive behaviour and long life experiences and include such life events as
marriage, entrance into parenthood, abortion and birth control, and transition to
second birth. By social influences I understand the ‘process by which attitudes,
values or behaviour of an individual are determined by the attitudes, values or
behaviour of others with whom he or she interacts’ (Bernardi, 2003, p. 535). I
examine di↵erent patterns of social relationships, such as those between spouses,
generations, siblings and peers. Based on the social influences stemming from
family and social relationships, I try to characterise di↵erent power relationships
and other social interdependencies underlying these relationships, which I then
connect to the context of local family systems.
On the methodological level, this study is based on the analysis of various qual-
itative methods, such as in-depth biographical interviews, life history calendars
(LHC) and family photographs. The interviews were collected in two Ukrainian
borderland cities: Lviv in western Ukraine and Kharkiv in eastern Ukraine. These
sites allowed me to compare how family relationships were historically organised
in Ukraine and how they actually shaped the informants’ reproductive decisions.
This study also uses archival demographic data and secondary ethnographic ma-
terials as supplementary sources.
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The empirical findings of this dissertation discuss di↵erent transitions of in-
dividual reproductive careers, namely marriage, entrance into parenthood, birth
control and abortion, and transitions to second and later births, all of which
I discuss in the context of family and peer relationships. In Soviet Ukraine, the
transition to marriage was characterised by strong parental control over men’s and
women’s pre-marital practices and sometimes also marital decisions. This strong
parental control before marriage was not without consequences, as it seems to
have created an imaginary dependency of children on their parents not only be-
fore but also after marriage, which I associate with the persistence of paternalistic
intergenerational values in family relationships in the two localities.
Similarly, the entrance into parenthood was also surrounded by frequent parental
assistance, particularly when a couple tried to postpone their entrance into par-
enthood. This pattern was also reinforced by the social learning from peers among
the Kharkiv informants and social contagion from siblings(in-law) among the Lviv
informants. That said, the actual decision to give birth was connected to the ex-
pectations of help with childcare in the future. In this respect, I observed that if
after the marriage a couple resided separately from their parents, they would also
take greater responsibility for childcare, and grandparental support became an
additional and temporary option, as it often was in Lviv. However, when spouses
resided with either set of parents, they also tended to rely more on the parents in
terms of childcare, which I more often observed in Kharkiv and less in Lviv.
These di↵erences in dynamics of spousal and intergenerational relationships
between the two localities became even more pronounced around abortion and
birth control decisions and their practices after first birth. Spousal cooperation in
birth control decision-making played an important role in how women exercised
their agency in these decisions and which birth control methods the couple used
and how e↵ectively they used them. In couples where spouses communicated
about birth control and abortion decisions, the women had fewer abortions, as
was often the case in Lviv. These women did not feel the need to exercise their
agency, as the husbands took over the responsibility of both birth control and
abortion. When abortion was practiced as a routine method to limit family size,
spouses did not communicate about birth control and abortion, as was the case
in Kharkiv. In this situation, birth control was the husband’s responsibility and
abortion was the wife’s. These women sought abortions to fulfil their own goals
and, at the same time, to maintain the dominant patriarchal order in marital
relationships as they understood it.
These di↵erences in spousal cooperation with regard to birth control seem to
have had direct implications for the transition to second and later births in the two
localities. In Lviv, spouses continued to negotiate the timing of second and third
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births and the childcare arrangements, while still mainly relying on each other
in these matters. In doing so, the Lviv informants often adopted a traditional
male-breadwinning model, which allowed spouses to share the costs of childcare:
husbands were responsible for material costs and wives for the emotional and
instrumental costs. However, some women resumed working part-time or worked
on jobs with more flexible working schedules after their child’s birth, and then
spouses divided the material and instrumental costs of childcare more equally
and without a traditional gender bias. In either case, the accumulated costs of
childcare were often shared between spouses. This strategy often allowed couples
to combine childcare after their first and second/third child, which seems to have
been reinforcing for many couples in Lviv to adopt a shorter birth spacing strategy.
In Kharkiv, in contrast, the timing of second and later births and childcare
were mainly the women’s responsibility. Some continued to rely on grandparental
support even after starting to reside separately. However, this support was not
always available due to di↵erent factors such as the few possibilities for multi-
generational co-residence or parental health issues. When women received little
intergenerational and spousal support, they tended to delay transition to second
birth until they felt more secure. Additionally, women in Kharkiv seem to have
learned from each other’s experiences about the benefits of this strategy. As such,
the adoption of the waiting strategy seems to have resulted in a more prolonged
interval between first and second births, sometimes ten to fifteen years, which in
other studies is defined as postponement as opposed to spacing. However, those
women who did not meet the deadline for parenthood because they were still
feeling too insecure to proceed with another birth never had a second child.
Overall, my findings illustrate that the ways in which family relationships
were organised over the life course formulated di↵erent responses in the two local-
ities to the emerging socio-economic conditions. Subsequently, these di↵erences
in responses were reflected in regional reproductive strategies. I suggest that
these di↵erences in responses have to do with the intrafamilial dependencies in
the two localities: more couple-oriented (horizontal intrafamilial interdependen-
cies) in Lviv and generations-oriented (vertical intrafamilial interdependencies)
in Kharkiv. I also observe continuity in these two social interdependencies with
the historical family systems and the intrafamilial (in)equalities produced within
them in the past, namely a mix of nuclear-stem family system in Lviv and a joint
family system in Kharkiv. In the early life, strong intergenerational connections
characterising both family systems seem to have promoted early and universal
entrance into marriage and parenthood in the past and during the Soviet time.
Additionally, the Soviet family policy adopted many of these paternalistic and
pronatalist values on the level of legal regulations, which meant that this re-
productive ideology was reinforced within and outside the family. In later life,
however, the intrafamily interdependencies start to di↵er in the two contexts, and
this aspect is crucial to understand regional patterns in fertility decline. During
the Soviet time, even though socio-economic constraints created more or less sim-
ilar structural uncertainties in the both localities, these structural factors did not
equally challenge intrafamilial interdependencies between spouse and generations.
Subsequently, these local intrafamilial interdependencies resulted in di↵erent re-
productive strategies on the micro-level and in their reflection on the macro-level
fertility trends.
Altogether, these findings provide a fruitful ground for formulating future hy-
potheses to be tested on larger and representative population samples. They also
formulate important clues for policy makers by suggesting that a more relativist
perspective that incorporates intrafamilial social inequalities and communication
strategies is needed to regulate the issues of fertility decline and subsequently the
process of population ageing, the latter of which may soon become a vital issue
in this part of the world as well.
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